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Merge XDP & AF_XDP implementation for IVAF with libie & page-pool #1

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michalQb and others added 30 commits April 12, 2023 10:00
The existing implementation of 'iavf_request_traffic_irqs()'
function does not request any interrupt for q_vectors that
have no Tx nor Rx queues assigned to it. However, the function
'iavf_free_traffic_irqs()' releases interrupts for all q_vectors
unconditionally.
Such an approach may result in showing kernel warning about
an attempt of releasing the interrupt that was not requested.

In order to solve that potential issue make both functions
fully symmetric. Therefore, add the logic to 'iavf_free_traffic_irqs()'
for skipping not used q_vectors.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
When the number of queues is being changed by the user, the information
about a new queue number is kept in the adapter structure member
(num_req_queues). Such an information was always reset to zero just
after setting queue number request is processed.

However, that structure member should always provide an information
about user's preference regarding the requested queue number, so
it should be preserved for future driver reinitializations or
setting up the adapter for XDP program.

Remove setting the number of requested queues to zero and use that
value as a priority one during next reinitializations of the adapter,
in order to avoid the scenario when the queue count can be changed
automatically out of user's control.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
When XDP is enabled, our true maximum number of queue pairs
can be reduced up to being cut in half, ex. for system with 10 CPUs
and 16 queue pairs allowed by PF, normally maximum would be 10 queues,
but XDP requires 2 queue pairs per channel, so the maximum of 8 queues
can be used if program is attached.

The above fact has to be reflected in ethtool.

Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
Fixup for:
commit d7dec60921d7 ("iavf: Implement AF_XDP RX processing")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Fixup for:
commit d7dec60921d7 ("iavf: Implement AF_XDP RX processing")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
This flag was never set, so remove it and simplify buffer
cleaning process.

Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
To avoid race between .ndo_xdp_xmit(), normal ZC TX processing
and XDP_TX in ZC mode when also sharing queues,
add locking to the later two.

Locking in .ndo_xdp_xmit() is already present.

Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
Replace the existing ring mask (common for RX and TX rings)
in iavf_q_vector with two masks dedicated to handling RX and TX
rings separately.

The virtchnl interface allows separate masks to be used for different
ring types, so there is no need to merge them into a single mask.
Also, after adding XDP support to iavf, the number of RX and TX
rings can be asymmetric. Therefore, this patch is a necessary
preparation for XDP support.

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Fixup for:
commit 8bde3351bf78 ("iavf: Prepare rings to support XDP")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Fixup for:
commit 12068d880512 ("iavf: Add AF_XDP initialization")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
This is a fixup for:
commit 25de83bc6519 ("iavf: Implement Tx path for AF_XDP")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Fixup for:
commit 8bde3351bf78 ("iavf: Prepare rings to support XDP")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
This is a fixup for:
commit 8dabbf16a166 ("iavf: Prepare VIRTCHNL functions to support XDP")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Fixup for:
commit 8dabbf16a166 ("iavf: Prepare VIRTCHNL functions to support XDP")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Fixup for:
commit 519f24bc590b ("iavf: Handle XDP_SETUP_PROG command in .ndo_bpf")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Fixup for:
commit 12068d880512 ("iavf: Add AF_XDP initialization")

Signed-off-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 20, 2023
Hou Tao says:

====================
The simple patch set aims to replace GFP_ATOMIC by GFP_KERNEL in
bpf_event_entry_gen(). These two patches in the patch set were
preparatory patches in "Fix the release of inner map" patchset [1] and
are not needed for v2, so re-post it to bpf-next tree.

Patch #1 reduces the scope of rcu_read_lock when updating fd map and
patch #2 replaces GFP_ATOMIC by GFP_KERNEL. Please see individual
patches for more details.

Change Log:
v3:
 * patch #1: fallback to patch #1 in v1. Update comments in
             bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem() to explain the reason for
	     rcu_read_lock() (Alexei)

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
 * patch #1: add rcu_read_lock/unlock() for bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem
             as well to make it consistent with
	     bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem and update commit message
             accordingly (Alexei)
 * patch #1/#2: collects ack tags from Yonghong

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
HID driver callbacks aren't called anymore once hid_destroy_device() has
been called. Hence, hid driver_data should be freed only after the
hid_destroy_device() function returned as driver_data is used in several
callbacks.

I observed a crash with kernel 6.10.0 on my T14s Gen 3, after enabling
KASAN to debug memory allocation, I got this output:

  [   13.050438] ==================================================================
  [   13.054060] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.054809] psmouse serio1: trackpoint: Synaptics TrackPoint firmware: 0x02, buttons: 3/3
  [   13.056432] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813152f408 by task (udev-worker)/479

