Rebase CoreOS patches onto Linux v4.7 #19

crawford · 2016-07-26T18:37:39Z

There were rebase conflicts with the following:

56c7486 /cc @mjg59
23b33d6 /cc @mjg59
7c61363 /cc @vcaputo

Please double check these for correctness.

Provide a single call to allow kernel code to determine whether the system has been configured to either disable module loading entirely or to load only modules signed with a trusted key. Bugzilla: N/A Upstream-status: Fedora mustard. Replaced by securelevels, but that was nak'd Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if any such restrictions have been enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given machine, and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if any of these features are enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

Allowing users to write to address space makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions. Prevent this when any restrictions have been imposed on loading modules. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

…cted This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which makes it possible for a user to circumvent any restrictions imposed on loading modules. Disable it in that case. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

…ictions kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec in this situation. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if module loading is restricted, since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a patch by Kees Cook. Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

…Boot mode UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option that enforces this automatically when enabled. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it in a secure modules environment. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

Provide two new security hooks for use with security files that are used when a file is copied up between layers: (1) security_inode_copy_up(). This is called so that the security label on the destination file can be set appropriately. (2) security_inode_copy_up_xattr(). This is called so that each xattr being copied up can be vetted - including modification and discard. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

Use the copy-up security hooks previously provided to allow an LSM to adjust the security on a newly created copy and to filter the xattrs copied to that file copy. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

Handle the opening of a unioned file by trying to derive the label that would be attached to the union-layer inode if it doesn't exist. If the union-layer inode does exist (as it necessarily does in overlayfs, but not in unionmount), we assume that it has the right label and use that. Otherwise we try to get it from the superblock. If the superblock has a globally-applied label, we use that, otherwise we try to transition to an appropriate label. This union label is then stored in the file_security_struct. We then perform an additional check to make sure that the calling task is granted permission by the union-layer inode label to open the file in addition to a check to make sure that the task is granted permission to open the lower file with the lower inode label. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

File operations (eg. read, write) issued against a file that is attached to the lower layer of a union file needs to be checked against the union-layer label not the lower layer label. The union label is stored in the file_security_struct rather than being retrieved from one of the inodes. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

This enables relocating source and build trees to different roots, provided they stay reachable relative to one another. Useful for builds done within a sandbox where the eventual root is prefixed by some undesirable path component.

If a user opens a file r/w on overlayfs, and if the underlying inode is currently still on the lower fs, right now we're verifying whether selinux policy permits writes to the selinux context on the underlying inode. This is suboptimal, since we don't want confined processes to be able to write to these files if they're able to escape from a container and so don't want to permit this in policy. Have overlayfs pass down an additional flag when verifying the permission on lower inodes, and mask off the write bits in the selinux permissions check if that flag is set.

vcaputo · 2016-07-26T19:11:32Z

7c61363 looks fine, I presume the build process still works?

crawford · 2016-07-26T20:06:25Z

Haven't tried booting it yet, but it compiles for AMD64.

>>> Emerging (1 of 3) sys-kernel/coreos-modules-4.7.0::coreos for /build/amd64-usr/
>>> Installing (1 of 3) sys-kernel/coreos-modules-4.7.0::coreos to /build/amd64-usr/
>>> Emerging (2 of 3) sys-kernel/coreos-firmware-20160331-r1::coreos for /build/amd64-usr/
>>> Installing (2 of 3) sys-kernel/coreos-firmware-20160331-r1::coreos to /build/amd64-usr/
>>> Emerging (3 of 3) sys-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.7.0::coreos for /build/amd64-usr/
>>> Installing (3 of 3) sys-kernel/coreos-kernel-4.7.0::coreos to /build/amd64-usr/

