mount by filesystem uuid or label #1
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koverstreet
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smp_processor_id() checks preemption if CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT is enabled, causing a warning dump during boot: [ 5.042377] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: swapper/0/1 [ 5.050281] caller is pwrdm_set_next_pwrst+0x48/0x88 [ 5.055330] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.14.24-g57341df0b4 #1 Use the raw_smp_processor_id() for the trace instead, this value does not need to be perfectly correct. The alternative of disabling preempt is too heavy weight operation to be applied in PM hot path for just tracing purposes. Signed-off-by: Tero Kristo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
koverstreet
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…s found If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if different from the current one. However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we should continue walking through attributes using the current table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested attributes. For example, given this sequence: 1 OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY 2 OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL 3 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID 4 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC 5 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST 6 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL 7 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC 8 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST 9 OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT 10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK 11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3, and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting attributes #9 to #11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is 15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the wrong table: [ 7654.586496] ================================================================== [ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430 [ 7654.610983] [ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1 [ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016 [ 7654.631379] Call Trace: [ 7654.634108] [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 7654.639843] [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290 [ 7654.647129] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.654607] [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330 [ 7654.661406] [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40 [ 7654.668789] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.676076] [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch] [ 7654.684234] [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 7654.689968] [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590 [ 7654.696574] [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch] [ 7654.705122] [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0 [ 7654.712503] [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21 [ 7654.719401] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.726298] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.733195] [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50 [ 7654.740187] [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0 [ 7654.746406] [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 7654.752914] [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 7654.758456] [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch] [snip] [ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 7655.138226] ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch] [ 7655.145507] [ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 7655.152514] ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa [ 7655.160585] ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa [ 7655.176701] ^ [ 7655.184372] ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05 [ 7655.192431] ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.200490] ================================================================== Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
koverstreet
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Aug 12, 2018
syzbot caught an infinite recursion in nsh_gso_segment().
Problem here is that we need to make sure the NSH header is of
reasonable length.
BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48 max: 48!
48 locks held by syz-executor0/10189:
#0: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x30f/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3517
#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#1: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#2: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#3: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#4: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#5: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#6: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#7: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#8: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#9: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#10: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#11: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#12: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#13: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#14: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#15: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#16: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#17: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#18: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#19: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#20: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#21: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#22: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#23: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#24: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#25: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#26: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#27: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#28: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#29: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#30: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#31: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread
#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#32: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#33: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#34: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#35: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#36: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#37: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#38: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#39: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#40: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#41: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#42: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#43: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#44: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#45: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#46: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2080 [inline]
#47: (ptrval) (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: skb_mac_gso_segment+0x221/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2787
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 1 PID: 10189 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #26
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
__lock_acquire+0x1788/0x5140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3449
lock_acquire+0x1dc/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3920
rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:246 [inline]
rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:632 [inline]
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x25b/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2789
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
nsh_gso_segment+0x405/0xb60 net/nsh/nsh.c:107
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3ad/0x720 net/core/dev.c:2792
__skb_gso_segment+0x3bb/0x870 net/core/dev.c:2865
skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4025 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x54d/0xd90 net/core/dev.c:3118
validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbf/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3168
sch_direct_xmit+0x354/0x11e0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:312
qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:399 [inline]
__qdisc_run+0x741/0x1af0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:410
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3243 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x28ea/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3551
dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3616
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2951 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x40f8/0x6070 net/packet/af_packet.c:2976
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639
__sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: c411ed8 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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This patch fixes crashes during boot for HVM guests on older (pre HVM
vector callback) Xen versions. Without this, current kernels will always
fail to boot on those Xen versions.
Sample stack trace:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffff200000
IP: __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1e/0x80
PGD 1e0e067 P4D 1e0e067 PUD 1e10067 PMD 235c067 PTE 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 512 Comm: kworker/u2:0 Not tainted 4.14.33-52.13.amzn1.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.3.amazon 11/11/2016
task: ffff88002531d700 task.stack: ffffc90000480000
RIP: 0010:__xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1e/0x80
RSP: 0000:ffff880025403ef0 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: ffffffff813cc760 RBX: ffffffffff200000 RCX: ffffc90000483ef0
RDX: ffff880020540a00 RSI: ffff880023c78000 RDI: 000000000000001c
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880025403f5c R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880025400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff200000 CR3: 0000000001e0a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
do_hvm_evtchn_intr+0xa/0x10
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x43/0x1a0
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x50
handle_irq_event+0x39/0x60
handle_fasteoi_irq+0x80/0x140
handle_irq+0xaf/0x120
do_IRQ+0x41/0xd0
common_interrupt+0x7d/0x7d
</IRQ>
During boot, the HYPERVISOR_shared_info page gets remapped to make it work
with KASLR. This means that any pointer derived from it needs to be
adjusted.
The only value that this applies to is the vcpu_info pointer for VCPU 0.
For PV and HVM with the callback vector feature, this gets done via the
smp_ops prepare_boot_cpu callback. Older Xen versions do not support the
HVM callback vector, so there is no Xen-specific smp_ops set up in that
scenario. So, the vcpu_info pointer for VCPU 0 never gets set to the proper
value, and the first reference of it will be bad. Fix this by resetting it
immediately after the remap.
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eduardo Valentin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alakesh Haloi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vallish Vaidyeshwara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
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syzbot loves to set very small mtu on devices, since it brings joy. We must make llc_ui_sendmsg() fool proof. usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to wrapped address (offset 0, size 18446612139802320068)! kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:100! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 17464 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #36 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88 RSP: 0018:ffff8801868bf800 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffffffff87d2fb00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: ffffffff81610731 RDI: ffffed0030d17ef6 RBP: ffff8801868bf858 R08: ffff88018daa4200 R09: ffffed003b5c4fb0 R10: ffffed003b5c4fb0 R11: ffff8801dae27d87 R12: ffffffff87d2f8e0 R13: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R14: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R15: ffffffff87d2f7a0 FS: 00007f56a14ac700(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2bc21000 CR3: 00000001abeb1000 CR4: 00000000001426f0 DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000030602 Call Trace: check_bogus_address mm/usercopy.c:153 [inline] __check_object_size+0x5d9/0x5d9 mm/usercopy.c:256 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:108 [inline] check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:139 [inline] copy_from_iter_full include/linux/uio.h:121 [inline] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3305 [inline] llc_ui_sendmsg+0x4b1/0x1530 net/llc/af_llc.c:941 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x455979 RSP: 002b:00007f56a14abc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f56a14ac6d4 RCX: 0000000000455979 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000018 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 00000000200012c0 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 0000000000000548 R14: 00000000006fbf60 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 55 c0 e8 c0 55 bb ff ff 75 c8 48 8b 55 c0 4d 89 f9 ff 75 d0 4d 89 e8 48 89 d9 4c 89 e6 41 56 48 c7 c7 80 fa d2 87 e8 a0 0b a3 ff <0f> 0b e8 95 55 bb ff e8 c0 a8 f7 ff 8b 95 14 ff ff ff 4d 89 e8 RIP: usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88 RSP: ffff8801868bf800 Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Connections in One-packet scheduling mode (-o, --ops) are removed with refcnt=0 because they are not hashed in conn table. To avoid refcount_dec reporting this as error, change them to be removed with refcount_dec_if_one as all other connections. refcount_t hit zero at ip_vs_conn_put+0x31/0x40 [ip_vs] in sh[15519], uid/euid: 497/497 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15519 at ../kernel/panic.c:657 refcount_error_report+0x94/0x9e Modules linked in: ip_vs_rr cirrus ttm sb_edac edac_core drm_kms_helper crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc mousedev drm aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd psmouse evdev input_leds led_class intel_agp fb_sys_fops syscopyarea sysfillrect intel_rapl_perf mac_hid intel_gtt serio_raw sysimgblt agpgart i2c_piix4 i2c_core ata_generic pata_acpi floppy cfg80211 rfkill button loop macvlan ip_vs nf_conntrack libcrc32c crc32c_generic ip_tables x_tables ipv6 crc_ccitt autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 fscrypto ata_piix libata atkbd libps2 scsi_mod crc32c_intel i8042 rtc_cmos serio af_packet dm_mod dax fuse xen_netfront xen_blkfront CPU: 0 PID: 15519 Comm: sh Tainted: G W 4.15.17 #1-NixOS Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.2.amazon 08/24/2006 RIP: 0010:refcount_error_report+0x94/0x9e RSP: 0000:ffffa344dde039c8 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 0000000000000057 RBX: ffffffff92f20e06 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: ffffa344dde165c0 RBP: ffffa344dde03b08 R08: 0000000000000218 R09: 0000000000000004 R10: ffffffff93006a80 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffa344d68cd100 R13: 00000000000001f1 R14: ffffffff92f12fb0 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007fc9d2040fc0(0000) GS:ffffa344dde00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000262a000 CR3: 0000000016a0c004 CR4: 00000000001606f0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ex_handler_refcount+0x4e/0x80 fixup_exception+0x33/0x40 do_trap+0x83/0x140 do_error_trap+0x83/0xf0 ? ip_vs_conn_drop_conntrack+0x120/0x1a5 [ip_vs] ? ip_finish_output2+0x29c/0x390 ? ip_finish_output2+0x1a2/0x390 invalid_op+0x1b/0x40 RIP: 0010:ip_vs_conn_put+0x31/0x40 [ip_vs] RSP: 0000:ffffa344dde03bb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffa344df31cf00 RCX: ffffa344d7450198 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00000000fffffe01 RDI: ffffa344d7450140 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000476 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffa344dde03b28 R11: ffffa344df200000 R12: ffffa344d7d09000 R13: ffffa344def3a980 R14: ffffffffc04f6e20 R15: 0000000000000008 ip_vs_in.part.29.constprop.36+0x34f/0x640 [ip_vs] ? ip_vs_conn_out_get+0xe0/0xe0 [ip_vs] ip_vs_remote_request4+0x47/0xa0 [ip_vs] ? ip_vs_in.part.29.constprop.36+0x640/0x640 [ip_vs] nf_hook_slow+0x43/0xc0 ip_local_deliver+0xac/0xc0 ? ip_rcv_finish+0x400/0x400 ip_rcv+0x26c/0x380 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x3a0/0xb10 ? inet_gro_receive+0x23c/0x2b0 ? netif_receive_skb_internal+0x24/0xb0 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x24/0xb0 napi_gro_receive+0xb8/0xe0 xennet_poll+0x676/0xb40 [xen_netfront] net_rx_action+0x139/0x3a0 __do_softirq+0xde/0x2b4 irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x2c/0x40 xen_hvm_callback_vector+0x7d/0x90 </IRQ> RIP: 0033:0x7fc9d11c91f9 RSP: 002b:00007ffebe8a2ea0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff0c RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: 0000000002609808 RCX: 0000000000000054 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000002605440 RDI: 00000000025f940e RBP: 00000000025f940e R08: 000000000260213d R09: 1999999999999999 R10: 000000000262a808 R11: 00000000025f942d R12: 00000000025f940e R13: 00007fc9d1301e20 R14: 00000000025f9408 R15: 00007fc9d1302720 Code: 48 8b 95 80 00 00 00 41 55 49 8d 8c 24 e0 05 00 00 45 8b 84 24 38 04 00 00 41 89 c1 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 a8 2f f2 92 e8 7c fa ff ff <0f> 0b 58 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 Reported-by: Net Filter <[email protected]> Fixes: b54ab92 ("netfilter: refcounter conversions") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
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The current code sets an affinity hint with a cpumask_t stored on the stack. This value can then be accessed through /proc/irq/*/affinity_hint/, causing a segfault or returning corrupt data. Move the cpumask_t into struct i40iw_msix_vector so it is available later. Backtrace: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffb16e600e7c90 IP: irq_affinity_hint_proc_show+0x60/0xf0 PGD 17c0c6d067 PUD 17c0c6e067 PMD 15d4a0e067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ... CPU: 3 PID: 172543 Comm: grep Tainted: G OE ... #1 Hardware name: ... task: ffff9a5caee08000 task.stack: ffffb16e659d8000 RIP: 0010:irq_affinity_hint_proc_show+0x60/0xf0 RSP: 0018:ffffb16e659dbd20 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffffb16e659dbd20 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffb16e600e7c90 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000046 RBP: ffffb16e659dbd88 R08: 0000000000000038 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000070803079 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9a59d1d97a00 R13: ffff9a5da47a6cd8 R14: ffff9a5da47a6c00 R15: ffff9a59d1d97a00 FS: 00007f946c31d740(0000) GS:ffff9a5dc1800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffb16e600e7c90 CR3: 00000016a4339000 CR4: 00000000007406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: seq_read+0x12d/0x430 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x11/0xb0 proc_reg_read+0x48/0x70 __vfs_read+0x37/0x140 ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 vfs_read+0x96/0x140 SyS_read+0x58/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x190 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 RIP: 0033:0x7f946bbc97e0 RSP: 002b:00007ffdd0c4ae08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000096b000 RCX: 00007f946bbc97e0 RDX: 000000000096b000 RSI: 00007f946a2f0000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 00007f946a2ef011 R09: 000000000000000a R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f946a2f0000 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007f946a2f0000 Code: b9 08 00 00 00 49 89 c6 48 89 df 31 c0 4d 8d ae d8 00 00 00 f3 48 ab 4c 89 ef e8 6c 9a 56 00 49 8b 96 30 01 00 00 48 85 d2 74 3f <48> 8b 0a 48 89 4d 98 48 8b 4a 08 48 89 4d a0 48 8b 4a 10 48 89 RIP: irq_affinity_hint_proc_show+0x60/0xf0 RSP: ffffb16e659dbd20 CR2: ffffb16e600e7c90 Fixes: 8e06af7 ("i40iw: add main, hdr, status") Signed-off-by: Andrew Boyer <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