  [   13.060970] CPU: 5 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0
  [   13.063978] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024
  [   13.067860] Call Trace:
  [   13.069383] input: TPPS/2 Synaptics TrackPoint as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input8
  [   13.071486]  <TASK>
  [   13.071492]  dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
  [   13.074870] snd_hda_intel 0000:33:00.6: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
  [   13.078296]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.082199]  print_report+0x174/0x505
  [   13.085776]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
  [   13.089367]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.093255]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.097464]  kasan_report+0xc8/0x150
  [   13.101461]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.105802]  amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.110303]  amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.114879]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.119450]  sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082]
  [   13.124097]  hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
  [   13.127404]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.131925]  ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
  [   13.136455]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
  [   13.140197]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
  [   13.143602]  ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b]
  [   13.147234]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.150446]  ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0
  [   13.155061]  hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
  [   13.158581]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.161814]  platform_probe+0xa2/0x150
  [   13.165029]  really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0
  [   13.168243]  __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
  [   13.171500]  driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
  [   13.175000]  __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
  [   13.178521]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
  [   13.181771]  bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180
  [   13.185033]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  [   13.188229]  ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
  [   13.191446]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.194382]  bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0
  [   13.197328]  driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
  [   13.200283]  ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
  [   13.203362]  do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380
  [   13.206432]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
  [   13.210175]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.213211]  ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
  [   13.216688]  do_init_module+0x238/0x750
  [   13.219696]  load_module+0x5011/0x6af0
  [   13.223096]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
  [   13.226743]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.230080]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.233323]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.236778]  ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
  [   13.239703]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.243070]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.245924]  ? init_module_from_file+0x13d/0x150
  [   13.248745]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.251503]  ? init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150
  [   13.254198]  init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150
  [   13.256826]  ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10
  [   13.259428]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.261959]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.264471]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.267026]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.269494]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.271949]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.274324]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
  [   13.276671]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  [   13.278963]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x1a6/0xad0
  [   13.281193]  idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
  [   13.283420]  ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10
  [   13.285619]  ? __pfx___seccomp_filter+0x10/0x10
  [   13.287714]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.289828]  ? __fget_light+0x57/0x420
  [   13.291870]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.293880]  ? security_capable+0x74/0xb0
  [   13.295820]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
  [   13.297874]  do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190
  [   13.299898]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.301905]  ? irqtime_account_irq+0x3d/0x1f0
  [   13.303877]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.305753]  ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x4e/0x130
  [   13.307577]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.309489]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  [   13.311371] RIP: 0033:0x7a21f96ade9d
  [   13.313234] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 63 de 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  [   13.317051] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae934e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
  [   13.319024] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005987276bfcf0 RCX: 00007a21f96ade9d
  [   13.321100] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007a21f8eda376 RDI: 000000000000001c
  [   13.323314] RBP: 00007a21f8eda376 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffeae934ec0
  [   13.325505] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
  [   13.327637] R13: 00005987276c1250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005987276c4530
  [   13.329737]  </TASK>

  [   13.333945] Allocated by task 139:
  [   13.336111]  kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
  [   13.336121]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.336125]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
  [   13.336129]  amdtp_hid_probe+0xb1/0x440 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.336138]  amd_sfh_hid_client_init+0xb8a/0x10f0 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.336144]  sfh_init_work+0x47/0x120 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.336150]  process_one_work+0x673/0xeb0
  [   13.336155]  worker_thread+0x795/0x1250
  [   13.336160]  kthread+0x290/0x350
  [   13.336164]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
  [   13.336169]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

  [   13.338175] Freed by task 139:
  [   13.340064]  kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
  [   13.340072]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.340076]  kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.340081]  poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.340085]  __kasan_slab_free+0x32/0x50
  [   13.340089]  kfree+0xe5/0x310
  [   13.340094]  amdtp_hid_remove+0xb2/0x160 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.340102]  amd_sfh_hid_client_deinit+0x324/0x640 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.340107]  amd_sfh_hid_client_init+0x94a/0x10f0 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.340113]  sfh_init_work+0x47/0x120 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.340118]  process_one_work+0x673/0xeb0
  [   13.340123]  worker_thread+0x795/0x1250
  [   13.340127]  kthread+0x290/0x350
  [   13.340132]  ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
  [   13.340136]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

  [   13.342482] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813152f400
                  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
  [   13.347357] The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
                  freed 64-byte region [ffff88813152f400, ffff88813152f440)