mjg59 · 2016-07-26T20:34:38Z

LGTM

[ Upstream commit d3e6952 ] I ran into this: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [coreos#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ coreos#19 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82bbf066>] [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710 RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358 RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048 RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: 0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220 ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232 ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82bca542>] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190 [<ffffffff825ae582>] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0 [<ffffffff825b4489>] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410 [<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74 RIP [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710 RSP <ffff880111747bb8> ---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]--- The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL, and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit b6bc1c7 upstream. Function ib_create_qp() was failing to return an error when rdma_rw_init_mrs() fails, causing a crash further down in ib_create_qp() when trying to dereferece the qp pointer which was actually a negative errno. The crash: crash> log|grep BUG [ 136.458121] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000098 crash> bt PID: 3736 TASK: ffff8808543215c0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "kworker/u64:2" #0 [ffff88084d323340] machine_kexec at ffffffff8105fbb0 #1 [ffff88084d3233b0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81116758 #2 [ffff88084d323480] crash_kexec at ffffffff8111682d #3 [ffff88084d3234b0] oops_end at ffffffff81032bd6 #4 [ffff88084d3234e0] no_context at ffffffff8106e431 #5 [ffff88084d323530] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e610 #6 [ffff88084d323590] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8106e6f4 #7 [ffff88084d3235a0] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8106ebdc #8 [ffff88084d323620] do_page_fault at ffffffff8106f057 #9 [ffff88084d323660] page_fault at ffffffff816e3148 [exception RIP: ib_create_qp+427] RIP: ffffffffa02554fb RSP: ffff88084d323718 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000004 RBX: fffffffffffffff4 RCX: 000000018020001f RDX: ffff880830997fc0 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88085f407200 RBP: ffff88084d323778 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffffea0020bae210 R10: ffffea0020bae218 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88084d3237c8 R13: 00000000fffffff4 R14: ffff880859fa5000 R15: ffff88082eb89800 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #10 [ffff88084d323780] rdma_create_qp at ffffffffa0782681 [rdma_cm] #11 [ffff88084d3237b0] nvmet_rdma_create_queue_ib at ffffffffa07c43f3 [nvmet_rdma] #12 [ffff88084d323860] nvmet_rdma_alloc_queue at ffffffffa07c5ba9 [nvmet_rdma] #13 [ffff88084d323900] nvmet_rdma_queue_connect at ffffffffa07c5c96 [nvmet_rdma] #14 [ffff88084d323980] nvmet_rdma_cm_handler at ffffffffa07c6450 [nvmet_rdma] #15 [ffff88084d3239b0] iw_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0787480 [rdma_cm] #16 [ffff88084d323a60] cm_conn_req_handler at ffffffffa0775f06 [iw_cm] #17 [ffff88084d323ab0] process_event at ffffffffa0776019 [iw_cm] #18 [ffff88084d323af0] cm_work_handler at ffffffffa0776170 [iw_cm] #19 [ffff88084d323cb0] process_one_work at ffffffff810a1483 #20 [ffff88084d323d90] worker_thread at ffffffff810a211d #21 [ffff88084d323ec0] kthread at ffffffff810a6c5c #22 [ffff88084d323f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff816e1ebf Fixes: 632bc3f ("IB/core, RDMA RW API: Do not exceed QP SGE send limit") Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 4dfce57 upstream. There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes, when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents on the temporary inode, something like: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 PID: 29439 TASK: ffff880550584fa0 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "xfs_fsr" [exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10] #9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs] #10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs] #11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs] #12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs] #13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs] #14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67 #15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5 #16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8 #17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c #18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b #19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e #20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27 #21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c #22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros when we tear down the extents during truncate. When the in-core inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes instead. This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun. Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number of extents, not di_nextents. Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the root cause. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit faab509 upstream. Andrey Konovalov reports that fuzz testing with syzkaller causes a KASAN warning in gadgetfs: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dev_config+0x86f/0x1190 at addr ffff88003c47e160 Write of size 65537 by task syz-executor0/6356 CPU: 3 PID: 6356 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.9.0-rc7+ #19 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 ffff88003c107ad8 ffffffff81f96aba ffffffff3dc11ef0 1ffff10007820eee ffffed0007820ee6 ffff88003dc11f00 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff8598b4c8 ffffffff81f96828 ffffffff813fb4a0 ffff88003b6eadc0 ffff88003c107738 Call Trace: [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffff81f96aba>] dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51 [<ffffffff817e4dec>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:159 [< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:197 [<ffffffff817e5080>] kasan_report_error+0x1f0/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:286 [<ffffffff817e5705>] kasan_report+0x35/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:306 [< inline >] check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:308 [<ffffffff817e3fb9>] check_memory_region+0x139/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:315 [<ffffffff817e4044>] kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:326 [< inline >] copy_from_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:689 [< inline >] ep0_write drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:1135 [<ffffffff83228caf>] dev_config+0x86f/0x1190 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:1759 [<ffffffff817fdd55>] __vfs_write+0x5d5/0x760 fs/read_write.c:510 [<ffffffff817ff650>] vfs_write+0x170/0x4e0 fs/read_write.c:560 [< inline >] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:607 [<ffffffff81803a5b>] SyS_write+0xfb/0x230 fs/read_write.c:599 [<ffffffff84f47ec1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Indeed, there is a comment saying that the value of len is restricted to a 16-bit integer, but the code doesn't actually do this. This patch fixes the warning. It replaces the comment with a computation that forces the amount of data copied from the user in ep0_write() to be no larger than the wLength size for the control transfer, which is a 16-bit quantity. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 45caeaa ] As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6. v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well. We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is: #8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648 [exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74] . . #9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64 #10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a #11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02 #12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4 #13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9 #14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d #15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06 #16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2 #17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608 #18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690 #19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3] #20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3] #21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2 #22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f #23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c #24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5 #25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5 #26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8 Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well. It's found the freed dst_entry here: 224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩ 225 {↩ 226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩ 227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩ 228 ↩ 229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩ 230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩ 231 }↩ But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in netfilter code as well. All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues: - Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable. - All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g: LockDroppedIcmps 267 A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be decremented twice for the same socket via: do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release(). Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash. To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket locked. The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too. As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and triggers the dst_release(). Fixes: ceb3320 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.") Cc: Eric Garver <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Sowa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 1ec1688 upstream. Otherwise lockdep says: [ 1337.483798] ================================================ [ 1337.483999] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ] [ 1337.484252] 4.11.0-rc6 #19 Not tainted [ 1337.484423] ------------------------------------------------ [ 1337.484626] mount/14766 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! [ 1337.484841] 1 lock held by mount/14766: [ 1337.485017] #0: (&type->s_umount_key#33/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8124171f>] sget_userns+0x2af/0x520 Caught by xfstests generic/413 which tried to mount with the unsupported mount option dax. Then xfstests generic/422 ran sync which deadlocks. Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mike Marshall <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit bbf29ff upstream. Reinette reported the following crash: BUG: Bad page state in process log2exe pfn:57600 page:ffffea00015d8000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x20200 flags: 0x4000000000040019(locked|uptodate|dirty|swapbacked) raw: 4000000000040019 0000000000000000 0000000000020200 00000000ffffffff raw: ffffea00015d8020 ffffea00015d8020 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set bad because of flags: 0x1(locked) Modules linked in: rfcomm 8021q bnep intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp efivars btusb btrtl btbcm pwm_lpss_pci snd_hda_codec_hdmi btintel pwm_lpss snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_soc_skl snd_hda_codec_generic snd_soc_skl_ipc spi_pxa2xx_platform snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_sst_match snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec mei_me snd_hda_core mei snd_soc_rt286 snd_soc_rl6347a snd_soc_core efivarfs CPU: 1 PID: 354 Comm: log2exe Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7-test-test #19 Hardware name: Intel corporation NUC6CAYS/NUC6CAYB, BIOS AYAPLCEL.86A.0027.2016.1108.1529 11/08/2016 Call Trace: bad_page+0x16a/0x1f0 free_pages_check_bad+0x117/0x190 free_hot_cold_page+0x7b1/0xad0 __put_page+0x70/0xa0 madvise_free_huge_pmd+0x627/0x7b0 madvise_free_pte_range+0x6f8/0x1150 __walk_page_range+0x6b5/0xe30 walk_page_range+0x13b/0x310 madvise_free_page_range.isra.16+0xad/0xd0 madvise_free_single_vma+0x2e4/0x470 SyS_madvise+0x8ce/0x1450 If somebody frees the page under us and we hold the last reference to it, put_page() would attempt to free the page before unlocking it. The fix is trivial reorder of operations. Dave said: "I came up with the exact same patch. For posterity, here's the test case, generated by syzkaller and trimmed down by Reinette: https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/log2.c And the config that helps detect this: https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/config-log2" Fixes: b8d3c4c ("mm/huge_memory.c: don't split THP page when MADV_FREE syscall is called") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Reported-by: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Minchan Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Huang Ying <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