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Aug 12, 2018
Currently; we're grabbing all of the modesetting locks before adding MST connectors to fbdev. This isn't actually necessary, and causes a deadlock as well: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.17.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #1 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/1:0/18 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000c832f62d (&helper->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] but task is already holding lock: 00000000942e28e2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8e/0x1c0 [drm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}: ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 drm_modeset_lock+0x71/0x130 [drm] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x7d/0x6b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_setup_crtcs+0x15e/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}: drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x58/0x6b0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_setup_crtcs+0x15e/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}: drm_setup_crtcs+0x10c/0xc90 [drm_kms_helper] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x29/0x480 [drm_kms_helper] nouveau_fbcon_init+0x138/0x1a0 [nouveau] nouveau_drm_load+0x173/0x7e0 [nouveau] drm_dev_register+0x134/0x1c0 [drm] drm_get_pci_dev+0x8e/0x160 [drm] nouveau_drm_probe+0x1a9/0x230 [nouveau] pci_device_probe+0xcd/0x150 driver_probe_device+0x30b/0x480 __driver_attach+0xbc/0xe0 bus_for_each_dev+0x67/0x90 bus_add_driver+0x164/0x260 driver_register+0x57/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x4d/0x323 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f8 load_module+0x20e5/0x2ac0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xb7/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&helper->lock){+.+.}: __mutex_lock+0x70/0x9d0 drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_mstm_register_connector+0x2c/0x50 [nouveau] drm_dp_add_port+0x2f5/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_add_port+0x33f/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0x87/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x4d/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] process_one_work+0x20d/0x650 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 kthread+0x11e/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &helper->lock --> crtc_ww_class_acquire --> crtc_ww_class_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(crtc_ww_class_acquire); lock(crtc_ww_class_mutex); lock(&helper->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/1:0/18: #0: 000000004a05cd50 ((wq_completion)"events_long"){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x187/0x650 #1: 00000000601c11d1 ((work_completion)(&mgr->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x187/0x650 #2: 00000000586ca0df (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x3a/0x1b0 [drm] #3: 00000000d3ca0ffa (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x44/0x1b0 [drm] #4: 00000000942e28e2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_backoff+0x8e/0x1c0 [drm] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G O 4.17.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #1 Hardware name: Gateway FX6840/FX6840, BIOS P01-A3 05/17/2010 Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work [drm_kms_helper] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xcb print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x1ce/0x1db __lock_acquire+0x128f/0x1350 ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.13+0x8f/0x1000 lock_acquire+0x9f/0x200 ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] __mutex_lock+0x70/0x9d0 ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 ? ww_mutex_lock+0x43/0x80 ? drm_modeset_lock+0xb2/0x130 [drm] ? drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] drm_fb_helper_add_one_connector+0x2a/0x60 [drm_kms_helper] nv50_mstm_register_connector+0x2c/0x50 [nouveau] drm_dp_add_port+0x2f5/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] ? mark_held_locks+0x50/0x80 ? kfree+0xcf/0x2a0 ? drm_dp_check_mstb_guid+0xd6/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xed/0x180 ? drm_dp_check_mstb_guid+0xd6/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_add_port+0x33f/0x420 [drm_kms_helper] ? nouveau_connector_aux_xfer+0x7c/0xb0 [nouveau] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90 ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3b/0x280 ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0xf0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_send_link_address+0x155/0x1e0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_check_and_send_link_address+0x87/0xd0 [drm_kms_helper] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x4d/0x80 [drm_kms_helper] process_one_work+0x20d/0x650 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390 ? process_one_work+0x650/0x650 kthread+0x11e/0x140 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Taking example from i915, the only time we need to hold any modesetting locks is when changing the port on the mstc, and in that case we only need to hold the connection mutex. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <[email protected]> Cc: Karol Herbst <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]>
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… missing When application fails to pass flags in netlink TLV for a new skbedit action, the kernel results in the following oops: [ 8.307732] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000021130 [ 8.309167] PGD 80000000193d1067 P4D 80000000193d1067 PUD 180e0067 PMD 0 [ 8.310595] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 8.311334] Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper serio_raw [ 8.314190] CPU: 1 PID: 397 Comm: tc Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #357 [ 8.315252] RIP: 0010:__tcf_idr_release+0x33/0x140 [ 8.316203] RSP: 0018:ffffa0718038f840 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 8.317123] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000021100 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 8.319831] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000021100 [ 8.321181] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000004adf8 R09: 0000000000000122 [ 8.322645] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff9e5b01ed R12: 0000000000000000 [ 8.324157] R13: ffffffff9e0d3cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 8.325590] FS: 00007f591292e700(0000) GS:ffff8fcf5bc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8.327001] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8.327987] CR2: 0000000000021130 CR3: 00000000180e6004 CR4: 00000000001606a0 [ 8.329289] Call Trace: [ 8.329735] tcf_skbedit_init+0xa7/0xb0 [ 8.330423] tcf_action_init_1+0x362/0x410 [ 8.331139] ? try_to_wake_up+0x44/0x430 [ 8.331817] tcf_action_init+0x103/0x190 [ 8.332511] tc_ctl_action+0x11a/0x220 [ 8.333174] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x23d/0x2e0 [ 8.333902] ? _cond_resched+0x16/0x40 [ 8.334569] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x5b/0x2c0 [ 8.335440] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.31+0xf0/0xf0 [ 8.336178] netlink_rcv_skb+0xdb/0x110 [ 8.336855] netlink_unicast+0x167/0x220 [ 8.337550] netlink_sendmsg+0x2a7/0x390 [ 8.338258] sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40 [ 8.338865] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2c5/0x2e0 [ 8.339531] ? pagecache_get_page+0x27/0x210 [ 8.340271] ? filemap_fault+0xa2/0x630 [ 8.340943] ? page_add_file_rmap+0x108/0x200 [ 8.341732] ? alloc_set_pte+0x2aa/0x530 [ 8.342573] ? finish_fault+0x4e/0x70 [ 8.343332] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xbc1/0x10d0 [ 8.344337] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0x80 [ 8.345040] __sys_sendmsg+0x53/0x80 [ 8.345678] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x100 [ 8.346339] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 8.347206] RIP: 0033:0x7f591191da67 [ 8.347831] RSP: 002b:00007fff745abd48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 8.349179] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff745abe70 RCX: 00007f591191da67 [ 8.350431] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff745abdc0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 8.351659] RBP: 000000005af35251 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 8.352922] R10: 00000000000005f1 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 8.354183] R13: 00007fff745afed0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00000000006767c0 [ 8.355400] Code: 41 89 d4 53 89 f5 48 89 fb e8 aa 20 fd ff 85 c0 0f 84 ed 00 00 00 48 85 db 0f 84 cf 00 00 00 40 84 ed 0f 85 cd 00 00 00 45 84 e4 <8b> 53 30 74 0d 85 d2 b8 ff ff ff ff 0f 8f b3 00 00 00 8b 43 2c [ 8.358699] RIP: __tcf_idr_release+0x33/0x140 RSP: ffffa0718038f840 [ 8.359770] CR2: 0000000000021130 [ 8.360438] ---[ end trace 60c66be45dfc14f0 ]--- The caller calls action's ->init() and passes pointer to "struct tc_action *a", which later may be initialized to point at the existing action, otherwise "struct tc_action *a" is still invalid, and therefore dereferencing it is an error as happens in tcf_idr_release, where refcnt is decremented. So in case of missing flags tcf_idr_release must be called only for existing actions. v2: - prepare patch for net tree Fixes: 5e1567a ("net sched: skbedit action fix late binding") Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak <[email protected]> Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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…pshotting [BUG] btrfs incremental send BUG happens when creating a snapshot of snapshot that is being used by send. [REASON] The problem can happen if while we are doing a send one of the snapshots used (parent or send) is snapshotted, because snapshoting implies COWing the root of the source subvolume/snapshot. 1. When doing an incremental send, the send process will get the commit roots from the parent and send snapshots, and add references to them through extent_buffer_get(). 2. When a snapshot/subvolume is snapshotted, its root node is COWed (transaction.c:create_pending_snapshot()). 3. COWing releases the space used by the node immediately, through: __btrfs_cow_block() --btrfs_free_tree_block() ----btrfs_add_free_space(bytenr of node) 4. Because send doesn't hold a transaction open, it's possible that the transaction used to create the snapshot commits, switches the commit root and the old space used by the previous root node gets assigned to some other node allocation. Allocation of a new node will use the existing extent buffer found in memory, which we previously got a reference through extent_buffer_get(), and allow the extent buffer's content (pages) to be modified: btrfs_alloc_tree_block --btrfs_reserve_extent ----find_free_extent (get bytenr of old node) --btrfs_init_new_buffer (use bytenr of old node) ----btrfs_find_create_tree_block ------alloc_extent_buffer --------find_extent_buffer (get old node) 5. So send can access invalid memory content and have unpredictable behaviour. [FIX] So we fix the problem by copying the commit roots of the send and parent snapshots and use those copies. CallTrace looks like this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1861! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 6 PID: 24235 Comm: btrfs Tainted: P O 3.10.105 #23721 ffff88046652d680 ti: ffff88041b720000 task.ti: ffff88041b720000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa08dd0e8>] read_node_slot+0x108/0x110 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffff88041b723b68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88043ca6b000 RBX: ffff88041b723c50 RCX: ffff880000000000 RDX: 000000000000004c RSI: ffff880314b133f8 RDI: ffff880458b24000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88041b723c66 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff8803f3e48890 R13: ffff8803f3e48880 R14: ffff880466351800 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f8c321dc8c0(0000) GS:ffff88047fcc0000(0000) CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 R2: 00007efd1006d000 CR3: 0000000213a24000 CR4: 00000000003407e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Stack: ffff88041b723c50 ffff8803f3e48880 ffff8803f3e48890 ffff8803f3e48880 ffff880466351800 0000000000000001 ffffffffa08dd9d7 ffff88041b723c50 ffff8803f3e48880 ffff88041b723c66 ffffffffa08dde85 a9ff88042d2c4400 Call Trace: [<ffffffffa08dd9d7>] ? tree_move_down.isra.33+0x27/0x50 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa08dde85>] ? tree_advance+0xb5/0xc0 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa08e83d4>] ? btrfs_compare_trees+0x2d4/0x760 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa0982050>] ? finish_inode_if_needed+0x870/0x870 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa09841ea>] ? btrfs_ioctl_send+0xeda/0x1050 [btrfs] [<ffffffffa094bd3d>] ? btrfs_ioctl+0x1e3d/0x33f0 [btrfs] [<ffffffff81111133>] ? handle_pte_fault+0x373/0x990 [<ffffffff8153a096>] ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff81063256>] ? set_task_cpu+0xb6/0x1d0 [<ffffffff811122c3>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x143/0x2a0 [<ffffffff81539cc0>] ? __do_page_fault+0x1d0/0x500 [<ffffffff81062f07>] ? check_preempt_curr+0x57/0x90 [<ffffffff8115075a>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x4aa/0x990 [<ffffffff81034f83>] ? do_fork+0x113/0x3b0 [<ffffffff812dd7d7>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x3a/0x6c [<ffffffff81150cc8>] ? SyS_ioctl+0x88/0xa0 [<ffffffff8153e422>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ---[ end trace 29576629ee80b2e1 ]--- Fixes: 7069830 ("Btrfs: add btrfs_compare_trees function") CC: [email protected] # 3.6+ Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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platform_domain_notifier contains a variable sized array, which the
pm_clk_notify() notifier treats as a NULL terminated array:
for (con_id = clknb->con_ids; *con_id; con_id++)
pm_clk_add(dev, *con_id);
Omitting the initialiser for con_ids means that the array is zero
sized, and there is no NULL terminator. This leads to pm_clk_notify()
overrunning into what ever structure follows, which may not be NULL.
This leads to an oops:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000008c
pgd = c0003000
[0000008c] *pgd=80000800004003c, *pmd=00000000c
Internal error: Oops: 206 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
Modules linked in:c
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #9
Hardware name: Keystone
PC is at strlen+0x0/0x34
LR is at kstrdup+0x18/0x54
pc : [<c0623340>] lr : [<c0111d6c>] psr: 20000013
sp : eec73dc0 ip : eed780c0 fp : 00000001
r10: 00000000 r9 : 00000000 r8 : eed71e10
r7 : 0000008c r6 : 0000008c r5 : 014000c0 r4 : c03a6ff4
r3 : c09445d0 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 014000c0 r0 : 0000008c
Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 30c5387d Table: 00003000 DAC: fffffffd
Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xeec72210)
Stack: (0xeec73dc0 to 0xeec74000)
...
[<c0623340>] (strlen) from [<c0111d6c>] (kstrdup+0x18/0x54)
[<c0111d6c>] (kstrdup) from [<c03a6ff4>] (__pm_clk_add+0x58/0x120)
[<c03a6ff4>] (__pm_clk_add) from [<c03a731c>] (pm_clk_notify+0x64/0xa8)
[<c03a731c>] (pm_clk_notify) from [<c004614c>] (notifier_call_chain+0x44/0x84)
[<c004614c>] (notifier_call_chain) from [<c0046320>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x48/0x60)
[<c0046320>] (__blocking_notifier_call_chain) from [<c0046350>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x18/0x20)
[<c0046350>] (blocking_notifier_call_chain) from [<c0390234>] (device_add+0x36c/0x534)
[<c0390234>] (device_add) from [<c047fc00>] (of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x70/0xa4)
[<c047fc00>] (of_platform_device_create_pdata) from [<c047fea0>] (of_platform_bus_create+0xf0/0x1ec)
[<c047fea0>] (of_platform_bus_create) from [<c047fff8>] (of_platform_populate+0x5c/0xac)
[<c047fff8>] (of_platform_populate) from [<c08b1f04>] (of_platform_default_populate_init+0x8c/0xa8)
[<c08b1f04>] (of_platform_default_populate_init) from [<c000a78c>] (do_one_initcall+0x3c/0x164)
[<c000a78c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c087bd9c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x10c/0x1d0)
[<c087bd9c>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c0628db0>] (kernel_init+0x8/0xf0)
[<c0628db0>] (kernel_init) from [<c00090d8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
Exception stack(0xeec73fb0 to 0xeec73ff8)
3fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000
Code: e3520000 1afffff7 e12fff1e c0801730 (e5d02000)
---[ end trace cafa8f148e262e80 ]---
Fix this by adding the necessary initialiser.
Fixes: fc20ffe ("ARM: keystone: add PM domain support for clock management")
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>
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syzkaller found a reliable way to crash the host, hitting a BUG() in __tcp_retransmit_skb() Malicous MSG_FASTOPEN is the root cause. We need to purge write queue in tcp_connect_init() at the point we init snd_una/write_seq. This patch also replaces the BUG() by a less intrusive WARN_ON_ONCE() kernel BUG at net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2837! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 5276 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #51 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__tcp_retransmit_skb+0x2992/0x2eb0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2837 RSP: 0000:ffff8801dae06ff8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8801b9fe61c0 RBX: 00000000ffc18a16 RCX: ffffffff864e1a49 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff864e2e12 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff8801dae073a0 R08: ffff8801b9fe61c0 R09: ffffed0039c40dd2 R10: ffffed0039c40dd2 R11: ffff8801ce206e93 R12: 00000000421eeaad R13: ffff8801ce206d4e R14: ffff8801ce206cc0 R15: ffff8801cd4f4a80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0063) knlGS:00000000096bc900 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 00000001c47b6000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_retransmit_skb+0x2e/0x250 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2923 tcp_retransmit_timer+0xc50/0x3060 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:488 tcp_write_timer_handler+0x339/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:573 tcp_write_timer+0x111/0x1d0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:593 call_timer_fn+0x230/0x940 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x79e/0xc50 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1d1/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:525 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x17e/0x710 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:863 Fixes: cf60af0 ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]> Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Doing faccessat("/afs/some/directory", 0) triggers a BUG in the permissions
check code.
Fix this by just removing the BUG section. If no permissions are asked
for, just return okay if the file exists.
Also:
(1) Split up the directory check so that it has separate if-statements
rather than if-else-if (e.g. checking for MAY_EXEC shouldn't skip the
check for MAY_READ and MAY_WRITE).
(2) Check for MAY_CHDIR as MAY_EXEC.
Without the main fix, the following BUG may occur:
kernel BUG at fs/afs/security.c:386!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
...
RIP: 0010:afs_permission+0x19d/0x1a0 [kafs]
...
Call Trace:
? inode_permission+0xbe/0x180
? do_faccessat+0xdc/0x270
? do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1f0
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: 00d3b7a ("[AFS]: Add security support.")
Reported-by: Jonathan Billings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
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…bj_dump()
In the nft_ct_helper_obj_dump(), always priv->helper4 is dereferenced.
But if family is ipv6, priv->helper6 should be dereferenced.