  [   13.347367] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  [   13.355409] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x13152f
  [   13.355416] anon flags: 0x2ffff8000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
  [   13.355423] page_type: 0xffffefff(slab)
  [   13.355429] raw: 02ffff8000000000 ffff8881000428c0 ffffea0004c43a00 0000000000000005
  [   13.355435] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000
  [   13.355439] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  [   13.357295] Memory state around the buggy address:
  [   13.357299]  ffff88813152f300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357303]  ffff88813152f380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357306] >ffff88813152f400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357309]                       ^
  [   13.357311]  ffff88813152f480: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357315]  ffff88813152f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   13.357318] ==================================================================
  [   13.357405] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
  [   13.383534] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0a1bc4140000013: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
  [   13.383544] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x050e020a00000098-0x050e020a0000009f]
  [   13.383551] CPU: 3 PID: 479 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G    B              6.10.0-arch1-2 #1 893bb55d7f0073f25c46adbb49eb3785fefd74b0
  [   13.383561] Hardware name: LENOVO 21CQCTO1WW/21CQCTO1WW, BIOS R22ET70W (1.40 ) 03/21/2024
  [   13.383565] RIP: 0010:amd_sfh_get_report+0x81/0x530 [amd_sfh]
  [   13.383580] Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 78 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 63 08 49 8d 7c 24 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 1a 03 00 00 45 8b 74 24 10 45
  [   13.383585] RSP: 0018:ffff8881261f7388 EFLAGS: 00010212
  [   13.383592] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88813152f400 RCX: 0000000000000002
  [   13.383597] RDX: 00a1c04140000013 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 050e020a0000009b
  [   13.383600] RBP: ffff88814d010000 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: fffffbfff3ddb8c0
  [   13.383604] R10: ffffffff9eedc607 R11: ffff88810ce98000 R12: 050e020a0000008b
  [   13.383607] R13: ffff88814d010000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000004
  [   13.383611] FS:  00007a21f94d0880(0000) GS:ffff8887e7d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [   13.383615] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [   13.383618] CR2: 00007e0014c438f0 CR3: 000000012614c000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
  [   13.383622] PKRU: 55555554
  [   13.383625] Call Trace:
  [   13.383629]  <TASK>
  [   13.383632]  ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
  [   13.383644]  ? die_addr+0x46/0x70
  [   13.383652]  ? exc_general_protection+0x150/0x240
  [   13.383664]  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
  [   13.383674]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x81/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.383686]  ? amd_sfh_get_report+0x3ec/0x530 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.383697]  amdtp_hid_request+0xb8/0x110 [amd_sfh 05f43221435b5205f734cd9da29399130f398a38]
  [   13.383706]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383713]  sensor_hub_get_feature+0x1d3/0x540 [hid_sensor_hub 3f13be3016ff415bea03008d45d99da837ee3082]
  [   13.383727]  hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x4d0/0xad0 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
  [   13.383739]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383745]  ? __pfx_hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_iio_common c3a5cbe93969c28b122609768bbe23efe52eb8f5]
  [   13.383753]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x96/0xf0
  [   13.383762]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383768]  ? devm_iio_device_alloc+0x34/0x50 [industrialio 3d261d5e5765625d2b052be40e526d62b1d2123b]
  [   13.383790]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383795]  ? __devm_add_action+0x167/0x1d0
  [   13.383806]  hid_gyro_3d_probe+0x120/0x7f0 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
  [   13.383818]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383826]  platform_probe+0xa2/0x150
  [   13.383832]  really_probe+0x1e3/0x8a0
  [   13.383838]  __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x370
  [   13.383844]  driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x120
  [   13.383851]  __driver_attach+0x190/0x4a0
  [   13.383857]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383863]  bus_for_each_dev+0x106/0x180
  [   13.383868]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383874]  ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383880]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383887]  bus_add_driver+0x29e/0x4d0
  [   13.383895]  driver_register+0x1a5/0x360
  [   13.383902]  ? __pfx_hid_gyro_3d_platform_driver_init+0x10/0x10 [hid_sensor_gyro_3d 63da36a143b775846ab2dbb86c343b401b5e3172]
  [   13.383910]  do_one_initcall+0xa7/0x380
  [   13.383919]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
  [   13.383927]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.383933]  ? kasan_unpoison+0x44/0x70
  [   13.383943]  do_init_module+0x238/0x750
  [   13.383955]  load_module+0x5011/0x6af0
  [   13.383962]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50
  [   13.383968]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.383973]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.383980]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.383993]  ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384007]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.384012]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384018]  ? init_module_from_file+0x13d/0x150
  [   13.384025]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384032]  ? init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150
  [   13.384037]  init_module_from_file+0xdf/0x150
  [   13.384044]  ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384050]  ? kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
  [   13.384055]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384060]  ? kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
  [   13.384066]  ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x180
  [   13.384071]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384080]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384085]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0
  [   13.384091]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384096]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x1a6/0xad0
  [   13.384106]  idempotent_init_module+0x23b/0x650
  [   13.384114]  ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384120]  ? __pfx___seccomp_filter+0x10/0x10
  [   13.384129]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384135]  ? __fget_light+0x57/0x420
  [   13.384142]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384147]  ? security_capable+0x74/0xb0
  [   13.384157]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x130
  [   13.384164]  do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190
  [   13.384174]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384179]  ? irqtime_account_irq+0x3d/0x1f0
  [   13.384188]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384193]  ? __irq_exit_rcu+0x4e/0x130
  [   13.384201]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  [   13.384206]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  [   13.384212] RIP: 0033:0x7a21f96ade9d
  [   13.384263] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 63 de 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  [   13.384267] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae934e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
  [   13.384273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005987276bfcf0 RCX: 00007a21f96ade9d
  [   13.384277] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007a21f8eda376 RDI: 000000000000001c
  [   13.384280] RBP: 00007a21f8eda376 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffeae934ec0
  [   13.384284] R10: 0000000000000050 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000
  [   13.384288] R13: 00005987276c1250 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005987276c4530
  [   13.384297]  </TASK>
  [   13.384299] Modules linked in: soundwire_amd(+) hid_sensor_gyro_3d(+) hid_sensor_magn_3d hid_sensor_accel_3d soundwire_generic_allocation amdxcp hid_sensor_trigger drm_exec industrialio_triggered_buffer soundwire_bus gpu_sched kvm_amd kfifo_buf qmi_helpers joydev drm_buddy hid_sensor_iio_common mousedev snd_soc_core industrialio i2c_algo_bit mac80211 snd_compress drm_suballoc_helper kvm snd_hda_intel drm_ttm_helper ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_intel_dspcfg ttm thinkpad_acpi(+) snd_intel_sdw_acpi hid_sensor_hub snd_rpl_pci_acp6x drm_display_helper snd_hda_codec hid_multitouch libarc4 snd_acp_pci platform_profile think_lmi(+) hid_generic firmware_attributes_class wmi_bmof cec snd_acp_legacy_common sparse_keymap rapl snd_hda_core psmouse cfg80211 pcspkr snd_pci_acp6x snd_hwdep video snd_pcm snd_pci_acp5x snd_timer snd_rn_pci_acp3x ucsi_acpi snd_acp_config snd sp5100_tco rfkill snd_soc_acpi typec_ucsi thunderbolt amd_sfh k10temp mhi soundcore i2c_piix4 snd_pci_acp3x typec i2c_hid_acpi roles i2c_hid wmi acpi_tad amd_pmc
  [   13.384454]  mac_hid i2c_dev crypto_user loop nfnetlink zram ip_tables x_tables dm_crypt cbc encrypted_keys trusted asn1_encoder tee dm_mod crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic gf128mul ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw sha512_ssse3 atkbd sha256_ssse3 libps2 sha1_ssse3 vivaldi_fmap nvme aesni_intel crypto_simd nvme_core cryptd ccp xhci_pci i8042 nvme_auth xhci_pci_renesas serio vfat fat btrfs blake2b_generic libcrc32c crc32c_generic crc32c_intel xor raid6_pq
  [   13.384552] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

KASAN reports a use-after-free of hid->driver_data in function
amd_sfh_get_report(). The backtrace indicates that the function is called
by amdtp_hid_request() which is one of the callbacks of hid device.
The current make sure that driver_data is freed only once
hid_destroy_device() returned.

Note that I observed the crash both on v6.9.9 and v6.10.0. The
code seems to be as it was from the early days of the driver.