This patch fixes system hang/crash while firmware dump is attempted with Block MQ enabled in qla2xxx driver. Fix is to remove check in fw dump template entries for existing request and response queues so that full buffer size is calculated during template size calculation. Following stack trace is seen during firmware dump capture process [ 694.390588] qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-5003:11: ISP System Error - mbx1=4b1fh mbx2=10h mbx3=2ah mbx7=0h. [ 694.402336] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90008c7b000 [ 694.402372] IP: memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 694.402386] PGD 105f01a067 [ 694.402386] PUD 85f89c067 [ 694.402398] PMD 10490cb067 [ 694.402409] PTE 0 [ 694.402421] [ 694.402437] Oops: 0002 [coreos#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 694.402452] Modules linked in: netconsole configfs qla2xxx scsi_transport_fc nvme_fc nvme_fabrics bnep bluetooth rfkill xt_tcpudp unix_diag xt_multiport ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs xfs libcrc32c ipmi_ssif sb_edac edac_core x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass igb crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel iTCO_wdt aes_x86_64 crypto_simd ptp iTCO_vendor_support glue_helper cryptd lpc_ich joydev i2c_i801 pcspkr ioatdma mei_me pps_core tpm_tis mei mfd_core acpi_power_meter tpm_tis_core ipmi_si ipmi_devintf tpm ipmi_msghandler shpchp wmi dca button acpi_pad btrfs xor uas usb_storage hid_generic usbhid raid6_pq crc32c_intel ast i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect [ 694.402692] sysimgblt fb_sys_fops xhci_pci ttm ehci_pci sr_mod xhci_hcd cdrom ehci_hcd drm usbcore sg [ 694.402730] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-1-default+ coreos#19 [ 694.402753] Hardware name: Supermicro X10DRi/X10DRi, BIOS 1.1a 10/16/2015 [ 694.402776] task: ffffffff81c0e4c0 task.stack: ffffffff81c00000 [ 694.402798] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 694.402813] RSP: 0018:ffff88085fc03cd0 EFLAGS: 00210006 [ 694.402832] RAX: ffffc90008c7ae0c RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 000000000001fe0c [ 694.402856] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: ffff8810332c01f4 RDI: ffffc90008c7b000 [ 694.402879] RBP: ffff88085fc03d18 R08: 0000000000020000 R09: 0000000000279e0a [ 694.402903] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffff88085fc03d80 [ 694.402927] R13: ffffc90008a01000 R14: ffffc90008a056d4 R15: ffff881052ef17e0 [ 694.402951] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88085fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 694.402977] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 694.403012] CR2: ffffc90008c7b000 CR3: 0000000001c09000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 [ 694.403036] Call Trace: [ 694.403047] <IRQ> [ 694.403072] ? qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t263+0x18e/0x380 [qla2xxx] [ 694.403099] qla27xx_walk_template+0x9d/0x1a0 [qla2xxx] [ 694.403124] qla27xx_fwdump+0x1f3/0x272 [qla2xxx] [ 694.403149] qla2x00_async_event+0xb08/0x1a50 [qla2xxx] [ 694.403169] ? enqueue_task_fair+0xa2/0x9d0 Signed-off-by: Mike Hernandez <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Joe Carnuccio <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