Steps to reproduces:
#test.nft
table ip6 filter {
ct helper ftp {
type "ftp" protocol tcp
}
chain input {
type filter hook input priority 4;
ct helper set "ftp"
}
}
%nft -f test.nft
%nft list ruleset
we can see the below messages:
[ 916.286233] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
[ 916.294777] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[ 916.302613] Modules linked in: nft_objref nf_conntrack_sip nf_conntrack_snmp nf_conntrack_broadcast nf_conntrack_ftp nft_ct nf_conntrack nf_tables nfnetlink [last unloaded: nfnetlink]
[ 916.318758] CPU: 1 PID: 2093 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #181
[ 916.326772] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015
[ 916.338773] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1a/0x90
[ 916.342781] RSP: 0018:ffff88010ff0f2f8 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 916.346773] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880119b26ee8 RCX: ffff88010c150038
[ 916.354777] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff880119b26ee8 RDI: 0000000000000010
[ 916.362773] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000007e88 R09: ffff88010c15003c
[ 916.370773] R10: ffff88010c150037 R11: ffffed002182a007 R12: ffff88010ff04040
[ 916.378779] R13: 0000000000000010 R14: ffff880119b26f30 R15: ffff88010ff04110
[ 916.387265] FS: 00007f57a1997700(0000) GS:ffff88011b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 916.394785] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 916.402778] CR2: 00007f57a0ac80f0 CR3: 000000010ff02000 CR4: 00000000001006e0
[ 916.410772] Call Trace:
[ 916.414787] nft_ct_helper_obj_dump+0x94/0x200 [nft_ct]
[ 916.418779] ? nft_ct_set_eval+0x560/0x560 [nft_ct]
[ 916.426771] ? memset+0x1f/0x40
[ 916.426771] ? __nla_reserve+0x92/0xb0
[ 916.434774] ? memcpy+0x34/0x50
[ 916.434774] nf_tables_fill_obj_info+0x484/0x860 [nf_tables]
[ 916.442773] ? __nft_release_basechain+0x600/0x600 [nf_tables]
[ 916.450779] ? lock_acquire+0x193/0x380
[ 916.454771] ? lock_acquire+0x193/0x380
[ 916.458789] ? nf_tables_dump_obj+0x148/0xcb0 [nf_tables]
[ 916.462777] nf_tables_dump_obj+0x5f0/0xcb0 [nf_tables]
[ 916.470769] ? __alloc_skb+0x30b/0x500
[ 916.474779] netlink_dump+0x752/0xb50
[ 916.478775] __netlink_dump_start+0x4d3/0x750
[ 916.482784] nf_tables_getobj+0x27a/0x930 [nf_tables]
[ 916.490774] ? nft_obj_notify+0x100/0x100 [nf_tables]
[ 916.494772] ? nf_tables_getobj+0x930/0x930 [nf_tables]
[ 916.502579] ? nf_tables_dump_flowtable_done+0x70/0x70 [nf_tables]
[ 916.506774] ? nft_obj_notify+0x100/0x100 [nf_tables]
[ 916.514808] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x8ab/0xa86 [nfnetlink]
[ 916.518771] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x550/0xa86 [nfnetlink]
[ 916.526782] netlink_rcv_skb+0x23e/0x360
[ 916.530773] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x200/0x200 [nfnetlink]
[ 916.534778] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x280/0x280
[ 916.542770] ? netlink_ack+0x870/0x870
[ 916.546786] ? ns_capable_common+0xf4/0x130
[ 916.550765] nfnetlink_rcv+0x172/0x16c0 [nfnetlink]
[ 916.554771] ? sched_clock_local+0xe2/0x150
[ 916.558774] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x144/0x180
[ 916.566575] ? lock_acquire+0x380/0x380
[ 916.570775] ? sched_clock_local+0xe2/0x150
[ 916.574765] ? nfnetlink_net_init+0x130/0x130 [nfnetlink]
[ 916.578763] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x144/0x180
[ 916.582770] ? lock_acquire+0x193/0x380
[ 916.590771] ? lock_acquire+0x193/0x380
[ 916.594766] ? lock_acquire+0x380/0x380
[ 916.598760] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x262/0xa60
[ 916.602766] ? lock_acquire+0x193/0x380
[ 916.606766] netlink_unicast+0x3ef/0x5a0
[ 916.610771] ? netlink_attachskb+0x630/0x630
[ 916.614763] netlink_sendmsg+0x72a/0xb00
[ 916.618769] ? netlink_unicast+0x5a0/0x5a0
[ 916.626766] ? _copy_from_user+0x92/0xc0
[ 916.630773] __sys_sendto+0x202/0x300
[ 916.634772] ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0
[ 916.638759] ? lock_acquire+0x380/0x380
[ 916.642769] ? lock_acquire+0x193/0x380
[ 916.646761] ? finish_task_switch+0xf4/0x560
[ 916.650763] ? __schedule+0x582/0x19a0
[ 916.655301] ? __sched_text_start+0x8/0x8
[ 916.655301] ? up_read+0x1c/0x110
[ 916.655301] ? __do_page_fault+0x48b/0xaa0
[ 916.655301] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x59/0xbe
[ 916.655301] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0
[ 916.655301] do_syscall_64+0x96/0x3d0
[ 916.655301] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 916.655301] RIP: 0033:0x7f57a0ff5e03
[ 916.655301] RSP: 002b:00007fff6367e0a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 916.655301] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff6367f1e0 RCX: 00007f57a0ff5e03
[ 916.655301] RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 00007fff6367e110 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 916.655301] RBP: 00007fff6367e100 R08: 00007f57a0ce9160 R09: 000000000000000c
[ 916.655301] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff6367e110
[ 916.655301] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 00007f57a153c610 R15: 0000562417258de0
[ 916.655301] Code: ff ff ff 0f 1f 40 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 fa 53 48 c1 ea 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fd 48 83 ec 08 <0f> b6 04 02 48 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f
[ 916.655301] RIP: strlen+0x1a/0x90 RSP: ffff88010ff0f2f8
[ 916.771929] ---[ end trace 1065e048e72479fe ]---
[ 916.777204] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 916.778158] Kernel Offset: 0x14000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
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__gre6_xmit() pushes GRE headers before handing over to ip6_tnl_xmit() for generic IP-in-IP processing. However it doesn't make sure that there is enough headroom to push the header to. That can lead to the panic cited below. (Reproducer below that). Fix by requesting either needed_headroom if already primed, or just the bare minimum needed for the header otherwise. [ 158.576725] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104! [ 158.581510] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI [ 158.587174] Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_matchall ip6_gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 gre sch_ingress vrf veth x86_pkg_temp_thermal mlx_platform nfsd e1000e leds_mlxcpld [ 158.602268] CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4-net_master-custom-139 #10 [ 158.610938] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. "MSN2410-CB2F"/"SA000874", BIOS 4.6.5 03/08/2016 [ 158.620426] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0xc3/0x100 [ 158.624586] RSP: 0018:ffff8801d3f27110 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 158.629882] RAX: 0000000000000082 RBX: ffff8801c02cc040 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 158.637127] RDX: 0000000000000082 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffed003a7e4e18 [ 158.644366] RBP: ffff8801bfec8020 R08: ffffed003aabce19 R09: ffffed003aabce19 [ 158.651574] R10: 000000000000000b R11: ffffed003aabce18 R12: ffff8801c364de66 [ 158.658786] R13: 000000000000002c R14: 00000000000000c0 R15: ffff8801c364de68 [ 158.666007] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801d5400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 158.674212] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 158.680036] CR2: 00007f4b3702dcd0 CR3: 0000000003228002 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 158.687228] Call Trace: [ 158.689752] ? __gre6_xmit+0x246/0xd80 [ip6_gre] [ 158.694475] ? __gre6_xmit+0x246/0xd80 [ip6_gre] [ 158.699141] skb_push+0x78/0x90 [ 158.702344] __gre6_xmit+0x246/0xd80 [ip6_gre] [ 158.706872] ip6gre_tunnel_xmit+0x3bc/0x610 [ip6_gre] [ 158.711992] ? __gre6_xmit+0xd80/0xd80 [ip6_gre] [ 158.716668] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x210/0x210 [ 158.721761] ? print_irqtrace_events+0x120/0x120 [ 158.726461] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x210 [ 158.730572] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x210 [ 158.734692] ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10 [ 158.738705] ? skb_network_protocol+0x76/0x200 [ 158.743216] ? netif_skb_features+0x1b2/0x550 [ 158.747648] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x137/0x770 [ 158.752010] sch_direct_xmit+0x2ef/0x5d0 [ 158.755992] ? pfifo_fast_dequeue+0x3fa/0x670 [ 158.760460] ? pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len+0x810/0x810 [ 158.765975] ? __lock_is_held+0xa0/0x160 [ 158.770002] __qdisc_run+0x39e/0xfc0 [ 158.773673] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [ 158.777781] ? pfifo_fast_enqueue+0x24b/0x3e0 [ 158.782191] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x5d0/0x5d0 [ 158.786372] ? pfifo_fast_dequeue+0x670/0x670 [ 158.790818] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x172/0x1770 [ 158.795195] ? preempt_count_sub+0xf/0xd0 [ 158.799313] __dev_queue_xmit+0x410/0x1770 [ 158.803512] ? ___slab_alloc+0x605/0x930 [ 158.807525] ? ___slab_alloc+0x605/0x930 [ 158.811540] ? memcpy+0x34/0x50 [ 158.814768] ? netdev_pick_tx+0x1c0/0x1c0 [ 158.818895] ? __skb_clone+0x2fd/0x3d0 [ 158.822712] ? __copy_skb_header+0x270/0x270 [ 158.827079] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x93/0xa0 [ 158.831903] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x344/0x4d0 [ 158.836199] ? skb_clone+0x123/0x230 [ 158.839869] ? skb_split+0x820/0x820 [ 158.843521] ? tcf_mirred+0x554/0x930 [act_mirred] [ 158.848407] tcf_mirred+0x554/0x930 [act_mirred] [ 158.853104] ? tcf_mirred_act_wants_ingress.part.2+0x10/0x10 [act_mirred] [ 158.860005] ? __lock_acquire+0x706/0x26e0 [ 158.864162] ? mark_lock+0x13d/0xb40 [ 158.867832] tcf_action_exec+0xcf/0x2a0 [ 158.871736] tcf_classify+0xfa/0x340 [ 158.875402] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x8e1/0x1c60 [ 158.880334] ? nf_ingress+0x500/0x500 [ 158.884059] ? process_backlog+0x347/0x4b0 [ 158.888241] ? lock_acquire+0xd8/0x320 [ 158.892050] ? process_backlog+0x1b6/0x4b0 [ 158.896228] ? process_backlog+0xc2/0x4b0 [ 158.900291] process_backlog+0xc2/0x4b0 [ 158.904210] net_rx_action+0x5cc/0x980 [ 158.908047] ? napi_complete_done+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 158.912525] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x80/0x80 [ 158.916534] ? __lock_is_held+0x34/0x160 [ 158.920541] __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x9d2 [ 158.924308] ? trace_event_raw_event_irq_handler_exit+0x140/0x140 [ 158.930515] run_ksoftirqd+0x1d/0x40 [ 158.934152] smpboot_thread_fn+0x32b/0x690 [ 158.938299] ? sort_range+0x20/0x20 [ 158.941842] ? preempt_count_sub+0xf/0xd0 [ 158.945940] ? schedule+0x5b/0x140 [ 158.949412] kthread+0x206/0x300 [ 158.952689] ? sort_range+0x20/0x20 [ 158.956249] ? kthread_stop+0x570/0x570 [ 158.960164] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 158.963823] Code: 14 3e ff 8b 4b 78 55 4d 89 f9 41 56 41 55 48 c7 c7 a0 cf db 82 41 54 44 8b 44 24 2c 48 8b 54 24 30 48 8b 74 24 20 e8 16 94 13 ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 60 8e 1f 85 48 83 c4 20 e8 55 ef a6 ff 89 74 24 [ 158.983235] RIP: skb_panic+0xc3/0x100 RSP: ffff8801d3f27110 [ 158.988935] ---[ end trace 5af56ee845aa6cc8 ]--- [ 158.993641] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 159.000176] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 159.003767] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Reproducer: ip link add h1 type veth peer name swp1 ip link add h3 type veth peer name swp3 ip link set dev h1 up ip address add 192.0.2.1/28 dev h1 ip link add dev vh3 type vrf table 20 ip link set dev h3 master vh3 ip link set dev vh3 up ip link set dev h3 up ip link set dev swp3 up ip address add dev swp3 2001:db8:2::1/64 ip link set dev swp1 up tc qdisc add dev swp1 clsact ip link add name gt6 type ip6gretap \ local 2001:db8:2::1 remote 2001:db8:2::2 ip link set dev gt6 up sleep 1 tc filter add dev swp1 ingress pref 1000 matchall skip_hw \ action mirred egress mirror dev gt6 ping -I h1 192.0.2.2 Fixes: c12b395 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <[email protected]> Acked-by: William Tu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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dev->needed_headroom is not primed until ip6_tnl_xmit(), so it starts out zero. Thus the call to skb_cow_head() fails to actually make sure there's enough headroom to push the ERSPAN headers to. That can lead to the panic cited below. (Reproducer below that). Fix by requesting either needed_headroom if already primed, or just the bare minimum needed for the header otherwise. [ 190.703567] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104! [ 190.708384] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI [ 190.714007] Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_matchall ip6_gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 gre sch_ingress vrf veth x86_pkg_temp_thermal mlx_platform nfsd e1000e leds_mlxcpld [ 190.728975] CPU: 1 PID: 959 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4-net_master-custom-139 #10 [ 190.737647] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. "MSN2410-CB2F"/"SA000874", BIOS 4.6.5 03/08/2016 [ 190.747006] Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work [ 190.752222] RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0xc3/0x100 [ 190.756358] RSP: 0018:ffff8801d54072f0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 190.761629] RAX: 0000000000000085 RBX: ffff8801c1a8ecc0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 190.768830] RDX: 0000000000000085 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffed003aa80e54 [ 190.776025] RBP: ffff8801bd1ec5a0 R08: ffffed003aabce19 R09: ffffed003aabce19 [ 190.783226] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed003aabce18 R12: ffff8801bf695dbe [ 190.790418] R13: 0000000000000084 R14: 00000000000006c0 R15: ffff8801bf695dc8 [ 190.797621] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801d5400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 190.805786] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 190.811582] CR2: 000055fa929aced0 CR3: 0000000003228004 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 190.818790] Call Trace: [ 190.821264] <IRQ> [ 190.823314] ? ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x5e4/0x1982 [ip6_gre] [ 190.828940] ? ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x5e4/0x1982 [ip6_gre] [ 190.834562] skb_push+0x78/0x90 [ 190.837749] ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x5e4/0x1982 [ip6_gre] [ 190.843219] ? ip6gre_tunnel_ioctl+0xd90/0xd90 [ip6_gre] [ 190.848577] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x210/0x210 [ 190.853679] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x210/0x210 [ 190.858783] ? print_irqtrace_events+0x120/0x120 [ 190.863451] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x210 [ 190.867496] ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10 [ 190.871474] ? skb_network_protocol+0x76/0x200 [ 190.875977] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x137/0x770 [ 190.880317] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x6d/0xa0 [ 190.884624] sch_direct_xmit+0x2ef/0x5d0 [ 190.888589] ? pfifo_fast_dequeue+0x3fa/0x670 [ 190.892994] ? pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len+0x810/0x810 [ 190.898455] ? __lock_is_held+0xa0/0x160 [ 190.902422] __qdisc_run+0x39e/0xfc0 [ 190.906041] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [ 190.910090] ? pfifo_fast_enqueue+0x24b/0x3e0 [ 190.914501] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x5d0/0x5d0 [ 190.918658] ? pfifo_fast_dequeue+0x670/0x670 [ 190.923047] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x172/0x1770 [ 190.927365] ? preempt_count_sub+0xf/0xd0 [ 190.931421] __dev_queue_xmit+0x410/0x1770 [ 190.935553] ? ___slab_alloc+0x605/0x930 [ 190.939524] ? print_irqtrace_events+0x120/0x120 [ 190.944186] ? memcpy+0x34/0x50 [ 190.947364] ? netdev_pick_tx+0x1c0/0x1c0 [ 190.951428] ? __skb_clone+0x2fd/0x3d0 [ 190.955218] ? __copy_skb_header+0x270/0x270 [ 190.959537] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x93/0xa0 [ 190.964282] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x344/0x4d0 [ 190.968520] ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10 [ 190.972495] ? skb_clone+0x123/0x230 [ 190.976112] ? skb_split+0x820/0x820 [ 190.979747] ? tcf_mirred+0x554/0x930 [act_mirred] [ 190.984582] tcf_mirred+0x554/0x930 [act_mirred] [ 190.989252] ? tcf_mirred_act_wants_ingress.part.2+0x10/0x10 [act_mirred] [ 190.996109] ? __lock_acquire+0x706/0x26e0 [ 191.000239] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x210 [ 191.004294] tcf_action_exec+0xcf/0x2a0 [ 191.008179] tcf_classify+0xfa/0x340 [ 191.011794] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x8e1/0x1c60 [ 191.016630] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x210/0x210 [ 191.021732] ? nf_ingress+0x500/0x500 [ 191.025458] ? process_backlog+0x347/0x4b0 [ 191.029619] ? print_irqtrace_events+0x120/0x120 [ 191.034302] ? lock_acquire+0xd8/0x320 [ 191.038089] ? process_backlog+0x1b6/0x4b0 [ 191.042246] ? process_backlog+0xc2/0x4b0 [ 191.046303] process_backlog+0xc2/0x4b0 [ 191.050189] net_rx_action+0x5cc/0x980 [ 191.053991] ? napi_complete_done+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 191.058386] ? mark_lock+0x13d/0xb40 [ 191.062001] ? clockevents_program_event+0x6b/0x1d0 [ 191.066922] ? print_irqtrace_events+0x120/0x120 [ 191.071593] ? __lock_is_held+0xa0/0x160 [ 191.075566] __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x9d2 [ 191.079282] ? ip6_finish_output2+0x524/0x1460 [ 191.083771] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 [ 191.087994] </IRQ> [ 191.090130] do_softirq.part.13+0x38/0x40 [ 191.094178] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x135/0x190 [ 191.098591] ip6_finish_output2+0x54d/0x1460 [ 191.102916] ? ip6_forward_finish+0x2f0/0x2f0 [ 191.107314] ? ip6_mtu+0x3c/0x2c0 [ 191.110674] ? ip6_finish_output+0x2f8/0x650 [ 191.114992] ? ip6_output+0x12a/0x500 [ 191.118696] ip6_output+0x12a/0x500 [ 191.122223] ? ip6_route_dev_notify+0x5b0/0x5b0 [ 191.126807] ? ip6_finish_output+0x650/0x650 [ 191.131120] ? ip6_fragment+0x1a60/0x1a60 [ 191.135182] ? icmp6_dst_alloc+0x26e/0x470 [ 191.139317] mld_sendpack+0x672/0x830 [ 191.143021] ? igmp6_mcf_seq_next+0x2f0/0x2f0 [ 191.147429] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x77/0x190 [ 191.151913] ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x47/0x90 [ 191.156144] addrconf_dad_completed+0x561/0x720 [ 191.160731] ? addrconf_rs_timer+0x3a0/0x3a0 [ 191.165036] ? mark_held_locks+0xc9/0x140 [ 191.169095] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x77/0x190 [ 191.173570] ? addrconf_dad_work+0x50d/0xa20 [ 191.177886] ? addrconf_dad_work+0x529/0xa20 [ 191.182194] addrconf_dad_work+0x529/0xa20 [ 191.186342] ? addrconf_dad_completed+0x720/0x720 [ 191.191088] ? __lock_is_held+0xa0/0x160 [ 191.195059] ? process_one_work+0x45d/0xe20 [ 191.199302] ? process_one_work+0x51e/0xe20 [ 191.203531] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x93/0xa0 [ 191.208279] process_one_work+0x51e/0xe20 [ 191.212340] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x200/0x200 [ 191.216912] ? get_lock_stats+0x4b/0xf0 [ 191.220788] ? preempt_count_sub+0xf/0xd0 [ 191.224844] ? worker_thread+0x219/0x860 [ 191.228823] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0x6d/0xa0 [ 191.233142] worker_thread+0xeb/0x860 [ 191.236848] ? process_one_work+0xe20/0xe20 [ 191.241095] kthread+0x206/0x300 [ 191.244352] ? process_one_work+0xe20/0xe20 [ 191.248587] ? kthread_stop+0x570/0x570 [ 191.252459] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [ 191.256082] Code: 14 3e ff 8b 4b 78 55 4d 89 f9 41 56 41 55 48 c7 c7 a0 cf db 82 41 54 44 8b 44 24 2c 48 8b 54 24 30 48 8b 74 24 20 e8 16 94 13 ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c7 60 8e 1f 85 48 83 c4 20 e8 55 ef a6 ff 89 74 24 [ 191.275327] RIP: skb_panic+0xc3/0x100 RSP: ffff8801d54072f0 [ 191.281024] ---[ end trace 7ea51094e099e006 ]--- [ 191.285724] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 191.292168] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 191.295697] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Reproducer: ip link add h1 type veth peer name swp1 ip link add h3 type veth peer name swp3 ip link set dev h1 up ip address add 192.0.2.1/28 dev h1 ip link add dev vh3 type vrf table 20 ip link set dev h3 master vh3 ip link set dev vh3 up ip link set dev h3 up ip link set dev swp3 up ip address add dev swp3 2001:db8:2::1/64 ip link set dev swp1 up tc qdisc add dev swp1 clsact ip link add name gt6 type ip6erspan \ local 2001:db8:2::1 remote 2001:db8:2::2 oseq okey 123 ip link set dev gt6 up sleep 1 tc filter add dev swp1 ingress pref 1000 matchall skip_hw \ action mirred egress mirror dev gt6 ping -I h1 192.0.2.2 Fixes: e41c7c6 ("ip6erspan: make sure enough headroom at xmit.") Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <[email protected]> Acked-by: William Tu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== net: ip6_gre: Fixes in headroom handling This series mends some problems in headroom management in ip6_gre module. The current code base has the following three closely-related problems: - ip6gretap tunnels neglect to ensure there's enough writable headroom before pushing GRE headers. - ip6erspan does this, but assumes that dev->needed_headroom is primed. But that doesn't happen until ip6_tnl_xmit() is called later. Thus for the first packet, ip6erspan actually behaves like ip6gretap above. - ip6erspan shares some of the code with ip6gretap, including calculations of needed header length. While there is custom ERSPAN-specific code for calculating the headroom, the computed values are overwritten by the ip6gretap code. The first two issues lead to a kernel panic in situations where a packet is mirrored from a veth device to the device in question. They are fixed, respectively, in patches #1 and #2, which include the full panic trace and a reproducer. The rest of the patchset deals with the last issue. In patches #3 to #6, several functions are split up into reusable parts. Finally in patch #7 these blocks are used to compose ERSPAN-specific callbacks where necessary to fix the hlen calculation. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Recently during testing, I ran into the following panic: [ 207.892422] Internal error: Accessing user space memory outside uaccess.h routines: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 207.901637] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc [...] [ 207.966530] CPU: 45 PID: 2256 Comm: test_verifier Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc3+ #7 [ 207.974956] Hardware name: FOXCONN R2-1221R-A4/C2U4N_MB, BIOS G31FB18A 03/31/2017 [ 207.982428] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 207.987214] pc : bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 207.992603] lr : 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 207.996080] sp : ffff000013703ca0 [ 207.999384] x29: ffff000013703ca0 x28: 0000000000000001 [ 208.004688] x27: 0000000000000001 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 208.009992] x25: ffff000013703ce0 x24: ffff800fb4afcb00 [ 208.015295] x23: ffff00007d2f5038 x22: ffff00007d2f5000 [ 208.020599] x21: fffffffffeff2a6f x20: 000000000000000a [ 208.025903] x19: ffff000009578000 x18: 0000000000000a03 [ 208.031206] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 208.036510] x15: 0000ffff9de83000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 208.041813] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 208.047116] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: ffff0000089e7f18 [ 208.052419] x9 : fffffffffeff2a6f x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 208.057723] x7 : 000000000000000a x6 : 00280c6160000000 [ 208.063026] x5 : 0000000000000018 x4 : 0000000000007db6 [ 208.068329] x3 : 000000000008647a x2 : 19868179b1484500 [ 208.073632] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000009578c08 [ 208.078938] Process test_verifier (pid: 2256, stack limit = 0x0000000049ca7974) [ 208.086235] Call trace: [ 208.088672] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x34/0xc0 [ 208.093713] 0xffff000000bdb754 [ 208.096845] bpf_test_run+0x78/0xf8 [ 208.100324] bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x148/0x230 [ 208.104758] sys_bpf+0x314/0x1198 [ 208.108064] el0_svc_naked+0x30/0x34 [ 208.111632] Code: 91302260 f9400001 f9001fa1 d2800001 (29500680) [ 208.117717] ---[ end trace 263cb8a59b5bf29f ]--- The program itself which caused this had a long jump over the whole instruction sequence where all of the inner instructions required heavy expansions into multiple BPF instructions. Additionally, I also had BPF hardening enabled which requires once more rewrites of all constant values in order to blind them. Each time we rewrite insns, bpf_adj_branches() would need to potentially adjust branch targets which cross the patchlet boundary to accommodate for the additional delta. Eventually that lead to the case where the target offset could not fit into insn->off's upper 0x7fff limit anymore where then offset wraps around becoming negative (in s16 universe), or vice versa depending on the jump direction. Therefore it becomes necessary to detect and reject any such occasions in a generic way for native eBPF and cBPF to eBPF migrations. For the latter we can simply check bounds in the bpf_convert_filter()'s BPF_EMIT_JMP helper macro and bail out once we surpass limits. The bpf_patch_insn_single() for native eBPF (and cBPF to eBPF in case of subsequent hardening) is a bit more complex in that we need to detect such truncations before hitting the bpf_prog_realloc(). Thus the latter is split into an extra pass to probe problematic offsets on the original program in order to fail early. With that in place and carefully tested I no longer hit the panic and the rewrites are rejected properly. The above example panic I've seen on bpf-next, though the issue itself is generic in that a guard against this issue in bpf seems more appropriate in this case. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Hangbin reported an Oops triggered by the syzkaller qdisc rules: kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI Modules linked in: sch_red CPU: 0 PID: 28699 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4.kcov #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:qdisc_hash_add+0x26/0xa0 RSP: 0018:ffff8800589cf470 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff824ad971 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffffc9000ce9f000 RDI: 000000000000003c RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffed000b139ea2 R09: ffff8800589cf4f0 R10: ffff8800589cf50f R11: ffffed000b139ea2 R12: ffff880054019fc0 R13: ffff880054019fb4 R14: ffff88005c0af600 R15: ffff880054019fb0 FS: 00007fa6edcb1700(0000) GS:ffff88005ce00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000740 CR3: 000000000fc16000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: red_change+0x2d2/0xed0 [sch_red] qdisc_create+0x57e/0xef0 tc_modify_qdisc+0x47f/0x14e0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6a8/0x920 netlink_rcv_skb+0x2a2/0x3c0 netlink_unicast+0x511/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x825/0xc30 sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x100 ___sys_sendmsg+0x778/0x8e0 __sys_sendmsg+0xf5/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x3b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x450869 RSP: 002b:00007fa6edcb0c48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa6edcb16b4 RCX: 0000000000450869 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000013 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 0000000000008778 R14: 0000000000702838 R15: 00007fa6edcb1700 Code: e9 0b fe ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 53 48 89 fb 89 f5 e8 3f 07 f3 fe 48 8d 7b 3c 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 51 RIP: qdisc_hash_add+0x26/0xa0 RSP: ffff8800589cf470 When a red qdisc is updated with a 0 limit, the child qdisc is left unmodified, no additional scheduler is created in red_change(), the 'child' local variable is rightfully NULL and must not add it to the hash table. This change addresses the above issue moving qdisc_hash_add() right after the child qdisc creation. It additionally removes unneeded checks for noop_qdisc. Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]> Fixes: 49b4997 ("net: sched: make default fifo qdiscs appear in the dump") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Add a test which shows a race in the multi-order iteration code. This
test reliably hits the race in under a second on my machine, and is the
result of a real bug report against kernel a production v4.15 based
kernel (4.15.6-300.fc27.x86_64). With a real kernel this issue is hit
when using order 9 PMD DAX radix tree entries.
The race has to do with how we tear down multi-order sibling entries
when we are removing an item from the tree. Remember that an order 2
entry looks like this:
struct radix_tree_node.slots[] = [entry][sibling][sibling][sibling]
where 'entry' is in some slot in the struct radix_tree_node, and the
three slots following 'entry' contain sibling pointers which point back
to 'entry.'
When we delete 'entry' from the tree, we call :
radix_tree_delete()
radix_tree_delete_item()
__radix_tree_delete()
replace_slot()
replace_slot() first removes the siblings in order from the first to the
last, then at then replaces 'entry' with NULL. This means that for a
brief period of time we end up with one or more of the siblings removed,
so:
struct radix_tree_node.slots[] = [entry][NULL][sibling][sibling]
This causes an issue if you have a reader iterating over the slots in
the tree via radix_tree_for_each_slot() while only under
rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() protection. This is a common case in
mm/filemap.c.
The issue is that when __radix_tree_next_slot() => skip_siblings() tries
to skip over the sibling entries in the slots, it currently does so with
an exact match on the slot directly preceding our current slot.
Normally this works:
V preceding slot
struct radix_tree_node.slots[] = [entry][sibling][sibling][sibling]
^ current slot
This lets you find the first sibling, and you skip them all in order.
But in the case where one of the siblings is NULL, that slot is skipped
and then our sibling detection is interrupted:
V preceding slot
struct radix_tree_node.slots[] = [entry][NULL][sibling][sibling]
^ current slot
This means that the sibling pointers aren't recognized since they point
all the way back to 'entry', so we think that they are normal internal
radix tree pointers. This causes us to think we need to walk down to a
struct radix_tree_node starting at the address of 'entry'.
In a real running kernel this will crash the thread with a GP fault when
you try and dereference the slots in your broken node starting at
'entry'.
In the radix tree test suite this will be caught by the address
sanitizer:
==27063==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address
0x60c0008ae400 at pc 0x00000040ce4f bp 0x7fa89b8fcad0 sp 0x7fa89b8fcac0
READ of size 8 at 0x60c0008ae400 thread T3
#0 0x40ce4e in __radix_tree_next_slot /home/rzwisler/project/linux/tools/testing/radix-tree/radix-tree.c:1660
#1 0x4022cc in radix_tree_next_slot linux/../../../../include/linux/radix-tree.h:567
#2 0x4022cc in iterator_func /home/rzwisler/project/linux/tools/testing/radix-tree/multiorder.c:655
#3 0x7fa8a088d50a in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x750a)
#4 0x7fa8a03bd16e in clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xf516e)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: CR, Sapthagirish <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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Since get_kprobe_ctlblk() uses smp_processor_id() to access per-cpu variable, it hits smp_processor_id sanity check as below. [ 7.006928] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: swapper/0/1 [ 7.007859] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x24 [ 7.008438] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00192-g4eb17253e4b5 #1 [ 7.008890] Hardware name: Generic DT based system [ 7.009917] [<c0313f0c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030e6d8>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [ 7.010473] [<c030e6d8>] (show_stack) from [<c0c64694>] (dump_stack+0x84/0x98) [ 7.010990] [<c0c64694>] (dump_stack) from [<c071ca5c>] (check_preemption_disabled+0x138/0x13c) [ 7.011592] [<c071ca5c>] (check_preemption_disabled) from [<c071ca80>] (debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x24) [ 7.012214] [<c071ca80>] (debug_smp_processor_id) from [<c03335e0>] (optimized_callback+0x2c/0xe4) [ 7.013077] [<c03335e0>] (optimized_callback) from [<bf0021b0>] (0xbf0021b0) To fix this issue, call get_kprobe_ctlblk() right after irq-disabled since that disables preemption. Fixes: 0dc016d ("ARM: kprobes: enable OPTPROBES for ARM 32") Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
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commit 8fb472c ("ipmr: improve hash scalability") added a call to rhltable_init() without checking its return value. This problem was then later copied to IPv6 and factorized in commit 0bbbf0e ("ipmr, ip6mr: Unite creation of new mr_table") kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 31552 Comm: syz-executor7 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #60 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:277 [inline] RIP: 0010:__rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:630 [inline] RIP: 0010:rhltable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:716 [inline] RIP: 0010:mr_mfc_find_parent+0x2ad/0xbb0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:63 RSP: 0018:ffff8801826aef70 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc90001ea0000 RDX: 0000000000000079 RSI: ffffffff8661e859 RDI: 000000000000000c RBP: ffff8801826af1c0 R08: ffff8801b2212000 R09: ffffed003b5e46c2 R10: ffffed003b5e46c2 R11: ffff8801daf23613 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8801826af198 R14: ffff8801cf8225c0 R15: ffff8801826af658 FS: 00007ff7fa732700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000003ffffff9c CR3: 00000001b0210000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ip6mr_cache_find_parent net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:981 [inline] ip6mr_mfc_delete+0x1fe/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1221 ip6_mroute_setsockopt+0x15c6/0x1d70 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1698 do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.9+0x422/0x4660 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:163 ipv6_setsockopt+0xbd/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:922 rawv6_setsockopt+0x59/0x140 net/ipv6/raw.c:1060 sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3039 __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 8fb472c ("ipmr: improve hash scalability") Fixes: 0bbbf0e ("ipmr, ip6mr: Unite creation of new mr_table") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Cc: Yuval Mintz <[email protected]> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Dasd uses completion_data from struct request to store per request private data - this is problematic since this member is part of a union which is also used by IO schedulers. Let the block layer maintain space for per request data behind each struct request. Fixes crashes on block layer timeouts like this one: Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space Failing address: 0000000000000000 TEID: 0000000000000483 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:0000000001308007 R3:00000000fffc8007 S:00000000fffcc000 P:000000000000013d Oops: 0004 ilc:2 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: [...] CPU: 0 PID: 1480 Comm: kworker/0:2H Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4-00046-gaa3bcd43b5af #203 Hardware name: IBM 3906 M02 702 (LPAR) Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work Krnl PSW : 0000000067ac406b 00000000b6960308 (do_raw_spin_trylock+0x30/0x78) R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000c00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000b9d3c8 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 00000000cf9639d8 0000000000000000 0700000000000000 0000000000000000 000000000099f09e 0000000000000000 000000000076e9d0 000000006247bb08 000000006247bae0 Krnl Code: 00000000001c159c: b90400c2 lgr %r12,%r2 00000000001c15a0: a7180000 lhi %r1,0 #00000000001c15a4: 583003a4 l %r3,932 >00000000001c15a8: ba132000 cs %r1,%r3,0(%r2) 00000000001c15ac: a7180001 lhi %r1,1 00000000001c15b0: a784000b brc 8,1c15c6 00000000001c15b4: c0e5004e72aa brasl %r14,b8fb08 00000000001c15ba: 1812 lr %r1,%r2 Call Trace: ([<0700000000000000>] 0x700000000000000) [<0000000000b9d3d2>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7a/0xb8 [<000000000099f09e>] dasd_times_out+0x46/0x278 [<000000000076ea6e>] blk_mq_terminate_expired+0x9e/0x108 [<000000000077497a>] bt_for_each+0x102/0x130 [<0000000000774e54>] blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x74/0xd8 [<000000000076fea0>] blk_mq_timeout_work+0x260/0x320 [<0000000000169dd4>] process_one_work+0x3bc/0x708 [<000000000016a382>] worker_thread+0x262/0x408 [<00000000001723a8>] kthread+0x160/0x178 [<0000000000b9e73a>] kernel_thread_starter+0x6/0xc [<0000000000b9e734>] kernel_thread_starter+0x0/0xc INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000000b9d3cc>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x74/0xb8 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ott <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefan Haberland <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
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syzkaller reports for buffer overflow for interface name when starting sync daemons [1] What we do is that we copy user structure into larger stack buffer but later we search NUL past the stack buffer. The same happens for sched_name when adding/editing virtual server. We are restricted by IP_VS_SCHEDNAME_MAXLEN and IP_VS_IFNAME_MAXLEN being used as size in include/uapi/linux/ip_vs.h, so they include the space for NUL. As using strlcpy is wrong for unsafe source, replace it with strscpy and add checks to return EINVAL if source string is not NUL-terminated. The incomplete strlcpy fix comes from 2.6.13. For the netlink interface reduce the len parameter for IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_MCAST_IFN and IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME, so that we get proper EINVAL. [1] kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1052! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 373 Comm: syz-executor936 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #45 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051 RSP: 0018:ffff8801c976f800 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000022 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000022 RSI: ffffffff8160f6f1 RDI: ffffed00392edef6 RBP: ffff8801c976f800 R08: ffff8801cf4c62c0 R09: ffffed003b5e4fb0 R10: ffffed003b5e4fb0 R11: ffff8801daf27d87 R12: ffff8801c976fa20 R13: ffff8801c976fae4 R14: ffff8801c976fae0 R15: 000000000000048b FS: 00007fd99f75e700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000200001c0 CR3: 00000001d6843000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: strlen include/linux/string.h:270 [inline] strlcpy include/linux/string.h:293 [inline] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x31c/0x1d00 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ip_setsockopt+0xd8/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253 udp_setsockopt+0x62/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2487 ipv6_setsockopt+0x149/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:917 tcp_setsockopt+0x93/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3057 sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3046 __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x447369 RSP: 002b:00007fd99f75dda8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e39e4 RCX: 0000000000447369 RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e39e0 R13: 75a1ff93f0896195 R14: 6f745f3168746576 R15: 0000000000000001 Code: 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 0f 0b 48 89 df e8 d2 8f 48 fa eb de 55 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 60 65 64 88 48 89 e5 e8 91 dd f3 f9 <0f> 0b 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 RIP: fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051 RSP: ffff8801c976f800 Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Fixes: e4ff675 ("ipvs: add sync_maxlen parameter for the sync daemon") Fixes: 4da62fc ("[IPVS]: Fix for overflows") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
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If a instance has an event trigger enabled when it is freed, it could cause an access of free memory. Here's the case that crashes: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # mkdir instances/foo # echo snapshot > instances/foo/events/initcall/initcall_start/trigger # rmdir instances/foo Would produce: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI Modules linked in: tun bridge ... CPU: 5 PID: 6203 Comm: rmdir Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc4-test+ #933 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016 RIP: 0010:clear_event_triggers+0x3b/0x70 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003783de0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b2b RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800c7130ba0 RBP: ffffc90003783e00 R08: ffff8801131993f8 R09: 0000000100230016 R10: ffffc90003783d80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800c7130ba0 R13: ffff8800c7130bd8 R14: ffff8800cc093768 R15: 00000000ffffff9c FS: 00007f6f4aa86700(0000) GS:ffff88011eb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f6f4a5aed60 CR3: 00000000cd552001 CR4: 00000000001606e0 Call Trace: event_trace_del_tracer+0x2a/0xc5 instance_rmdir+0x15c/0x200 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x52/0x90 vfs_rmdir+0xdb/0x160 do_rmdir+0x16d/0x1c0 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x17/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe This was due to the call the clears out the triggers when an instance is being deleted not removing the trigger from the link list. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 85f2b08 ("tracing: Add basic event trigger framework") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