Signed-off-by: Olivier Sobrie <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Basavaraj Natikar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
We find a bug as below:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000003
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 PID: 358 Comm: bash Tainted: G        W I        6.6.0-10893-g60d6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/4
RIP: 0010:partition_sched_domains_locked+0x483/0x600
Code: 01 48 85 d2 74 0d 48 83 05 29 3f f8 03 01 f3 48 0f bc c2 89 c0 48 9
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000fdbc58 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000100000003 RBX: ffff888100b3dfa0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000002fe80
RBP: ffff888100b3dfb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc90000fdbcb0 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffff888100a92b48 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f44a5425740(0000) GS:ffff888237d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000100030973 CR3: 000000010722c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? show_regs+0x8c/0xa0
 ? __die_body+0x23/0xa0
 ? __die+0x3a/0x50
 ? page_fault_oops+0x1d2/0x5c0
 ? partition_sched_domains_locked+0x483/0x600
 ? search_module_extables+0x2a/0xb0
 ? search_exception_tables+0x67/0x90
 ? kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x144/0x1b0
 ? __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x211/0x360
 ? up_read+0x3b/0x50
 ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x1a/0x30
 ? exc_page_fault+0x890/0xd90
 ? __lock_acquire.constprop.0+0x24f/0x8d0
 ? __lock_acquire.constprop.0+0x24f/0x8d0
 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
 ? partition_sched_domains_locked+0x483/0x600
 ? partition_sched_domains_locked+0xf0/0x600
 rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x806/0xdc0
 update_partition_sd_lb+0x118/0x130
 cpuset_write_resmask+0xffc/0x1420
 cgroup_file_write+0xb2/0x290
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x194/0x290
 new_sync_write+0xeb/0x160
 vfs_write+0x16f/0x1d0
 ksys_write+0x81/0x180
 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30
 x64_sys_call+0x2f25/0x4630
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
RIP: 0033:0x7f44a553c887

It can be reproduced with cammands:
cd /sys/fs/cgroup/
mkdir test
cd test/
echo +cpuset > ../cgroup.subtree_control
echo root > cpuset.cpus.partition
cat /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset.cpus.effective
0-3
echo 0-3 > cpuset.cpus // taking away all cpus from root

This issue is caused by the incorrect rebuilding of scheduling domains.
In this scenario, test/cpuset.cpus.partition should be an invalid root
and should not trigger the rebuilding of scheduling domains. When calling
update_parent_effective_cpumask with partcmd_update, if newmask is not
null, it should recheck newmask whether there are cpus is available
for parect/cs that has tasks.

Fixes: 0c7f293 ("cgroup/cpuset: Add cpuset.cpus.exclusive.effective for v2")
Cc: [email protected] # v6.7+
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
UBSAN reports the following 'subtraction overflow' error when booting
in a virtual machine on Android:

 | Internal error: UBSAN: integer subtraction overflow: 00000000f2005515 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 | Modules linked in:
 | CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.10.0-00006-g3cbe9e5abd46-dirty #4
 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
 | pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 | pc : cancel_delayed_work+0x34/0x44
 | lr : cancel_delayed_work+0x2c/0x44
 | sp : ffff80008002ba60
 | x29: ffff80008002ba60 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
 | x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff1f65014cd3c0
 | x20: ffffc0e84c9d0da0 x19: ffffc0e84cab3558 x18: ffff800080009058
 | x17: 00000000247ee1f8 x16: 00000000247ee1f8 x15: 00000000bdcb279d
 | x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000075 x12: 00000a0000000000
 | x11: ffff1f6501499018 x10: 00984901651fffff x9 : ffff5e7cc35af000
 | x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 3d4d455453595342 x6 : 000000004e514553
 | x5 : ffff1f6501499265 x4 : ffff1f650ff60b10 x3 : 0000000000000620
 | x2 : ffff80008002ba78 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 | Call trace:
 |  cancel_delayed_work+0x34/0x44
 |  deferred_probe_extend_timeout+0x20/0x70
 |  driver_register+0xa8/0x110
 |  __platform_driver_register+0x28/0x3c
 |  syscon_init+0x24/0x38
 |  do_one_initcall+0xe4/0x338
 |  do_initcall_level+0xac/0x178
 |  do_initcalls+0x5c/0xa0
 |  do_basic_setup+0x20/0x30
 |  kernel_init_freeable+0x8c/0xf8
 |  kernel_init+0x28/0x1b4
 |  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
 | Code: f9000fbf 97fffa2f 39400268 37100048 (d42aa2a0)
 | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 | Kernel panic - not syncing: UBSAN: integer subtraction overflow: Fatal exception

This is due to shift_and_mask() using a signed immediate to construct
the mask and being called with a shift of 31 (WORK_OFFQ_POOL_SHIFT) so
that it ends up decrementing from INT_MIN.

Use an unsigned constant '1U' to generate the mask in shift_and_mask().

Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1211f3b ("workqueue: Preserve OFFQ bits in cancel[_sync] paths")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
The cxl_test unit test environment on qemu always hits below call trace
with KASAN enabled:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cxl_setup_parent_dport+0x480/0x530 [cxl_core]
 Read of size 1 at addr ff110000676014f8 by task (udev-worker)/676[   24.424403] CPU: 2 PID: 676 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: G           O     N 6.10.0-qemucxl #1
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS edk2-20240214-2.el9 02/14/2024
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0xea/0x150
  print_report+0xce/0x610
  ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x40/0x200
  kasan_report+0xcc/0x110
  __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x18/0x20
  cxl_setup_parent_dport+0x480/0x530 [cxl_core]
  cxl_mem_probe+0x49b/0xaa0 [cxl_mem]

cxl_test module models a CXL topology for testing, it creates some
emulated dports with platform devices in the CXL topology, so the
dport_dev of an emulated dport points to a platform device rather than a
pci device or a pci host bridge in the case. Currently,
cxl_setup_parent_dport() is used to set up RAS and AER capability on the
dport connected to the CXL memory device, but cxl_test does not support
RAS or AER functionality yet, so the fix is implementing a
__wrap_cxl_setup_parent_dport() to filter out all emulated dports,
guarantees only real dports can be handled by cxl_setup_parent_dport().