commit a04f001 upstream. A spinlock is held while updating the internal copy of the IRQ mask, but not while writing it to the actual IMASK register. After the lock is released, an IRQ can occur before the IMASK register is written. If handling this IRQ causes the mask to be changed, when the handler returns back to the middle of the first mask update, a stale value will be written to the mask register. If this causes an IRQ to become unmasked that cannot have its status cleared by writing a 1 to it in the IREG register, e.g. the SDIO IRQ, then we can end up stuck with the same IRQ repeatedly being fired but not handled. Normally the MMC IRQ handler attempts to clear any unexpected IRQs by writing IREG, but for those that cannot be cleared in this way then the IRQ will just repeatedly fire. This was resulting in lockups after a while of using Wi-Fi on the CI20 (GitHub issue #19). Resolve by holding the spinlock until after the IMASK register has been updated. Cc: [email protected] Link: MIPS#19 Fixes: 61bfbdb ("MMC: Add support for the controller on JZ4740 SoCs.") Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Smith <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af50e4b ] syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment(). Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of reasonable length. BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189: #0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517 #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline] #47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 __lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449 lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920 rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792 __skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168 sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312 qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline] __qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit a5ba1d9 upstream. We have reports of the following crash: PID: 7 TASK: ffff88085c6d61c0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u25:0" #0 [ffff88085c6db710] machine_kexec at ffffffff81046239 #1 [ffff88085c6db760] crash_kexec at ffffffff810fc248 #2 [ffff88085c6db830] oops_end at ffffffff81008ae7 #3 [ffff88085c6db860] no_context at ffffffff81050b8f #4 [ffff88085c6db8b0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050d75 #5 [ffff88085c6db900] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81050e83 #6 [ffff88085c6db910] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8105132e #7 [ffff88085c6db9b0] do_page_fault at ffffffff8105152c #8 [ffff88085c6db9c0] page_fault at ffffffff81a3f122 [exception RIP: uart_put_char+149] RIP: ffffffff814b67b5 RSP: ffff88085c6dba78 RFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000000292 RBX: ffffffff827c5120 RCX: 0000000000000081 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000005f RDI: ffffffff827c5120 RBP: ffff88085c6dba98 R8: 000000000000012c R9: ffffffff822ea320 R10: ffff88085fe4db04 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff881059f9c000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000000000000005f R15: 0000000000000fba ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #9 [ffff88085c6dbaa0] tty_put_char at ffffffff81497544 #10 [ffff88085c6dbac0] do_output_char at ffffffff8149c91c #11 [ffff88085c6dbae0] __process_echoes at ffffffff8149cb8b #12 [ffff88085c6dbb30] commit_echoes at ffffffff8149cdc2 #13 [ffff88085c6dbb60] n_tty_receive_buf_fast at ffffffff8149e49b #14 [ffff88085c6dbbc0] __receive_buf at ffffffff8149ef5a #15 [ffff88085c6dbc20] n_tty_receive_buf_common at ffffffff8149f016 #16 [ffff88085c6dbca0] n_tty_receive_buf2 at ffffffff8149f194 #17 [ffff88085c6dbcb0] flush_to_ldisc at ffffffff814a238a #18 [ffff88085c6dbd50] process_one_work at ffffffff81090be2 #19 [ffff88085c6dbe20] worker_thread at ffffffff81091b4d #20 [ffff88085c6dbeb0] kthread at ffffffff81096384 #21 [ffff88085c6dbf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff81a3d69f after slogging through some dissasembly: ffffffff814b6720 <uart_put_char>: ffffffff814b6720: 55 push %rbp ffffffff814b6721: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff814b6724: 48 83 ec 20 sub $0x20,%rsp ffffffff814b6728: 48 89 1c 24 mov %rbx,(%rsp) ffffffff814b672c: 4c 89 64 24 08 mov %r12,0x8(%rsp) ffffffff814b6731: 4c 89 6c 24 10 mov %r13,0x10(%rsp) ffffffff814b6736: 4c 89 74 24 18 mov %r14,0x18(%rsp) ffffffff814b673b: e8 b0 8e 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3f5f0 <mcount> ffffffff814b6740: 4c 8b a7 88 02 00 00 mov 0x288(%rdi),%r12 ffffffff814b6747: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d ffffffff814b674a: 41 89 f6 mov %esi,%r14d ffffffff814b674d: 49 83 bc 24 70 01 00 cmpq $0x0,0x170(%r12) ffffffff814b6754: 00 00 ffffffff814b6756: 49 8b 9c 24 80 01 00 mov 0x180(%r12),%rbx ffffffff814b675d: 00 ffffffff814b675e: 74 2f je ffffffff814b678f <uart_put_char+0x6f> ffffffff814b6760: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b6763: e8 a8 67 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cf10 <_raw_spin_lock_irqsave> ffffffff814b6768: 41 8b 8c 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%ecx ffffffff814b676f: 00 ffffffff814b6770: 89 ca mov %ecx,%edx ffffffff814b6772: f7 d2 not %edx ffffffff814b6774: 41 03 94 24 7c 01 00 add 0x17c(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b677b: 00 ffffffff814b677c: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b6782: 75 23 jne ffffffff814b67a7 <uart_put_char+0x87> ffffffff814b6784: 48 89 c6 mov %rax,%rsi ffffffff814b6787: 48 89 df mov %rbx,%rdi ffffffff814b678a: e8 e1 64 58 00 callq ffffffff81a3cc70 <_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore> ffffffff814b678f: 44 89 e8 mov %r13d,%eax ffffffff814b6792: 48 8b 1c 24 mov (%rsp),%rbx ffffffff814b6796: 4c 8b 64 24 08 mov 0x8(%rsp),%r12 ffffffff814b679b: 4c 8b 6c 24 10 mov 0x10(%rsp),%r13 ffffffff814b67a0: 4c 8b 74 24 18 mov 0x18(%rsp),%r14 ffffffff814b67a5: c9 leaveq ffffffff814b67a6: c3 retq ffffffff814b67a7: 49 8b 94 24 70 01 00 mov 0x170(%r12),%rdx ffffffff814b67ae: 00 ffffffff814b67af: 48 63 c9 movslq %ecx,%rcx ffffffff814b67b2: 41 b5 01 mov $0x1,%r13b ffffffff814b67b5: 44 88 34 0a mov %r14b,(%rdx,%rcx,1) ffffffff814b67b9: 41 8b 94 24 78 01 00 mov 0x178(%r12),%edx ffffffff814b67c0: 00 ffffffff814b67c1: 83 c2 01 add $0x1,%edx ffffffff814b67c4: 81 e2 ff 0f 00 00 and $0xfff,%edx ffffffff814b67ca: 41 89 94 24 78 01 00 mov %edx,0x178(%r12) ffffffff814b67d1: 00 ffffffff814b67d2: eb b0 jmp ffffffff814b6784 <uart_put_char+0x64> ffffffff814b67d4: 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 data32 data32 nopw %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1) ffffffff814b67db: 00 00 00 00 00 for our build, this is crashing at: circ->buf[circ->head] = c; Looking in uart_port_startup(), it seems that circ->buf (state->xmit.buf) protected by the "per-port mutex", which based on uart_port_check() is state->port.mutex. Indeed, the lock acquired in uart_put_char() is uport->lock, i.e. not the same lock. Anyway, since the lock is not acquired, if uart_shutdown() is called, the last chunk of that function may release state->xmit.buf before its assigned to null, and cause the race above. To fix it, let's lock uport->lock when allocating/deallocating state->xmit.buf in addition to the per-port mutex. v2: switch to locking uport->lock on allocation/deallocation instead of locking the per-port mutex in uart_put_char. Note that since uport->lock is a spin lock, we have to switch the allocation to GFP_ATOMIC. v3: move the allocation outside the lock, so we can switch back to GFP_KERNEL Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit b72c51a upstream. I ended up tracking down some rather nasty issues with f2fs (and other filesystem modules) constantly crashing on my kernel down to a combination of out of bounds memory accesses, one of which was coming from brcmfmac during module load: [ 30.891382] brcmfmac: brcmf_fw_alloc_request: using brcm/brcmfmac4356-sdio for chip BCM4356/2 [ 30.894437] ================================================================== [ 30.901581] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request+0x42c/0x480 [brcmfmac] [ 30.909935] Read of size 1 at addr ffff2000024865df by task kworker/6:2/387 [ 30.916805] [ 30.918261] CPU: 6 PID: 387 Comm: kworker/6:2 Tainted: G O 4.20.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #19 [ 30.927251] Hardware name: amlogic khadas-vim2/khadas-vim2, BIOS 2018.07-rc2-armbian 09/11/2018 [ 30.935964] Workqueue: events brcmf_driver_register [brcmfmac] [ 30.941641] Call trace: [ 30.944058] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3e8 [ 30.947676] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [ 30.950968] dump_stack+0x130/0x1c4 [ 30.954406] print_address_description+0x60/0x25c [ 30.959066] kasan_report+0x1b4/0x368 [ 30.962683] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x18/0x20 [ 30.967547] brcmf_fw_alloc_request+0x42c/0x480 [brcmfmac] [ 30.967639] brcmf_sdio_probe+0x163c/0x2050 [brcmfmac] [ 30.978035] brcmf_ops_sdio_probe+0x598/0xa08 [brcmfmac] [ 30.983254] sdio_bus_probe+0x190/0x398 [ 30.983270] really_probe+0x2a0/0xa70 [ 30.983296] driver_probe_device+0x1b4/0x2d8 [ 30.994901] __driver_attach+0x200/0x280 [ 30.994914] bus_for_each_dev+0x10c/0x1a8 [ 30.994925] driver_attach+0x38/0x50 [ 30.994935] bus_add_driver+0x330/0x608 [ 30.994953] driver_register+0x140/0x388 [ 31.013965] sdio_register_driver+0x74/0xa0 [ 31.014076] brcmf_sdio_register+0x14/0x60 [brcmfmac] [ 31.023177] brcmf_driver_register+0xc/0x18 [brcmfmac] [ 31.023209] process_one_work+0x654/0x1080 [ 31.032266] worker_thread+0x4f0/0x1308 [ 31.032286] kthread+0x2a8/0x320 [ 31.039254] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c [ 31.039269] [ 31.044226] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 31.044351] brcmf_firmware_path+0x11f/0xfffffffffffd3b40 [brcmfmac] [ 31.055601] [ 31.057031] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 