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…n phase Delay registering ourselves with the acpi lid notification mechanism until we are registering the connectors after initialisation is complete. This prevents a possibility of trying to handle the lid notification before we are ready with the danger of chasing uninitialised function pointers. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 IP: (null) PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI Modules linked in: arc4(+) iwldvm(+) i915(+) mac80211 i2c_algo_bit coretemp mei_wdt iwlwifi drm_kms_helper kvm_intel wmi_bmof iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support kvm snd_hda_codec_conexant snd_hda_codec_generic drm psmouse cfg80211 irqbypass input_leds pcspkr i2c_i801 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec thinkpad_acpi snd_hda_core mei_me lpc_ich snd_hwdep e1000e wmi nvram snd_pcm mei snd_timer shpchp ptp pps_core rfkill syscopyarea snd intel_agp sysfillrect intel_gtt soundcore sysimgblt battery led_class fb_sys_fops ac rtc_cmos agpgart evdev mac_hid acpi_cpufreq ip_tables x_tables ext4 crc32c_generic crc16 mbcache jbd2 fscrypto crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd aes_x86_64 xts algif_skcipher af_alg dm_crypt dm_mod sd_mod uas usb_storage serio_raw atkbd libps2 ahci libahci uhci_hcd libata scsi_mod ehci_pci ehci_hcd usbcore usb_common i8042 serio CPU: 1 PID: 378 Comm: systemd-logind Not tainted 4.16.8-1-ARCH #1 Hardware name: LENOVO 7454CTO/7454CTO, BIOS 6DET72WW (3.22 ) 10/25/2012 RIP: 0010: (null) RSP: 0018:ffffaf4580c33a18 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff947533558000 RCX: 000000000000003e RDX: ffffffffc0aa80c0 RSI: ffffaf4580c33a3c RDI: ffff947534e4c000 RBP: ffff947533558338 R08: ffff947534598930 R09: ffffffffc0a928b1 R10: ffffd8f181d5fd40 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffc0a928b1 R13: ffff947533558368 R14: ffffffffc0a928a9 R15: ffff947534e4c000 FS: 00007f3dc4ddb940(0000) GS:ffff947539280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000006e214000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 Call Trace: ? intel_modeset_setup_hw_state+0x385/0xf60 [i915] ? __intel_display_resume+0x1e/0xc0 [i915] ? intel_display_resume+0xcc/0x120 [i915] ? intel_lid_notify+0xbc/0xc0 [i915] ? notifier_call_chain+0x47/0x70 ? blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3e/0x60 ? acpi_lid_notify_state+0x8f/0x1d0 ? acpi_lid_update_state+0x49/0x70 ? acpi_lid_input_open+0x60/0x90 ? input_open_device+0x5d/0xa0 ? evdev_open+0x1ba/0x1e0 [evdev] ? chrdev_open+0xa3/0x1b0 ? cdev_put.part.0+0x20/0x20 ? do_dentry_open+0x14c/0x300 ? path_openat+0x30c/0x1240 ? current_time+0x16/0x60 ? do_filp_open+0x93/0x100 ? __check_object_size+0xfb/0x180 ? do_sys_open+0x186/0x210 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x190 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Code: Bad RIP value. RIP: (null) RSP: ffffaf4580c33a18 CR2: 0000000000000000 Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106559 Fixes: c1c7af6 ("drm/i915: force mode set at lid open time") Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <[email protected]> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jani Nikula <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] (cherry picked from commit e578a57) Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
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The table field in nft_obj_filter is not an array. In order to check tablename, we should check if the pointer is set. Test commands: %nft add table ip filter %nft add counter ip filter ct1 %nft reset counters Splat looks like: [ 306.510504] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled [ 306.516184] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ 306.524775] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI [ 306.528284] Modules linked in: nft_objref nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables [ 306.528284] CPU: 0 PID: 1488 Comm: nft Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #17 [ 306.528284] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 07/08/2015 [ 306.528284] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_dump_obj+0x52c/0xa70 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] RSP: 0018:ffff8800b6cb7520 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 306.528284] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800b6c49820 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 306.528284] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffffed0016d96e9a [ 306.528284] RBP: ffff8800b6cb75c0 R08: ffffed00236fce7c R09: ffffed00236fce7b [ 306.528284] R10: ffffffff9f6241e8 R11: ffffed00236fce7c R12: ffff880111365108 [ 306.528284] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800b6c49860 R15: ffff8800b6c49860 [ 306.528284] FS: 00007f838b007700(0000) GS:ffff88011b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 306.528284] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 306.528284] CR2: 00007ffeafabcf78 CR3: 00000000b6cbe000 CR4: 00000000001006f0 [ 306.528284] Call Trace: [ 306.528284] netlink_dump+0x470/0xa20 [ 306.528284] __netlink_dump_start+0x5ae/0x690 [ 306.528284] ? nf_tables_getobj+0x1b3/0x740 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] nf_tables_getobj+0x2f5/0x740 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] ? nft_obj_notify+0x100/0x100 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] ? nf_tables_getobj+0x740/0x740 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] ? nf_tables_dump_flowtable_done+0x70/0x70 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] ? nft_obj_notify+0x100/0x100 [nf_tables] [ 306.528284] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x8ff/0x932 [nfnetlink] [ 306.528284] ? nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x216/0x932 [nfnetlink] [ 306.528284] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1c9/0x2f0 [ 306.528284] ? nfnetlink_bind+0x1d0/0x1d0 [nfnetlink] [ 306.528284] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x270/0x270 [ 306.528284] ? netlink_ack+0x7a0/0x7a0 [ 306.528284] ? ns_capable_common+0x6e/0x110 [ ... ] Fixes: e46abbc ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow table names of up to 255 chars") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
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Since an SRP remote port is attached as a child to shost->shost_gendev and as the only child, the translation from the shost pointer into an rport pointer must happen by looking up the shost child that is an rport. This patch fixes the following KASAN complaint: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in srp_timed_out+0x57/0x110 [scsi_transport_srp] Read of size 4 at addr ffff880035d3fcc0 by task kworker/1:0H/19 CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: kworker/1:0H Not tainted 4.16.0-rc3-dbg+ #1 Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc7 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 kasan_report+0x231/0x350 srp_timed_out+0x57/0x110 [scsi_transport_srp] scsi_times_out+0xc7/0x3f0 [scsi_mod] blk_mq_terminate_expired+0xc2/0x140 bt_iter+0xbc/0xd0 blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x1c7/0x350 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x325/0x3f0 process_one_work+0x441/0xa50 worker_thread+0x76/0x6c0 kthread+0x1b2/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 Fixes: e68ca75 ("scsi_transport_srp: Reduce failover time") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> Cc: Laurence Oberman <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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Aug 12, 2018
Calling XDP redirection requires bh disabled. Softirq can call another XDP function and redirection functions, then the percpu static variable ri->map can be overwritten to NULL. This is a generic XDP case called from tun. [ 3535.736058] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 3535.743974] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 3535.746530] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 3535.750049] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm ipmi_ssif irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ses aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd enclosure hpwdt hpilo glue_helper ipmi_si pcspkr wmi mei_me ioatdma mei ipmi_devintf shpchp dca ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich acpi_power_meter sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm smartpqi i40e crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas tg3 i2c_core ptp pps_core [ 3535.813456] CPU: 5 PID: 1630 Comm: vhost-1614 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4 #2 [ 3535.820127] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 11/14/2017 [ 3535.828732] RIP: 0010:__xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 [ 3535.833740] RSP: 0018:ffffb4bc47bf7c58 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 3535.839009] RAX: ffff9fdfcfea1c40 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9fdf27fe3100 [ 3535.846205] RDX: ffff9fdfca769200 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 3535.853402] RBP: ffffb4bc491d9000 R08: 00000000000045ad R09: 0000000000000ec0 [ 3535.860597] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff9fdf26c3ce4e R12: ffff9fdf9e72c000 [ 3535.867794] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffff2 R15: ffff9fdfc82cdd00 [ 3535.874990] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9fdfcfe80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3535.883152] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3535.888948] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000bde724004 CR4: 00000000007626e0 [ 3535.896145] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3535.903342] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3535.910538] PKRU: 55555554 [ 3535.913267] Call Trace: [ 3535.915736] xdp_do_generic_redirect+0x7a/0x310 [ 3535.920310] do_xdp_generic.part.117+0x285/0x370 [ 3535.924970] tun_get_user+0x5b9/0x1260 [tun] [ 3535.929279] tun_sendmsg+0x52/0x70 [tun] [ 3535.933237] handle_tx+0x2ad/0x5f0 [vhost_net] [ 3535.937721] vhost_worker+0xa5/0x100 [vhost] [ 3535.942030] kthread+0xf5/0x130 [ 3535.945198] ? vhost_dev_ioctl+0x3b0/0x3b0 [vhost] [ 3535.950031] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10 [ 3535.953727] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 3535.957334] Code: 0e 74 15 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 49 aa b3 ff f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 c3 e9 29 9d b3 ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <8b> 47 18 83 f8 0e 74 0d 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 49 a9 b3 ff 31 c0 c3 [ 3535.976387] RIP: __xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 RSP: ffffb4bc47bf7c58 [ 3535.982883] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 3535.987096] ---[ end trace 383b299dd1430240 ]--- [ 3536.131325] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 3536.137484] Kernel Offset: 0x26a00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 3536.281406] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- And a kernel with generic case fixed still panics in tun driver XDP redirect, because it disabled only preemption, but not bh. [ 2055.128746] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 2055.136662] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2055.139219] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 2055.142736] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ses aesni_intel ipmi_ssif crypto_simd enclosure cryptd hpwdt glue_helper ioatdma hpilo wmi dca pcspkr ipmi_si acpi_power_meter ipmi_devintf shpchp mei_me ipmi_msghandler mei lpc_ich sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm i40e smartpqi tg3 scsi_transport_sas crc32c_intel i2c_core ptp pps_core [ 2055.206142] CPU: 6 PID: 1693 Comm: vhost-1683 Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc5-fix-tun+ #1 [ 2055.215011] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 11/14/2017 [ 2055.223617] RIP: 0010:__xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 [ 2055.228624] RSP: 0018:ffff998b07607cc0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2055.233892] RAX: ffff8dbd8e235700 RBX: ffff8dbd8ff21c40 RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 2055.241089] RDX: ffff998b097a9000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 2055.248286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000000065a8 R09: 0000000000005d80 [ 2055.255483] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffff8dbcf0100000 R12: ffff998b097a9000 [ 2055.262681] R13: ffff8dbd8c98c000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff998b07607d78 [ 2055.269879] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8dbd8ff00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2055.278039] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2055.283834] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000c0c8cc005 CR4: 00000000007626e0 [ 2055.291030] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2055.298227] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2055.305424] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2055.308153] Call Trace: [ 2055.310624] xdp_do_redirect+0x7b/0x380 [ 2055.314499] tun_get_user+0x10fe/0x12a0 [tun] [ 2055.318895] tun_sendmsg+0x52/0x70 [tun] [ 2055.322852] handle_tx+0x2ad/0x5f0 [vhost_net] [ 2055.327337] vhost_worker+0xa5/0x100 [vhost] [ 2055.331646] kthread+0xf5/0x130 [ 2055.334813] ? vhost_dev_ioctl+0x3b0/0x3b0 [vhost] [ 2055.339646] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10 [ 2055.343343] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 2055.346950] Code: 0e 74 15 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 e9 aa b3 ff f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 c3 e9 c9 9d b3 ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <8b> 47 18 83 f8 0e 74 0d 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 e9 a9 b3 ff 31 c0 c3 [ 2055.366004] RIP: __xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 RSP: ffff998b07607cc0 [ 2055.372500] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 2055.375856] ---[ end trace 2a2dcc5e9e174268 ]--- [ 2055.523626] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 2055.529796] Kernel Offset: 0x2e000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 2055.677539] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- v2: - Removed preempt_disable/enable since local_bh_disable will prevent preemption as well, feedback from Jason Wang. Fixes: 761876c ("tap: XDP support") Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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Commit 7675076 ("arch_numa: switch over to numa_memblks") significantly cleaned up the NUMA registration code, but also dropped a significant check that was refusing to accept to configure a memblock with an invalid nid. On "quality hardware" such as my ThunderX machine, this results in a kernel that dies immediately: [ 0.000000] Booting Linux on physical CPU 0x0000000000 [0x431f0a10] [ 0.000000] Linux version 6.12.0-00013-g8920d74cf8db (maz@valley-girl) (gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40) #3872 SMP PREEMPT Wed Nov 27 15:25:49 GMT 2024 [ 0.000000] KASLR disabled due to lack of seed [ 0.000000] Machine model: Cavium ThunderX CN88XX board [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.4 by American Megatrends [ 0.000000] efi: ESRT=0xffce0ff18 SMBIOS 3.0=0xfffb0000 ACPI 2.0=0xffec60000 MEMRESERVE=0xffc905d98 [ 0.000000] esrt: Reserving ESRT space from 0x0000000ffce0ff18 to 0x0000000ffce0ff50. [ 0.000000] earlycon: pl11 at MMIO 0x000087e024000000 (options '115200n8') [ 0.000000] printk: legacy bootconsole [pl11] enabled [ 0.000000] NODE_DATA(0) allocated [mem 0xff6754580-0xff67566bf] [ 0.000000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000001d40 [ 0.000000] Mem abort info: [ 0.000000] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 0.000000] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 0.000000] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 0.000000] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 0.000000] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 0.000000] Data abort info: [ 0.000000] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 0.000000] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 0.000000] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 0.000000] [0000000000001d40] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 0.000000] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 0.000000] Modules linked in: [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.12.0-00013-g8920d74cf8db #3872 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: Cavium ThunderX CN88XX board (DT) [ 0.000000] pstate: a00000c5 (NzCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 0.000000] pc : sparse_init_nid+0x54/0x428 [ 0.000000] lr : sparse_init+0x118/0x240 [ 0.000000] sp : ffff800081da3cb0 [ 0.000000] x29: ffff800081da3cb0 x28: 0000000fedbab10c x27: 0000000000000001 [ 0.000000] x26: 0000000ffee250f8 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffff800082102cd0 [ 0.000000] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 00000000001fffff [ 0.000000] x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 0.000000] x17: 0000000001b00000 x16: 0000000ffd130000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] x14: 00000000003e0000 x13: 00000000000001c8 x12: 0000000000000014 [ 0.000000] x11: ffff800081e82860 x10: ffff8000820fb2c8 x9 : ffff8000820fb490 [ 0.000000] x8 : 0000000000ffed20 x7 : 0000000000000014 x6 : 00000000001fffff [ 0.000000] x5 : 00000000ffffffff x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000040 x0 : 0000000000000007 [ 0.000000] Call trace: [ 0.000000] sparse_init_nid+0x54/0x428 [ 0.000000] sparse_init+0x118/0x240 [ 0.000000] bootmem_init+0x70/0x1c8 [ 0.000000] setup_arch+0x184/0x270 [ 0.000000] start_kernel+0x74/0x670 [ 0.000000] __primary_switched+0x80/0x90 [ 0.000000] Code: f865d804 d37df060 cb030000 d2800003 (b95d4084) [ 0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! [ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! ]--- while previous kernel versions were able to recognise how brain-damaged the machine is, and only build a fake node. Use the memblock_validate_numa_coverage() helper to restore some sanity and a "working" system. Fixes: 7675076 ("arch_numa: switch over to numa_memblks") Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Cc: Zi Yan <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]>