Fixes: f05fd10 ("cxl/pci: Add RCH downstream port AER register discovery")
Reported-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Li Ming <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
When of_irq_parse_raw() is invoked with a device address smaller than
the interrupt parent node (from #address-cells property), KASAN detects
the following out-of-bounds read when populating the initial match table
(dyndbg="func of_irq_parse_* +p"):

  OF: of_irq_parse_one: dev=/soc@0/picasso/watchdog, index=0
  OF:  parent=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, intsize=2
  OF:  intspec=4
  OF: of_irq_parse_raw: ipar=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, size=2
  OF:  -> addrsize=3
  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0
  Read of size 4 at addr ffffff81beca5608 by task bash/764

  CPU: 1 PID: 764 Comm: bash Tainted: G           O       6.1.67-484c613561-nokia_sm_arm64 #1
  Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.01-12.24.03-dirty 01/01/2023
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0xdc/0x130
   show_stack+0x1c/0x30
   dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x84
   print_report+0x150/0x448
   kasan_report+0x98/0x140
   __asan_load4+0x78/0xa0
   of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0
   of_irq_parse_one+0x24c/0x270
   parse_interrupts+0xc0/0x120
   of_fwnode_add_links+0x100/0x2d0
   fw_devlink_parse_fwtree+0x64/0xc0
   device_add+0xb38/0xc30
   of_device_add+0x64/0x90
   of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x170
   of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x600
   of_platform_notify+0x1b0/0x254
   blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xd0
   __of_changeset_entry_notify+0x1b8/0x230
   __of_changeset_apply_notify+0x54/0xe4
   of_overlay_fdt_apply+0xc04/0xd94
   ...

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff81beca5600
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
  The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
   128-byte region [ffffff81beca5600, ffffff81beca5680)

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page:00000000230d3d03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1beca4
  head:00000000230d3d03 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
  flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2)
  raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffffff810000c300
  raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffffff81beca5500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffffff81beca5580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  >ffffff81beca5600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                        ^
   ffffff81beca5680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
   ffffff81beca5700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ==================================================================
  OF:  -> got it !

Prevent the out-of-bounds read by copying the device address into a
buffer of sufficient size.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
re-enumerating full-speed devices after a failed address device command
can trigger a NULL pointer dereference.

Full-speed devices may need to reconfigure the endpoint 0 Max Packet Size
value during enumeration. Usb core calls usb_ep0_reinit() in this case,
which ends up calling xhci_configure_endpoint().

On Panther point xHC the xhci_configure_endpoint() function will
additionally check and reserve bandwidth in software. Other hosts do
this in hardware

If xHC address device command fails then a new xhci_virt_device structure
is allocated as part of re-enabling the slot, but the bandwidth table
pointers are not set up properly here.
This triggers the NULL pointer dereference the next time usb_ep0_reinit()
is called and xhci_configure_endpoint() tries to check and reserve
bandwidth

[46710.713538] usb 3-1: new full-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd
[46710.713699] usb 3-1: Device not responding to setup address.
[46710.917684] usb 3-1: Device not responding to setup address.
[46711.125536] usb 3-1: device not accepting address 5, error -71
[46711.125594] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[46711.125600] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[46711.125603] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[46711.125606] PGD 0 P4D 0
[46711.125610] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[46711.125615] CPU: 1 PID: 25760 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.10.3_2 #1
[46711.125620] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd.
[46711.125623] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [usbcore]
[46711.125668] RIP: 0010:xhci_reserve_bandwidth (drivers/usb/host/xhci.c

Fix this by making sure bandwidth table pointers are set up correctly
after a failed address device command, and additionally by avoiding
checking for bandwidth in cases like this where no actual endpoints are
added or removed, i.e. only context for default control endpoint 0 is
evaluated.

Reported-by: Karel Balej <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/[email protected]/
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 651aaf3 ("usb: xhci: Handle USB transaction error on address command")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
Lockdep reported a warning in Linux version 6.6:

[  414.344659] ================================
[  414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[  414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted
[  414.346221] --------------------------------
[  414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
[  414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
[  414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0
[  414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
[  414.351751]   lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460
[  414.352218]   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60
[  414.352769]   __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60
[  414.353289]   sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0
[  414.353829]   sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270
[  414.354338]   blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170
[  414.354807]   __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0
[  414.355335]   blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0
[  414.355847]   __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30
[  414.356367]   scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830
[  414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[  414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted
[  414.346221] --------------------------------
[  414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
[  414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
[  414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0
[  414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
[  414.351751]   lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460
[  414.352218]   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60
[  414.352769]   __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60
[  414.353289]   sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0
[  414.353829]   sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270
[  414.354338]   blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170
[  414.354807]   __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0
[  414.355335]   blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0
[  414.355847]   __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30
[  414.356367]   scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830
[  414.356863]   scsi_io_completion+0x177/0x1610
[  414.357379]   scsi_complete+0x12f/0x260
[  414.357856]   blk_complete_reqs+0xba/0xf0
[  414.358338]   __do_softirq+0x1b0/0x7a2
[  414.358796]   irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0
[  414.359262]   sysvec_call_function_single+0xaf/0xc0
[  414.359828]   asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20
[  414.360426]   default_idle+0x1e/0x30
[  414.360873]   default_idle_call+0x9b/0x1f0
[  414.361390]   do_idle+0x2d2/0x3e0
[  414.361819]   cpu_startup_entry+0x55/0x60
[  414.362314]   start_secondary+0x235/0x2b0
[  414.362809]   secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b
[  414.363413] irq event stamp: 428794
[  414.363825] hardirqs last  enabled at (428793): [<ffffffff816bfd1c>] ktime_get+0x1dc/0x200
[  414.364694] hardirqs last disabled at (428794): [<ffffffff85470177>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x47/0x50
[  414.365629] softirqs last  enabled at (428444): [<ffffffff85474780>] __do_softirq+0x540/0x7a2
[  414.366522] softirqs last disabled at (428419): [<ffffffff813f65ab>] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0
[  414.367425]
               other info that might help us debug this:
[  414.368194]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  414.368900]        CPU0
[  414.369225]        ----
[  414.369548]   lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait);
[  414.370000]   <Interrupt>
[  414.370342]     lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait);
[  414.370802]
                *** DEADLOCK ***
[  414.371569] 5 locks held by kworker/u10:3/1152:
[  414.372088]  #0: ffff88810130e938 ((wq_completion)writeback){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x357/0x13f0
[  414.373180]  #1: ffff88810201fdb8 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x3a3/0x13f0
[  414.374384]  #2: ffffffff86ffbdc0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00
[  414.375342]  #3: ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0
[  414.376377]  #4: ffff888106205a08 (&hctx->dispatch_wait_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1337/0x1ee0
[  414.378607]
               stack backtrace:
[  414.379177] CPU: 0 PID: 1152 Comm: kworker/u10:3 Not tainted 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6
[  414.380032] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  414.381177] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0)
[  414.381805] Call Trace:
[  414.382136]  <TASK>
[  414.382429]  dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
[  414.382884]  mark_lock_irq+0xb3b/0x1260
[  414.383367]  ? __pfx_mark_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
[  414.383889]  ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0
[  414.384373]  ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10
[  414.384903]  ? graph_lock+0xcf/0x410
[  414.385350]  ? save_trace+0x3d/0xc70
[  414.385808]  mark_lock.part.20+0x56d/0xa90
[  414.386317]  mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110
[  414.386791]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  414.387320]  lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0
[  414.387901]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50
[  414.388422]  trace_hardirqs_on+0x58/0x100
[  414.388917]  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50
[  414.389422]  __blk_mq_tag_busy+0x1d6/0x2a0
[  414.389920]  __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x761/0x9f0
[  414.390899]  blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1780/0x1ee0
[  414.391473]  ? __pfx_blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x10/0x10
[  414.392070]  ? sbitmap_get+0x2b8/0x450
[  414.392533]  ? __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x210/0x9f0
[  414.393095]  __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xd99/0x1690
[  414.393730]  ? elv_attempt_insert_merge+0x1b1/0x420
[  414.394302]  ? __pfx___blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x10/0x10
[  414.394970]  ? lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460
[  414.395456]  ? blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00
[  414.395986]  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[  414.396499]  blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x109/0x190
[  414.397100]  blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x66e/0xa00
[  414.397616]  blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x614/0x2030
[  414.398244]  ? __pfx_blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x10/0x10
[  414.398897]  ? writeback_sb_inodes+0x241/0xcc0
[  414.399429]  blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x65/0x80
[  414.399957]  __blk_flush_plug+0x2f1/0x530
[  414.400458]  ? __pfx___blk_flush_plug+0x10/0x10
[  414.400999]  blk_finish_plug+0x59/0xa0
[  414.401467]  wb_writeback+0x7cc/0x920
[  414.401935]  ? __pfx_wb_writeback+0x10/0x10
[  414.402442]  ? mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110
[  414.402931]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  414.403462]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0
[  414.404062]  wb_workfn+0x2b3/0xcf0
[  414.404500]  ? __pfx_wb_workfn+0x10/0x10
[  414.404989]  process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0
[  414.405546]  ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[  414.406139]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x101/0x2a0
[  414.406641]  ? assign_work+0x19b/0x240
[  414.407106]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x9d/0x110
[  414.407604]  worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160
[  414.408075]  ? __kthread_parkme+0x62/0x210
[  414.408572]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0
[  414.409168]  ? __kthread_parkme+0x13c/0x210
[  414.409678]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  414.410191]  kthread+0x33c/0x440
[  414.410602]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  414.411068]  ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
[  414.411526]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  414.411993]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  414.412489]  </TASK>

When interrupt is turned on while a lock holding by spin_lock_irq it
throws a warning because of potential deadlock.

blk_mq_prep_dispatch_rq
 blk_mq_get_driver_tag
  __blk_mq_get_driver_tag
   __blk_mq_alloc_driver_tag
    blk_mq_tag_busy -> tag is already busy
    // failed to get driver tag
 blk_mq_mark_tag_wait
  spin_lock_irq(&wq->lock) -> lock A (&sbq->ws[i].wait)
  __add_wait_queue(wq, wait) -> wait queue active
  blk_mq_get_driver_tag
  __blk_mq_tag_busy
-> 1) tag must be idle, which means there can't be inflight IO
   spin_lock_irq(&tags->lock) -> lock B (hctx->tags)
   spin_unlock_irq(&tags->lock) -> unlock B, turn on interrupt accidentally
-> 2) context must be preempt by IO interrupt to trigger deadlock.

As shown above, the deadlock is not possible in theory, but the warning
still need to be fixed.

Fix it by using spin_lock_irqsave to get lockB instead of spin_lock_irq.

Fixes: 4f1731d ("blk-mq: fix potential io hang by wrong 'wake_batch'")
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
Currently, enabling SG_DEBUG in the kernel will cause nouveau to hit a
BUG() on startup, when the iommu is enabled:

kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:187!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 PID: 930 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ torvalds#30
Hardware name: MSI MS-7A39/A320M GAMING PRO (MS-7A39), BIOS 1.I0 01/22/2019
RIP: 0010:sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
Code: 69 88 32 01 83 e1 03 f6 c3 03 75 20 a8 01 75 1e 48 09 cb 41 89 54
24 08 49 89 1c 24 41 89 6c 24 0c 5b 5d 41 5c e9 7b b9 88 00 <0f> 0b 0f 0b
0f 0b 48 8b 05 5e 46 9a 01 eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffffa776017bf6a0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa77600d87000 RCX: 000000000000002b
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa77680d87000
RBP: 000000000000e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff98f4c46aa508 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98f4c46aa508
R13: ffff98f4c46aa008 R14: ffffa77600d4a000 R15: ffffa77600d4a018
FS:  00007feeb5aae980(0000) GS:ffff98f5c4dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f22cb9a4520 CR3: 00000001043ba000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? die+0x36/0x90
 ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100
 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
 ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
 ? sg_init_one+0x85/0xa0
 nvkm_firmware_ctor+0x14a/0x250 [nouveau]
 nvkm_falcon_fw_ctor+0x42/0x70 [nouveau]
 ga102_gsp_booter_ctor+0xb4/0x1a0 [nouveau]
 r535_gsp_oneinit+0xb3/0x15f0 [nouveau]
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? nvkm_udevice_new+0x95/0x140 [nouveau]
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
 ? ktime_get+0x47/0xb0

Fix this by using the non-coherent allocator instead, I think there
might be a better answer to this, but it involve ripping up some of
APIs using sg lists.