31.061800] ffff200002486480: 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 31.068983] ffff200002486500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 31.068993] >ffff200002486580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 [ 31.068999] ^ [ 31.069017] ffff200002486600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 31.096521] ffff200002486680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa [ 31.096528] ================================================================== [ 31.096533] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint It appears that when trying to determine the length of the string in the alternate firmware path, we make the mistake of not handling the case where the firmware path is empty correctly. Since strlen(mp_path) can return 0, we'll end up accessing mp_path[-1] when the firmware_path isn't provided through the module arguments. So, fix this by just setting the end char to '\0' by default, and only changing it if we have a non-zero length. Additionally, use strnlen() with BRCMF_FW_ALTPATH_LEN instead of strlen() just to be extra safe. Fixes: 2baa3aa ("brcmfmac: introduce brcmf_fw_alloc_request() function") Cc: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]> Cc: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <[email protected]> Cc: Franky Lin <[email protected]> Cc: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]> Cc: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Cc: Arend Van Spriel <[email protected]> Cc: Himanshu Jha <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Haab <[email protected]> Cc: Jia-Shyr Chuang <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Molton <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.17+ Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit 41ba17f upstream. Commit <684d984038aa> ('powerpc/powernv: Add debugfs interface for imc-mode and imc') added debugfs interface for the nest imc pmu devices to support changing of different ucode modes. Primarily adding this capability for debug. But when doing so, the code did not consider the case of cpu-less nodes. So when reading the _cmd_ or _mode_ file of a cpu-less node will create this crash. Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000d0d58 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... CPU: 67 PID: 5301 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-next-20190627+ #19 NIP: c0000000000d0d58 LR: c00000000049aa18 CTR:c0000000000d0d50 REGS: c00020194548f9e0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.2.0-rc6-next-20190627+) MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR:28022822 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c00000000049aa14 DAR: 000000000003fc08 DSISR:40000000 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP imc_mem_get+0x8/0x20 LR simple_attr_read+0x118/0x170 Call Trace: simple_attr_read+0x70/0x170 (unreliable) debugfs_attr_read+0x6c/0xb0 __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 vfs_read+0xbc/0x1a0 ksys_read+0x7c/0x140 system_call+0x5c/0x70 Patch fixes the issue with a more robust check for vbase to NULL. Before patch, ls output for the debugfs imc directory # ls /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/imc/ imc_cmd_0 imc_cmd_251 imc_cmd_253 imc_cmd_255 imc_mode_0 imc_mode_251 imc_mode_253 imc_mode_255 imc_cmd_250 imc_cmd_252 imc_cmd_254 imc_cmd_8 imc_mode_250 imc_mode_252 imc_mode_254 imc_mode_8 After patch, ls output for the debugfs imc directory # ls /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/imc/ imc_cmd_0 imc_cmd_8 imc_mode_0 imc_mode_8 Actual bug here is that, we have two loops with potentially different loop counts. That is, in imc_get_mem_addr_nest(), loop count is obtained from the dt entries. But in case of export_imc_mode_and_cmd(), loop was based on for_each_nid() count. Patch fixes the loop count in latter based on the struct mem_info. Ideally it would be better to have array size in struct imc_pmu. Fixes: 684d984 ('powerpc/powernv: Add debugfs interface for imc-mode and imc') Reported-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: Jan Stancek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit f9c6456 upstream. Masoud Sharbiani noticed that commit 29ef680 ("memcg, oom: move out_of_memory back to the charge path") broke memcg OOM called from __xfs_filemap_fault() path. It turned out that try_charge() is retrying forever without making forward progress because mem_cgroup_oom(GFP_NOFS) cannot invoke the OOM killer due to commit 3da88fb ("mm, oom: move GFP_NOFS check to out_of_memory"). Allowing forced charge due to being unable to invoke memcg OOM killer will lead to global OOM situation. Also, just returning -ENOMEM will be risky because OOM path is lost and some paths (e.g. get_user_pages()) will leak -ENOMEM. Therefore, invoking memcg OOM killer (despite GFP_NOFS) will be the only choice we can choose for now. Until 29ef680, we were able to invoke memcg OOM killer when GFP_KERNEL reclaim failed [1]. But since 29ef680, we