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syzbot found a NULL deref [1] in modify_prefix_route(), caused by one fib6_info without a fib6_table pointer set. This can happen for net->ipv6.fib6_null_entry [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5837 Comm: syz-executor888 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-09567-g7eef7e306d3c #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xe4/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5089 Code: 08 84 d2 0f 85 15 14 00 00 44 8b 0d ca 98 f5 0e 45 85 c9 0f 84 b4 0e 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 96 2c 00 00 49 8b 04 24 48 3d a0 07 7f 93 0f 84 RSP: 0018:ffffc900035d7268 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 1ffff920006bae5f RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff90608e17 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000030 R13: ffff888036334880 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000555579e90380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffc59cc4278 CR3: 0000000072b54000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] modify_prefix_route+0x30b/0x8b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4831 inet6_addr_modify net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4923 [inline] inet6_rtm_newaddr+0x12c7/0x1ab0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:5055 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c7/0xea0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6920 netlink_rcv_skb+0x16b/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2541 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347 netlink_sendmsg+0x8b8/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:726 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2583 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2637 __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2669 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fd1dcef8b79 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc59cc4378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fd1dcef8b79 RDX: 0000000000040040 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000000113fd R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000006 R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc59cc438c R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> Fixes: 5eb902b ("net/ipv6: Remove expired routes with a separated list of routes.") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> CC: Kui-Feng Lee <[email protected]> Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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The udelay(5) is not enough, sometimes below kernel panic still be triggered: [ 4.012973] Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt [ 4.012976] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 186 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-0.0.0-devel-00004-g8b1b79e88956 #1 [ 4.012982] Hardware name: Toradex Verdin iMX8M Plus WB on Dahlia Board (DT) [ 4.012985] Call trace: [...] [ 4.013029] arm64_serror_panic+0x64/0x70 [ 4.013034] do_serror+0x3c/0x70 [ 4.013039] el1h_64_error_handler+0x30/0x54 [ 4.013046] el1h_64_error+0x64/0x68 [ 4.013050] clk_imx8mp_audiomix_runtime_resume+0x38/0x48 [ 4.013059] __genpd_runtime_resume+0x30/0x80 [ 4.013066] genpd_runtime_resume+0x114/0x29c [ 4.013073] __rpm_callback+0x48/0x1e0 [ 4.013079] rpm_callback+0x68/0x80 [ 4.013084] rpm_resume+0x3bc/0x6a0 [ 4.013089] __pm_runtime_resume+0x50/0x9c [ 4.013095] pm_runtime_get_suppliers+0x60/0x8c [ 4.013101] __driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x14c [ 4.013108] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x120 [ 4.013114] __driver_attach+0xc4/0x200 [ 4.013119] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0 [ 4.013125] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 [ 4.013130] bus_add_driver+0x110/0x240 [ 4.013135] driver_register+0x68/0x124 [ 4.013142] __platform_driver_register+0x24/0x30 [ 4.013149] sdma_driver_init+0x20/0x1000 [imx_sdma] [ 4.013163] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1e0 [ 4.013168] do_init_module+0x5c/0x21c [ 4.013175] load_module+0x1a98/0x205c [ 4.013181] init_module_from_file+0x88/0xd4 [ 4.013187] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x258/0x350 [ 4.013194] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x50/0xe0 [ 4.013202] do_el0_svc+0xa8/0xe0 [ 4.013208] el0_svc+0x3c/0x140 [ 4.013215] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [ 4.013222] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 4.013228] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs The correct way is to wait handshake, but it needs BUS clock of BLK-CTL be enabled, which is in separate driver. So delay is the only option here. The udelay(10) is a data got by experiment. Fixes: e8dc41a ("pmdomain: imx: gpcv2: Add delay after power up handshake") Reported-by: Francesco Dolcini <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241007132555.GA53279@francesco-nb/ Signed-off-by: Shengjiu Wang <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
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Blamed commit forgot to change hsr_init_skb() to allocate larger skb for RedBox case. Indeed, send_hsr_supervision_frame() will add two additional components (struct hsr_sup_tlv and struct hsr_sup_payload) syzbot reported the following crash: skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff8afd4b0a len:34 put:6 head:ffff88802ad29e00 data:ffff88802ad29f22 tail:0x144 end:0x140 dev:gretap0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 7611 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x157/0x1d0 net/core/skbuff.c:206 Code: b6 04 01 84 c0 74 04 3c 03 7e 21 8b 4b 70 41 56 45 89 e8 48 c7 c7 a0 7d 9b 8c 41 57 56 48 89 ee 52 4c 89 e2 e8 9a 76 79 f8 90 <0f> 0b 4c 89 4c 24 10 48 89 54 24 08 48 89 34 24 e8 94 76 fb f8 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc90000858ab8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: ffff8880598c08c0 RCX: ffffffff816d3e69 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff816de786 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffffffff8c9b91c0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000302 R11: ffffffff961cc1d0 R12: ffffffff8afd4b0a R13: 0000000000000006 R14: ffff88804b938130 R15: 0000000000000140 FS: 000055558a3d6500(0000) GS:ffff88806a800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1295974ff8 CR3: 000000002ab6e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:211 [inline] skb_put+0x174/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:2617 send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x6fa/0x9e0 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:342 hsr_proxy_announce+0x1a3/0x4a0 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:436 call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x610 kernel/time/timer.c:1794 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1845 [inline] __run_timers+0x6e8/0x930 kernel/time/timer.c:2419 __run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2430 [inline] __run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2423 [inline] run_timer_base+0x111/0x190 kernel/time/timer.c:2439 run_timer_softirq+0x1a/0x40 kernel/time/timer.c:2449 handle_softirqs+0x213/0x8f0 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:637 [inline] irq_exit_rcu+0xbb/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa4/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 </IRQ> Fixes: 5055ccc ("net: hsr: Provide RedBox support (HSR-SAN)") Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Lukasz Majewski <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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When arm64 is configured with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y, a warning is printed from the patching code because patch_map(), e.g. | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/arm64/kernel/patching.c:45 patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00002-ge1a5d6c6be55 #1 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 800003c5 (Nzcv DAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | lr : patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | sp : ffffa9bb312a79a0 | x29: ffffa9bb312a79a0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000000001 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000000402e8 | x23: ffffa9bb2c94c1c8 x22: ffffa9bb2c94c000 x21: ffffa9bb222e883c | x20: 0000000000000002 x19: ffffc1ffc100ba40 x18: ffffa9bb2cf0f21c | x17: 0000000000000006 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000004 | x14: 1ffff5376625b4ac x13: ffff753766a67fb8 x12: ffff753766919cd1 | x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 1ffff5376625b4c3 x9 : 1ffff5376625b4af | x8 : ffff753766254f0a x7 : 0000000041b58ab3 x6 : ffff753766254f18 | x5 : ffffa9bb312d9bc0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffffa9bb29bd90e4 | x2 : 0000000000000002 x1 : ffffa9bb312d9bc0 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 (P) | patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 (L) | __aarch64_insn_write+0xa8/0x120 | aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync+0x4c/0xb8 | arch_jump_label_transform_queue+0x7c/0x100 | jump_label_update+0x154/0x460 | static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0x1d8/0x280 | static_key_enable+0x2c/0x48 | early_randomize_kstack_offset+0x104/0x168 | do_early_param+0xe4/0x148 | parse_args+0x3a4/0x838 | parse_early_options+0x50/0x68 | parse_early_param+0x58/0xe0 | setup_arch+0x78/0x1f0 | start_kernel+0xa0/0x530 | __primary_switched+0x8c/0xa0 | irq event stamp: 0 | hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | softirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The warning has been produced since commit: 3e25d5a ("asm-generic: add an optional pfn_valid check to page_to_phys") ... which added a pfn_valid() check into page_to_phys(), and at this point in boot pfn_valid() will always return false because the vmemmap has not yet been initialized and there are no valid mem_sections yet. Before that commit, the arithmetic performed by page_to_phys() would give the expected physical address, though it is somewhat dubious to use vmemmap addresses before the vmemmap has been initialized. Aside from kernel image addresses, all executable code should be allocated from execmem (where all allocations will fall within the vmalloc area), and so there's no need for the fallback case when CONFIG_EXECMEM=n. Simplify patch_map() accordingly, directly converting kernel image addresses and removing the redundant fallback case. Fixes: 3e25d5a ("asm-generic: add an optional pfn_valid check to page_to_phys") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
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Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its
strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one.
The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host()
that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running
machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right
errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in
machine__new_host().
Before the patch:
(gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1
<SNIP>
Summary of events:
gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
pselect6 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
poll 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
<SNIP>
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
478 if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL)
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
#1 0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673
#2 0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708
#3 0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747
#4 0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456
#5 0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487
#6 0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351
#7 0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404
#8 0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448
#9 0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560
(gdb)
After:
root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1
<SNIP>
pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
epoll_wait 188 0 983.428 0.000 5.231 15.595 8.68%
ioctl 94 0 0.811 0.004 0.009 0.016 2.82%
read 188 0 0.322 0.001 0.002 0.006 5.15%
write 141 0 0.280 0.001 0.002 0.018 8.39%
timerfd_settime 94 0 0.138 0.001 0.001 0.007 6.47%
gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
poll 222 0 959.577 0.000 4.322 21.414 11.40%
recvmsg 150 0 0.539 0.001 0.004 0.013 5.12%
write 300 0 0.442 0.001 0.001 0.007 3.29%
read 150 0 0.183 0.001 0.001 0.009 5.53%
getpid 102 0 0.101 0.000 0.001 0.008 7.82%
root@number:~#
Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()")
Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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Similar to commit 65c4c94 ("usb: typec: ucsi: Fix a missing bits to bytes conversion in ucsi_init()"), there was a missing conversion from bits to bytes. Here the outcome is worse though: since the value is lower than UCSI_MAX_DATA_LENGTH, instead of bailing out with an error, it writes past the buffer size. The error is then seen in other places like below: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x891e812cd0ed968: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 110 PID: 906 Comm: prometheus-node Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-xe #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Lunar Lake Client Platform/LNL-M LP5 RVP1, BIOS LNLMFWI1.R00.3222.D84.2410171025 10/17/2024 RIP: 0010:power_supply_get_property+0x3e/0xe0 Code: 85 c0 7e 4f 4c 8b 07 89 f3 49 89 d4 49 8b 48 20 48 85 c9 74 72 49 8b 70 18 31 d2 31 c0 eb 0b 83 c2 01 48 63 c2 48 39 c8 73 5d <3b> 1c 86 75 f0 49 8b 40 28 4c 89 e2 89 de ff d0 0f 1f 00 5b 41 5c RSP: 0018:ffffc900017dfa50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000011 RCX: c963b02c06092008 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0891e812cd0ed968 RDI: ffff888121dd6800 RBP: ffffc900017dfa68 R08: ffff88810a4024b8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc900017dfa78 R13: ffff888121dd6800 R14: ffff888138ad2c00 R15: ffff88810c57c528 FS: 00007713a2ffd6c0(0000) GS:ffff88846f380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000c0004b1000 CR3: 0000000121ce8003 CR4: 0000000000f72ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80 ? die_addr+0x37/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x1c1/0x440 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 ? power_supply_get_property+0x3e/0xe0 power_supply_hwmon_read+0x50/0xe0 hwmon_attr_show+0x46/0x170 dev_attr_show+0x1a/0x70 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xaa/0x120 kernfs_seq_show+0x41/0x60 Just use the buffer size as argument to fix it. Fixes: 226ff2e ("usb: typec: ucsi: Convert connector specific commands to bitmaps") Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]> Reported-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SJ1PR11MB6129CCD82CD78D8EE6E27EF4B9362@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Suggested-by: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <[email protected]> Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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System crash is observed with stack trace warning of use after free. There are 2 signals to tell dpc_thread to terminate (UNLOADING flag and kthread_stop). On setting the UNLOADING flag when dpc_thread happens to run at the time and sees the flag, this causes dpc_thread to exit and clean up itself. When kthread_stop is called for final cleanup, this causes use after free. Remove UNLOADING signal to terminate dpc_thread. Use the kthread_stop as the main signal to exit dpc_thread. [596663.812935] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:294! [596663.812950] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [596663.812957] CPU: 13 PID: 1475935 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G IOE --------- - - 4.18.0-240.el8.x86_64 #1 [596663.812960] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380p Gen8, BIOS P70 08/20/2012 [596663.812974] RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x17d/0x360 ... [596663.813008] Call Trace: [596663.813022] ? __dentry_kill+0x121/0x170 [596663.813030] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [596663.813034] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [596663.813039] ? wait_for_completion+0x35/0x190 [596663.813048] ? try_to_wake_up+0x63/0x540 [596663.813055] free_task+0x5a/0x60 [596663.813061] kthread_stop+0xf3/0x100 [596663.813103] qla2x00_remove_one+0x284/0x440 [qla2xxx] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such as following calltrace: PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme" #0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15 #1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014 #2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1 #3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a #4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006 #5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce #6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced #7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b #8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362 #9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25 RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574 RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and simplify the code. Fixes: 958dc1d ("nvme-rdma: add clean action for failed reconnection") Reported-by: Yingfu.zhou <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chunguang.xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yue.zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
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syzbot found [1] that after blamed commit, ub->ubsock->sk was NULL when attempting the atomic_dec() : atomic_dec(&tipc_net(sock_net(ub->ubsock->sk))->wq_count); Fix this by caching the tipc_net pointer. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5896 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-next-20241203-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:387 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline] RIP: 0010:cleanup_bearer+0x1f7/0x280 net/tipc/udp_media.c:820 Code: 18 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 3c f7 99 f6 48 8b 1b 48 83 c3 30 e8 f0 e4 60 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 1a f7 99 f6 49 83 c7 e8 48 8b 1b RSP: 0018:ffffc9000410fb70 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: 0000000000000030 RCX: ffff88802fe45a00 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc9000410f900 RBP: ffff88807e1f0908 R08: ffffc9000410f907 R09: 1ffff92000821f20 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000821f21 R12: ffff888031d19980 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88807e1f0918 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ca050b000 CR3: 0000000031c0c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 6a2fa13 ("tipc: Fix use-after-free of kernel socket in cleanup_bearer().") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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…A in a MM We currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn't true. So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-reference NULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL. This fixes the report: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024 RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline] RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194 Code: ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044 RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1 R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8 FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709 __do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline] __se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline] __x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [[email protected]: add unlikely()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 3974388 ("[PATCH] Swap Migration V5: sys_migrate_pages interface") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/ Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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…imary CPU Commit 5944ce0 ("arch_topology: Build cacheinfo from primary CPU") adds functionality that architectures can use to optionally allocate and build cacheinfo early during boot. Commit 6539cff ("cacheinfo: Add arch specific early level initializer") lets secondary CPUs correct (and reallocate memory) cacheinfo data if needed. If the early build functionality is not used and cacheinfo does not need correction, memory for cacheinfo is never allocated. x86 does not use the early build functionality. Consequently, during the cacheinfo CPU hotplug callback, last_level_cache_is_valid() attempts to dereference a NULL pointer: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000100 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEPMT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID 19 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2 #1 RIP: 0010: last_level_cache_is_valid+0x95/0xe0a Allocate memory for cacheinfo during the cacheinfo CPU hotplug callback if not done earlier. Moreover, before determining the validity of the last-level cache info, ensure that it has been allocated. Simply checking for non-zero cache_leaves() is not sufficient, as some architectures (e.g., Intel processors) have non-zero cache_leaves() before allocation. Dereferencing NULL cacheinfo can occur in update_per_cpu_data_slice_size(). This function iterates over all online CPUs. However, a CPU may have come online recently, but its cacheinfo may not have been allocated yet. While here, remove an unnecessary indentation in allocate_cache_info(). [ bp: Massage. ] Fixes: 6539cff ("cacheinfo: Add arch specific early level initializer") Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Radu Rendec <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andreas Herrmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] # 6.3+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Multiple syzbot warnings have been reported. These warnings are mainly
about the lock order between trie->lock and kmalloc()'s internal lock.
See report [1] as an example:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.10.0-rc7-syzkaller-00003-g4376e966ecb7 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz.3.2069/15008 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88801544e6d8 (&n->list_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: get_partial_node ...
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88802dcc89f8 (&trie->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: trie_update_elem ...