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 2541626 ("drm/nouveau/acr: use common falcon HS FW code for ACR FWs")
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
During suspend/resume the following BUG was hit:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in: bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc libaes
CPU: 1 PID: 1282 Comm: rtcwake Not tainted
6.10.0-rc3-00732-gc8bd1f7f3e61 #15240
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
PC is at dql_completed+0x270/0x2cc
LR is at __free_old_xmit+0x120/0x198
pc : [<c07ffa54>]    lr : [<c0c42bf4>]    psr: 80000013
...
Flags: Nzcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment none
Control: 10c5387d  Table: 43a4406a  DAC: 00000051
...
Process rtcwake (pid: 1282, stack limit = 0xfbc21278)
Stack: (0xe0805e80 to 0xe0806000)
...
Call trace:
  dql_completed from __free_old_xmit+0x120/0x198
  __free_old_xmit from free_old_xmit+0x44/0xe4
  free_old_xmit from virtnet_poll_tx+0x88/0x1b4
  virtnet_poll_tx from __napi_poll+0x2c/0x1d4
  __napi_poll from net_rx_action+0x140/0x2b4
  net_rx_action from handle_softirqs+0x11c/0x350
  handle_softirqs from call_with_stack+0x18/0x20
  call_with_stack from do_softirq+0x48/0x50
  do_softirq from __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa0/0xa4
  __local_bh_enable_ip from virtnet_open+0xd4/0x21c
  virtnet_open from virtnet_restore+0x94/0x120
  virtnet_restore from virtio_device_restore+0x110/0x1f4
  virtio_device_restore from dpm_run_callback+0x3c/0x100
  dpm_run_callback from device_resume+0x12c/0x2a8
  device_resume from dpm_resume+0x12c/0x1e0
  dpm_resume from dpm_resume_end+0xc/0x18
  dpm_resume_end from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1f0/0x72c
  suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x270/0x2a0
  pm_suspend from state_store+0x68/0xc8
  state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1cc
  kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x2b0/0x3dc
  vfs_write from ksys_write+0x5c/0xd4
  ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54
Exception stack(0xe8bf1fa8 to 0xe8bf1ff0)
...
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

After virtnet_napi_enable() is called, the following path is hit:
  __napi_poll()
    -> virtnet_poll()
      -> virtnet_poll_cleantx()
        -> netif_tx_wake_queue()

That wakes the TX queue and allows skbs to be submitted and accounted by
BQL counters.

Then netdev_tx_reset_queue() is called that resets BQL counters and
eventually leads to the BUG in dql_completed().

Move virtnet_napi_tx_enable() what does BQL counters reset before RX
napi enable to avoid the issue.

Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
Fixes: c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits")
Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
We recently made GUP's common page table walking code to also walk hugetlb
VMAs without most hugetlb special-casing, preparing for the future of
having less hugetlb-specific page table walking code in the codebase. 
Turns out that we missed one page table locking detail: page table locking
for hugetlb folios that are not mapped using a single PMD/PUD.

Assume we have hugetlb folio that spans multiple PTEs (e.g., 64 KiB
hugetlb folios on arm64 with 4 KiB base page size).  GUP, as it walks the
page tables, will perform a pte_offset_map_lock() to grab the PTE table
lock.

However, hugetlb that concurrently modifies these page tables would
actually grab the mm->page_table_lock: with USE_SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS, the
locks would differ.  Something similar can happen right now with hugetlb
folios that span multiple PMDs when USE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCKS.

This issue can be reproduced [1], for example triggering:

[ 3105.936100] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 3105.939323] WARNING: CPU: 31 PID: 2732 at mm/gup.c:142 try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188
[ 3105.944634] Modules linked in: [...]
[ 3105.974841] CPU: 31 PID: 2732 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.10.0-64.eln141.aarch64 #1
[ 3105.980406] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20240524-4.fc40 05/24/2024
[ 3105.986185] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 3105.991108] pc : try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188
[ 3105.994013] lr : follow_page_pte+0xd8/0x430
[ 3105.996986] sp : ffff80008eafb8f0
[ 3105.999346] x29: ffff80008eafb900 x28: ffffffe8d481f380 x27: 00f80001207cff43
[ 3106.004414] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff80008eafba48
[ 3106.009520] x23: 0000ffff9372f000 x22: ffff7a54459e2000 x21: ffff7a546c1aa978
[ 3106.014529] x20: ffffffe8d481f3c0 x19: 0000000000610041 x18: 0000000000000001
[ 3106.019506] x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffffffffffffff x15: 0000000000000000
[ 3106.024494] x14: ffffb85477fdfe08 x13: 0000ffff9372ffff x12: 0000000000000000
[ 3106.029469] x11: 1fffef4a88a96be1 x10: ffff7a54454b5f0c x9 : ffffb854771b12f0
[ 3106.034324] x8 : 0008000000000000 x7 : ffff7a546c1aa980 x6 : 0008000000000080
[ 3106.038902] x5 : 00000000001207cf x4 : 0000ffff9372f000 x3 : ffffffe8d481f000
[ 3106.043420] x2 : 0000000000610041 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 3106.047957] Call trace:
[ 3106.049522]  try_grab_folio+0x11c/0x188
[ 3106.051996]  follow_pmd_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x150/0x2e0
[ 3106.055527]  follow_page_mask+0x1a0/0x2b8
[ 3106.058118]  __get_user_pages+0xf0/0x348
[ 3106.060647]  faultin_page_range+0xb0/0x360
[ 3106.063651]  do_madvise+0x340/0x598

Let's make huge_pte_lockptr() effectively use the same PT locks as any
core-mm page table walker would.  Add ptep_lockptr() to obtain the PTE
page table lock using a pte pointer -- unfortunately we cannot convert
pte_lockptr() because virt_to_page() doesn't work with kmap'ed page tables
we can have with CONFIG_HIGHPTE.

Handle CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS correctly by checking in reverse order, such
that when e.g., CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS==2 with
PGDIR_SIZE==P4D_SIZE==PUD_SIZE==PMD_SIZE will work as expected.  Document
why that works.