need to invoke memcg OOM killer when GFP_NOFS reclaim failed [2]. Although in the past we did invoke memcg OOM killer for GFP_NOFS [3], we might get pre-mature memcg OOM reports due to this patch. [1] leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x6200ca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE), nodemask=(null), order=0, oom_score_adj=0 CPU: 0 PID: 2746 Comm: leaker Not tainted 4.18.0+ #19 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x63/0x88 dump_header+0x67/0x27a ? mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x91/0xf0 oom_kill_process+0x210/0x410 out_of_memory+0x10a/0x2c0 mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0x46/0x80 mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize+0x2e4/0x310 ? high_work_func+0x20/0x20 pagefault_out_of_memory+0x31/0x76 mm_fault_error+0x55/0x115 ? handle_mm_fault+0xfd/0x220 __do_page_fault+0x433/0x4e0 do_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x4009f0 Code: 03 00 00 00 e8 71 fd ff ff 48 83 f8 ff 49 89 c6 74 74 48 89 c6 bf c0 0c 40 00 31 c0 e8 69 fd ff ff 45 85 ff 7e 21 31 c9 66 90 <41> 0f be 14 0e 01 d3 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 05 41 c6 04 0e 2a 48 83 RSP: 002b:00007ffe29ae96f0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000001b RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000001ce1000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000007fffffe5 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f94be09220d R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000186a0 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f949d845000 R15: 0000000002800000 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 158965 memory+swap: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 kmem: usage 2016kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:844KB rss:521136KB rss_huge:0KB shmem:0KB mapped_file:0KB dirty:132KB writeback:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:521224KB inactive_file:1012KB active_file:8KB unevictable:0KB Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 2746 (leaker) score 998 or sacrifice child Killed process 2746 (leaker) total-vm:536704kB, anon-rss:521176kB, file-rss:1208kB, shmem-rss:0kB oom_reaper: reaped process 2746 (leaker), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB [2] leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x600040(GFP_NOFS), nodemask=(null), order=0, oom_score_adj=0 CPU: 1 PID: 2746 Comm: leaker Not tainted 4.18.0+ #20 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x63/0x88 dump_header+0x67/0x27a ? mem_cgroup_scan_tasks+0x91/0xf0 oom_kill_process+0x210/0x410 out_of_memory+0x109/0x2d0 mem_cgroup_out_of_memory+0x46/0x80 try_charge+0x58d/0x650 ? __radix_tree_replace+0x81/0x100 mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x7a/0x100 __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x92/0x180 add_to_page_cache_lru+0x4d/0xf0 iomap_readpages_actor+0xde/0x1b0 ? iomap_zero_range_actor+0x1d0/0x1d0 iomap_apply+0xaf/0x130 iomap_readpages+0x9f/0x150 ? iomap_zero_range_actor+0x1d0/0x1d0 xfs_vm_readpages+0x18/0x20 [xfs] read_pages+0x60/0x140 __do_page_cache_readahead+0x193/0x1b0 ondemand_readahead+0x16d/0x2c0 page_cache_async_readahead+0x9a/0xd0 filemap_fault+0x403/0x620 ? alloc_set_pte+0x12c/0x540 ? _cond_resched+0x14/0x30 __xfs_filemap_fault+0x66/0x180 [xfs] xfs_filemap_fault+0x27/0x30 [xfs] __do_fault+0x19/0x40 __handle_mm_fault+0x8e8/0xb60 handle_mm_fault+0xfd/0x220 __do_page_fault+0x238/0x4e0 do_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x4009f0 Code: 03 00 00 00 e8 71 fd ff ff 48 83 f8 ff 49 89 c6 74 74 48 89 c6 bf c0 0c 40 00 31 c0 e8 69 fd ff ff 45 85 ff 7e 21 31 c9 66 90 <41> 0f be 14 0e 01 d3 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 05 41 c6 04 0e 2a 48 83 RSP: 002b:00007ffda45c9290 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000001b RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000001a1e000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000007fffffe5 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f6d061ff20d R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000186a0 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f6ce59b2000 R15: 0000000002800000 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 7221 memory+swap: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 kmem: usage 1944kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:3632KB rss:518232KB rss_huge:0KB shmem:0KB mapped_file:0KB dirty:0KB writeback:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:518408KB inactive_file:3908KB active_file:12KB unevictable:0KB Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 2746 (leaker) score 992 or sacrifice child Killed process 2746 (leaker) total-vm:536704kB, anon-rss:518264kB, file-rss:1188kB, shmem-rss:0kB oom_reaper: reaped process 2746 (leaker), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB [3] leaker invoked oom-killer: gfp_mask=0x50, order=0, oom_score_adj=0 leaker cpuset=/ mems_allowed=0 CPU: 1 PID: 3206 Comm: leaker Not tainted 3.10.0-957.27.2.el7.