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&trie->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x60
trie_delete_elem+0xb0/0x820
___bpf_prog_run+0x3e51/0xabd0
__bpf_prog_run32+0xc1/0x100
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func
......
bpf_trace_run2+0x231/0x590
__bpf_trace_contention_end+0xca/0x110
trace_contention_end.constprop.0+0xea/0x170
__pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x28e/0xcc0
pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath
queued_spin_lock_slowpath
queued_spin_lock
do_raw_spin_lock+0x210/0x2c0
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x42/0x60
__put_partials+0xc3/0x170
qlink_free
qlist_free_all+0x4e/0x140
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x192/0x1e0
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90
kasan_slab_alloc
slab_post_alloc_hook
slab_alloc_node
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x153/0x310
__alloc_skb+0x2b1/0x380
......
-> #0 (&n->list_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add
check_prevs_add
validate_chain
__lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30
lock_acquire
lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x60
get_partial_node.part.0+0x20/0x350
get_partial_node
get_partial
___slab_alloc+0x65b/0x1870
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xb0
__slab_alloc_node
slab_alloc_node
__do_kmalloc_node
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x35c/0x440
kmalloc_node_noprof
bpf_map_kmalloc_node+0x98/0x4a0
lpm_trie_node_alloc
trie_update_elem+0x1ef/0xe00
bpf_map_update_value+0x2c1/0x6c0
map_update_elem+0x623/0x910
__sys_bpf+0x90c/0x49a0
...
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&trie->lock);
lock(&n->list_lock);
lock(&trie->lock);
lock(&n->list_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9045c0a3d5a7f1b119f7
A bpf program attached to trace_contention_end() triggers after
acquiring &n->list_lock. The program invokes trie_delete_elem(), which
then acquires trie->lock. However, it is possible that another
process is invoking trie_update_elem(). trie_update_elem() will acquire
trie->lock first, then invoke kmalloc_node(). kmalloc_node() may invoke
get_partial_node() and try to acquire &n->list_lock (not necessarily the
same lock object). Therefore, lockdep warns about the circular locking
dependency.
Invoking kmalloc() before acquiring trie->lock could fix the warning.
However, since BPF programs call be invoked from any context (e.g.,
through kprobe/tracepoint/fentry), there may still be lock ordering
problems for internal locks in kmalloc() or trie->lock itself.
To eliminate these potential lock ordering problems with kmalloc()'s
internal locks, replacing kmalloc()/kfree()/kfree_rcu() with equivalent
BPF memory allocator APIs that can be invoked in any context. The lock
ordering problems with trie->lock (e.g., reentrance) will be handled
separately.
Three aspects of this change require explanation:
1. Intermediate and leaf nodes are allocated from the same allocator.
Since the value size of LPM trie is usually small, using a single
alocator reduces the memory overhead of the BPF memory allocator.
2. Leaf nodes are allocated before disabling IRQs. This handles cases
where leaf_size is large (e.g., > 4KB - 8) and updates require
intermediate node allocation. If leaf nodes were allocated in
IRQ-disabled region, the free objects in BPF memory allocator would not
be refilled timely and the intermediate node allocation may fail.
3. Paired migrate_{disable|enable}() calls for node alloc and free. The
BPF memory allocator uses per-CPU struct internally, these paired calls
are necessary to guarantee correctness.
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Add more test cases for LPM trie in test_maps: 1) test_lpm_trie_update_flags It constructs various use cases for BPF_EXIST and BPF_NOEXIST and check whether the return value of update operation is expected. 2) test_lpm_trie_update_full_maps It tests the update operations on a full LPM trie map. Adding new node will fail and overwriting the value of existed node will succeed. 3) test_lpm_trie_iterate_strs and test_lpm_trie_iterate_ints There two test cases test whether the iteration through get_next_key is sorted and expected. These two test cases delete the minimal key after each iteration and check whether next iteration returns the second minimal key. The only difference between these two test cases is the former one saves strings in the LPM trie and the latter saves integers. Without the fix of get_next_key, these two cases will fail as shown below: test_lpm_trie_iterate_strs(1091):FAIL:iterate #2 got abc exp abS test_lpm_trie_iterate_ints(1142):FAIL:iterate #1 got 0x2 exp 0x1 Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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Hou Tao says: ==================== This patch set fixes several issues for LPM trie. These issues were found during adding new test cases or were reported by syzbot. The patch set is structured as follows: Patch #1~#2 are clean-ups for lpm_trie_update_elem(). Patch #3 handles BPF_EXIST and BPF_NOEXIST correctly for LPM trie. Patch #4 fixes the accounting of n_entries when doing in-place update. Patch #5 fixes the exact match condition in trie_get_next_key() and it may skip keys when the passed key is not found in the map. Patch #6~#7 switch from kmalloc() to bpf memory allocator for LPM trie to fix several lock order warnings reported by syzbot. It also enables raw_spinlock_t for LPM trie again. After these changes, the LPM trie will be closer to being usable in any context (though the reentrance check of trie->lock is still missing, but it is on my todo list). Patch #8: move test_lpm_map to map_tests to make it run regularly. Patch #9: add test cases for the issues fixed by patch #3~#5. Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always welcome. Change Log: v3: * patch #2: remove the unnecessary NULL-init for im_node * patch #6: alloc the leaf node before disabling IRQ to low the possibility of -ENOMEM when leaf_size is large; Free these nodes outside the trie lock (Suggested by Alexei) * collect review and ack tags (Thanks for Toke & Daniel) v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ * collect review tags (Thanks for Toke) * drop "Add bpf_mem_cache_is_mergeable() helper" patch * patch #3~#4: add fix tag * patch #4: rename the helper to trie_check_add_elem() and increase n_entries in it. * patch #6: use one bpf mem allocator and update commit message to clarify that using bpf mem allocator is more appropriate. * patch #7: update commit message to add the possible max running time for update operation. * patch #9: update commit message to specify the purpose of these test cases. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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If the FW log context memory is retained after FW reset, the existing code is not handling the condition correctly and zeroes out the data structures. This potentially will cause a division by zero crash when the user runs ethtool -w. The last_type is also not set correctly when the context memory is retained. This will cause errors because the last_type signals to the FW that all context memory types have been configured. Oops: divide error: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 53 UID: 0 PID: 7019 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc7+ #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-621C-TN12R/X13DDW-A, BIOS 1.4 08/10/2023 RIP: 0010:__bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] Code: 0a 31 d2 4c 89 6c 24 10 45 8b a5 fc df ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 20 31 db 66 89 44 24 06 48 63 c5 c1 e5 09 4c 0f af e0 48 8b 44 24 30 <49> f7 f4 4c 89 64 24 08 48 63 c5 4d 89 ec 31 ed 48 89 44 24 18 49 RSP: 0018:ff480591603d78b8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000100000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff23959e46740000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000100000 R09: ff23959e46740000 R10: ff480591603d7a18 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ff23959e46742008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04227c1740(0000) GS:ff2395adbf680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f04225b33a5 CR3: 000000108b9a4001 CR4: 0000000000773ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x33/0x90 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? exc_divide_error+0x36/0x50 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x16/0x20 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0xda/0x160 [bnxt_en] bnxt_get_ctx_coredump.constprop.0+0x1ed/0x390 [bnxt_en] ? __memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook+0x21c/0x3c0 ? __bnxt_get_coredump+0x473/0x4b0 [bnxt_en] __bnxt_get_coredump+0x473/0x4b0 [bnxt_en] ? security_file_alloc+0x74/0xe0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x78/0x120 bnxt_get_coredump_length+0x4b/0xf0 [bnxt_en] bnxt_get_dump_flag+0x40/0x60 [bnxt_en] __dev_ethtool+0x17e4/0x1fc0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc/0x1d0 ? do_syscall_64+0x85/0x150 ? unmap_page_range+0x299/0x4b0 ? vma_interval_tree_remove+0x215/0x2c0 ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x10a/0x300 dev_ethtool+0xa8/0x170 dev_ioctl+0x1b5/0x580 ? sk_ioctl+0x4a/0x110 sock_do_ioctl+0xab/0xf0 sock_ioctl+0x1ca/0x2e0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150 Fixes: 24d694a ("bnxt_en: Allocate backing store memory for FW trace logs") Signed-off-by: Hongguang Gao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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It is unclear if net/lapb code is supposed to be ready for 8021q. We can at least avoid crashes like the following : skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8aabe1f6 len:24 put:20 head:ffff88802824a400 data:ffff88802824a3fe tail:0x16 end:0x140 dev:nr0.2 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5508 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00144-g66418447d27b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024 RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline] RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216 Code: 0d 8d 48 c7 c6 2e 9e 29 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 1a 6f 37 02 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 RSP: 0018:ffffc90002ddf638 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 7a24750e538ff600 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888034a86650 R08: ffffffff8174b13c R09: 1ffff920005bbe60 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520005bbe61 R12: 0000000000000140 R13: ffff88802824a400 R14: ffff88802824a3fe R15: 0000000000000016 FS: 00007f2a5990d740(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000110c2631fd CR3: 0000000029504000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636 nr_header+0x36/0x320 net/netrom/nr_dev.c:69 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3148 [inline] vlan_dev_hard_header+0x359/0x480 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3148 [inline] lapbeth_data_transmit+0x1f6/0x2a0 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:257 lapb_data_transmit+0x91/0xb0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:447 lapb_transmit_buffer+0x168/0x1f0 net/lapb/lapb_out.c:149 lapb_establish_data_link+0x84/0xd0 lapb_device_event+0x4e0/0x670 notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __dev_notify_flags+0x207/0x400 dev_change_flags+0xf0/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:8922 devinet_ioctl+0xa4e/0x1aa0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1188 inet_ioctl+0x3d7/0x4f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1003 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1227 sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1346 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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Move setting irq_chip.name from probe() function to the initialization of "irq_chip" struct in order to fix vGPIO driver crash during bootup. Crash was caused by unauthorized modification of irq_chip.name field where irq_chip struct was initialized as const. This behavior is a consequence of suboptimal implementation of gpio_irq_chip_set_chip(), which should be changed to avoid casting away const qualifier. Crash log: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0ba81c0 /#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode /#PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation CPU: 33 UID: 0 PID: 1075 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00077-g2e1b3cc9d7f7 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Kaseyville RP/Kaseyville RP, BIOS KVLDCRB1.PGS.0026.D73.2410081258 10/08/2024 RIP: 0010:gnr_gpio_probe+0x171/0x220 [gpio_graniterapids] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Alan Borzeszkowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
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When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash [1]. Commit b96ed2c ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash cases for virtio-net. This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running: `while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network TX load from inside the machine. netdev_tx_reset_queue() can actually be dropped from virtnet_open path; the device is not stopped in any case. For BQL core part, it's just like traffic nearly ceases to exist for some period. For stall detector added to BQL, even if virtnet_close could somehow lead to some TX completions delayed for long, followed by virtnet_open, we can just take it as stall as mentioned in commit 6025b91 ("net: dqs: add NIC stall detector based on BQL"). Note also that users can still reset stall_max via sysfs. So, drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from virtnet_enable_queue_pair(). This eliminates the BQL crashes. As a result, netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now explicitly required in freeze/restore path. This patch adds it to immediately after free_unused_bufs(), following the rule of thumb: netdev_tx_reset_queue() should follow any SKB freeing not followed by netdev_tx_completed_queue(). This seems the most consistent and streamlined approach, and now netdev_tx_reset_queue() runs whenever free_unused_bufs() is done. [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2 Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \ BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d 4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01 d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40 FS: 00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die+0x32/0x80 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 __free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net] free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net] virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net] ? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0 ? update_curr+0x35/0x260 ? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0 net_rx_action+0x329/0x420 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0 handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0 do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0 virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net] __dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0 __dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250 dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60 do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 ? netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 ? netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x5f/0xee0 ? __pfx___probestub_irq_enable+0x3/0x10 ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? security_capable+0x3b/0x70 rtnl_newlink+0x784/0xaf0 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x24/0x6d0 ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink+0x10/0x10 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0 ? __pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x147/0x610 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0x13/0x60 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 __sys_sendmsg+0x66/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f41defe5b34 Code: 15 e1 12 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 95 0f 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55 RSP: 002b:00007ffe5336ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f41defe5b34 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe5336ed30 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffe5336eda0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00007ffe5336f6f9 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000067452259 R14: 0000556ccc28b040 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> [...] Fixes: c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits") Cc: <[email protected]> # v6.11+ Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <[email protected]> [ pabeni: trimmed possibly troublesome separator ] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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…nts' Koichiro Den says: ==================== virtio_net: correct netdev_tx_reset_queue() invocation points When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash [1]. Commit b96ed2c ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash scenarios for virtio-net. This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running: `while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network TX load from inside the machine. This patch series resolves the issue and also addresses similar existing problems: (a). Drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from open/close path. This eliminates the BQL crashes due to the problematic open/close path. (b). As a result of (a), netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now explicitly required in freeze/restore path. Add netdev_tx_reset_queue() immediately after free_unused_bufs() invocation. (c). Fix missing resetting in virtnet_tx_resize(). virtnet_tx_resize() has lacked proper resetting since commit c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits"). (d). Fix missing resetting in the XDP_SETUP_XSK_POOL path. Similar to (c), this path lacked proper resetting. Call netdev_tx_reset_queue() when virtqueue_reset() has actually recycled unused buffers. This patch series consists of six commits: [1/6]: Resolves (a) and (b). # also -stable 6.11.y [2/6]: Minor fix to make [4/6] streamlined. [3/6]: Prerequisite for (c). # also -stable 6.11.y [4/6]: Resolves (c) (incl. Prerequisite for (d)) # also -stable 6.11.y [5/6]: Preresuisite for (d). [6/6]: Resolves (d). Changes for v4: - move netdev_tx_reset_queue() out of free_unused_bufs() - submit to net, not net-next Changes for v3: - replace 'flushed' argument with 'recycle_done' Changes for v2: - add tx queue resetting for (b) to (d) above v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2 Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \ BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d 4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01 d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40 FS: 00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die+0x32/0x80 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 __free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net] free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net] virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net] ? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0 ? update_curr+0x35/0x260 ? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0 net_rx_action+0x329/0x420 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0 handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0 do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0 virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net] __dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0 __dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250 dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60 do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 ? netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 ? netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x5f/0xee0 ? __pfx___probestub_irq_enable+0x3/0x10 ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? security_capable+0x3b/0x7�[I0 rtnl_newlink+0x784/0xaf0 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x24/0x6d0 ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink+0x10/0x10 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0 ? __pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x147/0x610 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0x13/0x60 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 __sys_sendmsg+0x66/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f41defe5b34 Code: 15 e1 12 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 95 0f 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55 RSP: 002b:00007ffe5336ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f41defe5b34 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe5336ed30 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffe5336eda0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00007ffe5336f6f9 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000067452259 R14: 0000556ccc28b040 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> [...] ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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flush_tlb_kernel_range() may use IPIs to flush the TLBs of all the cores, which triggers the following warning when the irqs are disabled: [ 3.455330] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/smp.c:815 smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.456647] Modules linked in: [ 3.457218] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-00010-g91d3de7240b8 #1 [ 3.457416] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS [ 3.457633] epc : smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.457736] ra : on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x1e/0x30 [ 3.457786] epc : ffffffff800b669a ra : ffffffff800b67c2 sp : ff2000000000bb50 [ 3.457824] gp : ffffffff815212b8 tp : ff6000008014f080 t0 : 000000000000003f [ 3.457859] t1 : ffffffff815221e0 t2 : 000000000000000f s0 : ff2000000000bc10 [ 3.457920] s1 : 0000000000000040 a0 : ffffffff815221e0 a1 : 0000000000000001 [ 3.457953] a2 : 0000000000010000 a3 : 0000000000000003 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 3.458006] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffffffffffff a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 3.458042] s2 : ffffffff815223be s3 : 00fffffffffff000 s4 : ff600001ffe38fc0 [ 3.458076] s5 : ff600001ff950d00 s6 : 0000000200000120 s7 : 0000000000000001 [ 3.458109] s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : ff60000080841ef0 s10: 0000000000000001 [ 3.458141] s11: ffffffff81524812 t3 : 0000000000000001 t4 : ff60000080092bc0 [ 3.458172] t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ff200000000236d0 [ 3.458203] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff800b669a cause: 0000000000000003 [ 3.458373] [<ffffffff800b669a>] smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.458593] [<ffffffff800b67c2>] on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x1e/0x30 [ 3.458625] [<ffffffff8000e4ca>] __flush_tlb_range+0x118/0x1ca [ 3.458656] [<ffffffff8000e6b2>] flush_tlb_kernel_range+0x1e/0x26 [ 3.458683] [<ffffffff801ea56a>] kfence_protect+0xc0/0xce [ 3.458717] [<ffffffff801e9456>] kfence_guarded_free+0xc6/0x1c0 [ 3.458742] [<ffffffff801e9d6c>] __kfence_free+0x62/0xc6 [ 3.458764] [<ffffffff801c57d8>] kfree+0x106/0x32c [ 3.458786] [<ffffffff80588cf2>] detach_buf_split+0x188/0x1a8 [ 3.458816] [<ffffffff8058708c>] virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0xb6/0x1f6 [ 3.458839] [<ffffffff805871da>] virtqueue_get_buf+0xe/0x16 [ 3.458880] [<ffffffff80613d6a>] virtblk_done+0x5c/0xe2 [ 3.458908] [<ffffffff8058766e>] vring_interrupt+0x6a/0x74 [ 3.458930] [<ffffffff800747d8>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7c/0xe2 [ 3.458956] [<ffffffff800748f0>] handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x86 [ 3.458978] [<ffffffff800786cc>] handle_simple_irq+0x9e/0xbe [ 3.459004] [<ffffffff80073934>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x1c/0x2a [ 3.459027] [<ffffffff804bf87c>] imsic_handle_irq+0xba/0x120 [ 3.459056] [<ffffffff80073934>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x1c/0x2a [ 3.459080] [<ffffffff804bdb76>] riscv_intc_aia_irq+0x24/0x34 [ 3.459103] [<ffffffff809d0452>] handle_riscv_irq+0x2e/0x4c [ 3.459133] [<ffffffff809d923e>] call_on_irq_stack+0x32/0x40 So only flush the local TLB and let the lazy kfence page fault handling deal with the faults which could happen when a core has an old protected pte version cached in its TLB. That leads to potential inaccuracies which can be tolerated when using kfence. Fixes: 47513f2 ("riscv: Enable KFENCE for riscv64") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
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The vmemmap's, which is used for RV64 with SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, page tables are populated using pmd (page middle directory) hugetables. However, the pmd allocation is not using the generic mechanism used by the VMA code (e.g. pmd_alloc()), or the RISC-V specific create_pgd_mapping()/alloc_pmd_late(). Instead, the vmemmap page table code allocates a page, and calls vmemmap_set_pmd(). This results in that the pmd ctor is *not* called, nor would it make sense to do so. Now, when tearing down a vmemmap page table pmd, the cleanup code would unconditionally, and incorrectly call the pmd dtor, which results in a crash (best case). This issue was found when running the HMM selftests: | tools/testing/selftests/mm# ./test_hmm.sh smoke | ... # when unloading the test_hmm.ko module | page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10915b | flags: 0x1000000000000000(node=0|zone=1) | raw: 1000000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 | raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 | page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(ptdesc->pmd_huge_pte) | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:3080! | Kernel BUG [#1] | Modules linked in: test_hmm(-) sch_fq_codel fuse drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight dm_mod | CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 514 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 6.12.0-00982-gf2a4f1682d07 #2 | Tainted: [W]=WARN | Hardware name: riscv-virtio qemu/qemu, BIOS 2024.10 10/01/2024 | epc : remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | ra : remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | epc : ffffffff80010a68 ra : ffffffff80010a68 sp : ff20000000a73940 | gp : ffffffff827b2d88 tp : ff6000008785da40 t0 : ffffffff80fbce04 | t1 : 0720072007200720 t2 : 706d756420656761 s0 : ff20000000a73a50 | s1 : ff6000008915cff8 a0 : 0000000000000039 a1 : 0000000000000008 | a2 : ff600003fff0de20 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 | a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : c0000000ffffefff a7 : ffffffff824469b8 | s2 : ff1c0000022456c0 s3 : ff1ffffffdbfffff s4 : ff6000008915c000 | s5 : ff6000008915c000 s6 : ff6000008915c000 s7 : ff1ffffffdc00000 | s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : ff1ffffffdc00000 s10: ffffffff819a31f0 | s11: ffffffffffffffff t3 : ffffffff8000c950 t4 : ff60000080244f00 | t5 : ff60000080244000 t6 : ff20000000a73708 | status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ffffffff80010a68 cause: 0000000000000003 | [<ffffffff80010a68>] remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | [<ffffffff80fd238e>] vmemmap_free+0x14/0x1e | [<ffffffff8032e698>] section_deactivate+0x220/0x452 | [<ffffffff8032ef7e>] sparse_remove_section+0x4a/0x58 | [<ffffffff802f8700>] __remove_pages+0x7e/0xba | [<ffffffff803760d8>] memunmap_pages+0x2bc/0x3fe | [<ffffffff02a3ca28>] dmirror_device_remove_chunks+0x2ea/0x518 [test_hmm] | [<ffffffff02a3e026>] hmm_dmirror_exit+0x3e/0x1018 [test_hmm] | [<ffffffff80102c14>] __riscv_sys_delete_module+0x15a/0x2a6 | [<ffffffff80fd020c>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x1f2/0x266 | [<ffffffff80fde0a2>] _new_vmalloc_restore_context_a0+0xc6/0xd2 | Code: bf51 7597 0184 8593 76a5 854a 4097 0029 80e7 2c00 (9002) 7597 | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Add a check to avoid calling the pmd dtor, if the calling context is vmemmap_free(). Fixes: c75a74f ("riscv: mm: Add memory hotplugging support") Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
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This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
#0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
#0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
#1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
__might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
</TASK>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Tested-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
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This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock. [ 75.307983] ====================================================== [ 75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ #22 Not tainted [ 75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock: [ 75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO) at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308021] but task is already holding lock: [ 75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock) at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308053] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 75.308054] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 75.308055] -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 75.308057] __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50 [ 75.308061] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 75.308063] iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308085] __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60 [ 75.308088] __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90 [ 75.308090] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 75.308092] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 75.308095] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 75.308098] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 75.308100] __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0 [ 75.308103] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 [ 75.308105] lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90 [ 75.308107] iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308128] hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth] [ 75.308155] hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308180] hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth] [ 75.308206] hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308230] hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth] [ 75.308254] process_one_work+0x212/0x740 [ 75.308256] worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0 [ 75.308258] kthread+0xe4/0x120 [ 75.308259] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 75.308261] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 75.308263] other info that might help us debug this: [ 75.308264] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 75.308264] CPU0 CPU1 [ 75.308265] ---- ---- [ 75.308265] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308267] lock(sk_lock- AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308268] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308269] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308270] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623: [ 75.308272] #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740 [ 75.308276] #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)), at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740 [ 75.308280] #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3} at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308304] #3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth] Fixes: 02171da ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add hcon for listening bis sk") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
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This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by reworking iso_sock_recvmsg, to ensure that the socket lock is always released before calling a function that locks hdev. [ 561.670344] ====================================================== [ 561.670346] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 561.670349] 6.12.0-rc6+ #26 Not tainted [ 561.670351] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 561.670353] iso-tester/3289 is trying to acquire lock: [ 561.670355] ffff88811f600078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670405] but task is already holding lock: [ 561.670407] ffff88815af58258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: iso_sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670450] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 561.670452] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 561.670453] -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670458] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670463] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670467] bt_accept_dequeue+0x1a5/0x4d0 [bluetooth] [ 561.670510] iso_sock_accept+0x271/0x830 [bluetooth] [ 561.670547] do_accept+0x3dd/0x610 [ 561.670550] __sys_accept4+0xd8/0x170 [ 561.670553] __x64_sys_accept+0x74/0xc0 [ 561.670556] x64_sys_call+0x17d6/0x25f0 [ 561.670559] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670563] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670567] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670571] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670574] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670577] iso_sock_listen+0x2de/0xf30 [bluetooth] [ 561.670617] __sys_listen_socket+0xef/0x130 [ 561.670620] __x64_sys_listen+0xe1/0x190 [ 561.670623] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 561.670626] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670629] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670632] -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 561.670636] __lock_acquire+0x32ad/0x6ab0 [ 561.670639] lock_acquire.part.0+0x118/0x360 [ 561.670642] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670644] __mutex_lock+0x18d/0x12f0 [ 561.670647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 561.670651] iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670687] iso_sock_recvmsg+0x3e9/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670722] sock_recvmsg+0x1d5/0x240 [ 561.670725] sock_read_iter+0x27d/0x470 [ 561.670727] vfs_read+0x9a0/0xd30 [ 561.670731] ksys_read+0x1a8/0x250 [ 561.670733] __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0 [ 561.670736] x64_sys_call+0x1b12/0x25f0 [ 561.670738] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670741] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670744] other info that might help us debug this: [ 561.670745] Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH [ 561.670751] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 561.670753] CPU0 CPU1 [ 561.670754] ---- ---- [ 561.670756] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670758] lock(sk_lock AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 561.670761] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670764] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 561.670767] *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: 07a9342 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Send BIG Create Sync via hci_sync") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
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hci_devcd_append may lead to the release of the skb, so it cannot be accessed once it is called. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888033cfabb0 by task kworker/0:3/82 CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G U 6.6.40-lockdep-03464-g1d8b4eb3060e #1 b0b3c1cc0c842735643fb411799d97921d1f688c Hardware name: Google Yaviks_Ufs/Yaviks_Ufs, BIOS Google_Yaviks_Ufs.15217.552.0 05/07/2024 Workqueue: events btusb_rx_work [btusb] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xfd/0x150 print_report+0x131/0x780 kasan_report+0x177/0x1c0 btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk 03edd567dd71a65958807c95a65db31d433e1d01] btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x11c/0x1a0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 82: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc+0x19f/0x360 skb_clone+0x132/0xf70 btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x104/0x1a0 [btusb] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 Freed by task 1733: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0xb0 ____kasan_slab_free+0xfd/0x170 kmem_cache_free+0x183/0x3f0 hci_devcd_rx+0x91a/0x2060 [bluetooth] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033cfab40 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of freed 232-byte region [ffff888033cfab40, ffff888033cfac28) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000a174ba93 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33cfa head:00000000a174ba93 order:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0x4000000000000840(slab|head|zone=1) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 4000000000000840 ffff888100848a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888033cfaa80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc ffff888033cfab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888033cfab80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888033cfac00: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888033cfac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Check if we need to call hci_devcd_complete before calling hci_devcd_append. That requires that we check data->cd_info.cnt >= MTK_COREDUMP_NUM instead of data->cd_info.cnt > MTK_COREDUMP_NUM, as we increment data->cd_info.cnt only once the call to hci_devcd_append succeeds. Fixes: 0b70151 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: add MediaTek devcoredump support") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
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The current implementation removes cache tags after disabling ATS, leading to potential memory leaks and kernel crashes. Specifically, CACHE_TAG_DEVTLB type cache tags may still remain in the list even after the domain is freed, causing a use-after-free condition. This issue really shows up when multiple VFs from different PFs passed through to a single user-space process via vfio-pci. In such cases, the kernel may crash with kernel messages like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014 PGD 19036a067 P4D 1940a3067 PUD 136c9b067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 74 UID: 0 PID: 3183 Comm: testCli Not tainted 6.11.9 #2 RIP: 0010:cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x163/0x590 ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x190 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x5d/0x250 intel_iommu_tlb_sync+0x29/0x40 intel_iommu_unmap_pages+0xfe/0x160 __iommu_unmap+0xd8/0x1a0 vfio_unmap_unpin+0x182/0x340 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_remove_dma+0x2a/0xb0 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xafa/0x18e0 [vfio_iommu_type1] Move cache_tag_unassign_domain() before iommu_disable_pci_caps() to fix it. Fixes: 3b1d9e2 ("iommu/vt-d: Add cache tag assignment interface") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
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The qi_batch is allocated when assigning cache tag for a domain. While for nested parent domain, it is missed. Hence, when trying to map pages to the nested parent, NULL dereference occurred. Also, there is potential memleak since there is no lock around domain->qi_batch allocation. To solve it, add a helper for qi_batch allocation, and call it in both the __cache_tag_assign_domain() and __cache_tag_assign_parent_domain(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000200 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 8104795067 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 223 UID: 0 PID: 4357 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00028-g4b50c3c3b998-dirty #2632 Call Trace: ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x150 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x63/0x7b0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x220 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? cache_tag_flush_range_np+0x13c/0x260 intel_iommu_iotlb_sync_map+0x1a/0x30 iommu_map+0x61/0xf0 batch_to_domain+0x188/0x250 iopt_area_fill_domains+0x125/0x320 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 iopt_map_pages+0x63/0x100 iopt_map_common.isra.0+0xa7/0x190 iopt_map_user_pages+0x6a/0x80 iommufd_ioas_map+0xcd/0x1d0 iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x118/0x1c0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 705c1cd ("iommu/vt-d: Introduce batched cache invalidation") Cc: [email protected] Co-developed-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
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…s_lock For storing a value to a queue attribute, the queue_attr_store function first freezes the queue (->q_usage_counter(io)) and then acquire ->sysfs_lock. This seems not correct as the usual ordering should be to acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. This incorrect ordering causes the following lockdep splat which we are able to reproduce always simply by accessing /sys/kernel/debug file using ls command: [ 57.597146] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 57.597154] 6.12.0-10553-gb86545e02e8c #20 Tainted: G W [ 57.597162] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 57.597168] ls/4605 is trying to acquire lock: [ 57.597176] c00000003eb56710 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __might_fault+0x58/0xc0 [ 57.597200] but task is already holding lock: [ 57.597207] c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 [ 57.597226] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 57.597233] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 57.597241] -> #5 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597255] down_write+0x6c/0x18c [ 57.597264] start_creating+0xb4/0x24c [ 57.597274] debugfs_create_dir+0x2c/0x1e8 [ 57.597283] blk_register_queue+0xec/0x294 [ 57.597292] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597302] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597309] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597317] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597326] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597334] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597342] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597350] -> #4 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597362] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597370] blk_register_queue+0xd4/0x294 [ 57.597379] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597388] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597395] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597402] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597410] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597418] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597426] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597434] -> #3 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597446] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597454] queue_attr_store+0x9c/0x110 [ 57.597462] sysfs_kf_write+0x70/0xb0 [ 57.597471] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x2ac [ 57.597480] vfs_write+0x3dc/0x6e8 [ 57.597488] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597495] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597504] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597516] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#21){++++}-{0:0}: [ 57.597530] __submit_bio+0x5ec/0x828 [ 57.597538] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e4/0x4f0 [ 57.597547] iomap_readahead+0x2a0/0x448 [ 57.597556] xfs_vm_readahead+0x28/0x3c [ 57.597564] read_pages+0x88/0x41c [ 57.597571] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ac/0x2d8 [ 57.597580] filemap_get_pages+0x188/0x984 [ 57.597588] filemap_read+0x13c/0x4bc [ 57.597596] xfs_file_buffered_read+0x88/0x17c [ 57.597605] xfs_file_read_iter+0xac/0x158 [ 57.597614] vfs_read+0x2d4/0x3b4 [ 57.597622] ksys_read+0x84/0x144 [ 57.597629] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597637] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597647] -> #1 (mapping.invalidate_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597661] down_read+0x6c/0x220 [ 57.597669] filemap_fault+0x870/0x100c [ 57.597677] xfs_filemap_fault+0xc4/0x18c [ 57.597684] __do_fault+0x64/0x164 [ 57.597693] __handle_mm_fault+0x1274/0x1dac [ 57.597702] handle_mm_fault+0x248/0x484 [ 57.597711] ___do_page_fault+0x428/0xc0c [ 57.597719] hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x68 [ 57.597727] do_hash_fault+0x90/0x35c [ 57.597736] data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 [ 57.597745] _copy_from_user+0xf8/0x19c [ 57.597754] sel_write_load+0x178/0xd54 [ 57.597762] vfs_write+0x108/0x6e8 [ 57.597769] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597777] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597785] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597794] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597806] __lock_acquire+0x17cc/0x2330 [ 57.597814] lock_acquire+0x138/0x400 [ 57.597822] __might_fault+0x7c/0xc0 [ 57.597830] filldir64+0xe8/0x390 [ 57.597839] dcache_readdir+0x80/0x2d4 [ 57.597846] iterate_dir+0xd8/0x1d4 [ 57.597855] sys_getdents64+0x88/0x2d4 [ 57.597864] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597872] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597881] other info that might help us debug this: [ 57.597888] Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->debugfs_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3 [ 57.597905] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 57.597911] CPU0 CPU1 [ 57.597917] ---- ---- [ 57.597922] rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597932] lock(&q->debugfs_mutex); [ 57.597940] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597950] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 57.597958] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 57.597965] 2 locks held by ls/4605: [ 57.597971] #0: c0000000137c12f8 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0xcc/0x154 [ 57.597989] #1: c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 Prevent the above lockdep warning by acquiring ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue while storing a queue attribute in queue_attr_store function. Later, we also found[1] another function __blk_mq_update_nr_ hw_queues where we first freeze queue and then acquire the ->sysfs_lock. So we've also updated lock ordering in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues function and ensured that in all code paths we follow the correct lock ordering i.e. acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFj5m9Ke8+EHKQBs_Nk6hqd=LGXtk4mUxZUN5==ZcCjnZSBwHw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: af28141 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store") Tested-by: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.13, take #1 - Replace csr_write() with csr_set() for HVIEN PMU overflow bit
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Looks like it's not yet possible to mount by filesystem uuid or label. ZFS implements this with zpool.cache and userspace daemons, but I think bcachefs can make it even easier.
It might require some redundant device metadata to answer questions like "to which filesystem does this device belong?" before actually mounting any filesystem. Then the kernel module could expose each filesystem's device pool as a disk alias to allow something like
And the best feature: write-once
/etc/fstab!A filesystem's external uuid is stable, right? Otherwise this plan becomes much less foolproof.
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