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 04/13/2018 Call Trace: [<ffffffffaf364147>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [<ffffffffaf35eb6a>] dump_header+0x90/0x229 [<ffffffffaedbb456>] ? find_lock_task_mm+0x56/0xc0 [<ffffffffaee32a38>] ? try_get_mem_cgroup_from_mm+0x28/0x60 [<ffffffffaedbb904>] oom_kill_process+0x254/0x3d0 [<ffffffffaee36c36>] mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize+0x546/0x570 [<ffffffffaee360b0>] ? mem_cgroup_charge_common+0xc0/0xc0 [<ffffffffaedbc194>] pagefault_out_of_memory+0x14/0x90 [<ffffffffaf35d072>] mm_fault_error+0x6a/0x157 [<ffffffffaf3717c8>] __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0x4f0 [<ffffffffaf371925>] do_page_fault+0x35/0x90 [<ffffffffaf36d768>] page_fault+0x28/0x30 Task in /leaker killed as a result of limit of /leaker memory: usage 524288kB, limit 524288kB, failcnt 20628 memory+swap: usage 524288kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 kmem: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0 Memory cgroup stats for /leaker: cache:840KB rss:523448KB rss_huge:0KB mapped_file:0KB swap:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:523448KB inactive_file:464KB active_file:376KB unevictable:0KB Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 3206 (leaker) score 970 or sacrifice child Killed process 3206 (leaker) total-vm:536692kB, anon-rss:523304kB, file-rss:412kB, shmem-rss:0kB Bisected by Masoud Sharbiani. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 3da88fb ("mm, oom: move GFP_NOFS check to out_of_memory") [necessary after 29ef680] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Reported-by: Masoud Sharbiani <[email protected]> Tested-by: Masoud Sharbiani <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]> Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> [4.19+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit b88bf6c upstream. The following was observed by Kar Hin Ong with RT patchset: Backtrace: irq 19: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) CPU: 0 PID: 3329 Comm: irq/34-nipalk Tainted:4.14.87-rt49 #1 Hardware name: National Instruments NI PXIe-8880/NI PXIe-8880, BIOS 2.1.5f1 01/09/2020 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? dump_stack+0x46/0x5e ? __report_bad_irq+0x2e/0xb0 ? note_interrupt+0x242/0x290 ? nNIKAL100_memoryRead16+0x8/0x10 [nikal] ? handle_irq_event_percpu+0x55/0x70 ? handle_irq_event+0x4f/0x80 ? handle_fasteoi_irq+0x81/0x180 ? handle_irq+0x1c/0x30 ? do_IRQ+0x41/0xd0 ? common_interrupt+0x84/0x84 </IRQ> ... handlers: [<ffffffffb3297200>] irq_default_primary_handler threaded [<ffffffffb3669180>] usb_hcd_irq Disabling IRQ #19 The problem being that this device is triggering boot interrupts due to threaded interrupt handling and masking of the IO-APIC. These boot interrupts are then forwarded on to the legacy PCH's PIRQ lines where there is no handler present for the device. Whenever a PCI device fires interrupt (INTx) to Pin 20 of IOAPIC 2 (GSI 44), the kernel receives two interrupts: 1. Interrupt from Pin 20 of IOAPIC 2 -> Expected 2. Interrupt from Pin 19 of IOAPIC 1 -> UNEXPECTED Quirks for disabling boot interrupts (preferred) or rerouting the handler exist but do not address these Xeon chipsets' mechanism: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Add a new mechanism via PCI CFG for those chipsets supporting CIPINTRC register's dis_intx_rout2ich bit. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Kar Hin Ong <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kar Hin Ong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sean V Kelley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Matthew Garrett and others added 20 commits July 26, 2016 11:23

efi: Make EFI_SECURE_BOOT_SIG_ENFORCE depend on EFI

d1431fc

The functionality of the config option is dependent upon the platform being UEFI based. Reflect this in the config deps. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit

735f74a

UEFI machines can be booted in Secure Boot mode. Add a EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled. Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>

Overlayfs: Use copy-up security hooks

08ff141

Use the copy-up security hooks previously provided to allow an LSM to adjust the security on a newly created copy and to filter the xattrs copied to that file copy. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

SELinux: Stub in copy-up handling

5010e47

Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>

crawford merged commit 42eacc6 into coreos:v4.7-coreos Jul 26, 2016

crawford deleted the v4.7-coreos branch July 26, 2016 20:47

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Rebase CoreOS patches onto Linux v4.7 #19

Rebase CoreOS patches onto Linux v4.7 #19

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Rebase CoreOS patches onto Linux v4.7 #19

Rebase CoreOS patches onto Linux v4.7 #19

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