There is one ugly case: powerpc 8xx, whereby we have an 8 MiB hugetlb
folio being mapped using two PTE page tables.  While hugetlb wants to take
the PMD table lock, core-mm would grab the PTE table lock of one of both
PTE page tables.  In such corner cases, we have to make sure that both
locks match, which is (fortunately!) currently guaranteed for 8xx as it
does not support SMP and consequently doesn't use split PT locks.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 9cb28da ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
Fix invalid access to pgdat during hot-remove operation:
ndctl users reported a GPF when trying to destroy a namespace:
$ ndctl destroy-namespace all -r all -f
 Segmentation fault
 dmesg:
 Oops: general protection fault, probably for
 non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000005650: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
 PTI
 KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range
 [0x000000000002b280-0x000000000002b287]
 CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 1868 Comm: ndctl Not tainted 6.11.0-rc1 #1
 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/08HT8T, BIOS
 2.20.1 09/13/2023
 RIP: 0010:mod_node_page_state+0x2a/0x110

cxl-test users report a GPF when trying to unload the test module:
$ modrpobe -r cxl-test
 dmesg
 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000004200
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1076 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O N 6.11.0-rc1 torvalds#197
 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [N]=TEST
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/15
 RIP: 0010:mod_node_page_state+0x6/0x90

Currently, when memory is hot-plugged or hot-removed the accounting is
done based on the assumption that memmap is allocated from the same node
as the hot-plugged/hot-removed memory, which is not always the case.

In addition, there are challenges with keeping the node id of the memory
that is being remove to the time when memmap accounting is actually
performed: since this is done after remove_pfn_range_from_zone(), and
also after remove_memory_block_devices(). Meaning that we cannot use
pgdat nor walking though memblocks to get the nid.

Given all of that, account the memmap overhead system wide instead.

For this we are going to be using global atomic counters, but given that
memmap size is rarely modified, and normally is only modified either
during early boot when there is only one CPU, or under a hotplug global
mutex lock, therefore there is no need for per-cpu optimizations.

Also, while we are here rename nr_memmap to nr_memmap_pages, and
nr_memmap_boot to nr_memmap_boot_pages to be self explanatory that the
units are in page count.

[[email protected]: address a few nits from David Hildenbrand]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 15995a3 ("mm: report per-page metadata information")
Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/CAHj4cs9Ax1=CoJkgBGP_+sNu6-6=6v=_L-ZBZY0bVLD3wUWZQg@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/Zq0tPd2h6alFz8XF@aschofie-mobl2/#t
Tested-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: Domenico Cerasuolo <[email protected]>
Cc: Fan Ni <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Granados <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Zhijian <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Nhat Pham <[email protected]>
Cc: Sourav Panda <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
Preparations for FIB rule DSCP selector

This patchset moves the masking of the upper DSCP bits in 'flowi4_tos'
to the core instead of relying on callers of the FIB lookup API to do
it.

This will allow us to start changing users of the API to initialize the
'flowi4_tos' field with all six bits of the DSCP field. In turn, this
will allow us to extend FIB rules with a new DSCP selector.

By masking the upper DSCP bits in the core we are able to maintain the
behavior of the TOS selector in FIB rules and routes to only match on
the lower DSCP bits.

While working on this I found two users of the API that do not mask the
upper DSCP bits before performing the lookup. The first is an ancient
netlink family that is unlikely to be used. It is adjusted in patch #1
to mask both the upper DSCP bits and the ECN bits before calling the
API.

The second user is a nftables module that differs in this regard from
its equivalent iptables module. It is adjusted in patch #2 to invoke the
API with the upper DSCP bits masked, like all other callers. The
relevant selftest passed, but in the unlikely case that regressions are
reported because of this change, we can restore the existing behavior
using a new flow information flag as discussed here [1].

The last patch moves the masking of the upper DSCP bits to the core,
making the first two patches redundant, but I wanted to post them
separately to call attention to the behavior change for these two users
of the FIB lookup API.

Future patchsets (around 3) will start unmasking the upper DSCP bits
throughout the networking stack before adding support for the new FIB
rule DSCP selector.

Changes from v1 [2]:

Patch #3: Include <linux/ip.h> in <linux/in_route.h> instead of
including it in net/ip_fib.h

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ZpqpB8vJU%2FQ6LSqa@debian/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
We shouldn't set real_dev to NULL because packets can be in transit and
xfrm might call xdo_dev_offload_ok() in parallel. All callbacks assume
real_dev is set.

 Example trace:
 kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001030
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel: #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 kernel: #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 kernel: PGD 0 P4D 0
 kernel: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 2237 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.7.7+ alobakin#12
 kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
 kernel: RIP: 0010:nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim]
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel: Code: e0 0f 0b 48 83 7f 38 00 74 de 0f 0b 48 8b 47 08 48 8b 37 48 8b 78 40 e9 b2 e5 9a d7 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 86 80 02 00 00 <83> 80 30 10 00 00 01 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffabde81553b98 EFLAGS: 00010246
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel:
 kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9eb404e74900 RCX: ffff9eb403d97c60
 kernel: RDX: ffffffffc090de10 RSI: ffff9eb404e74900 RDI: ffff9eb3c5de9e00
 kernel: RBP: ffff9eb3c0a42000 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000014
 kernel: R10: 7974203030303030 R11: 3030303030303030 R12: 0000000000000000
 kernel: R13: ffff9eb3c5de9e00 R14: ffffabde81553cc8 R15: ffff9eb404c53000
 kernel: FS:  00007f2a77a3ad00(0000) GS:ffff9eb43bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 kernel: CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 kernel: CR2: 0000000000001030 CR3: 00000001122ab000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel: Call Trace:
 kernel:  <TASK>
 kernel:  ? __die+0x1f/0x60
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel:  ? page_fault_oops+0x142/0x4c0
 kernel:  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x670
 kernel:  ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel:  ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180
 kernel:  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
 kernel:  ? nsim_bpf_uninit+0x50/0x50 [netdevsim]
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel:  ? nsim_ipsec_offload_ok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim]
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one
 kernel:  bond_ipsec_offload_ok+0x7b/0x90 [bonding]
 kernel:  xfrm_output+0x61/0x3b0
 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bond_ipsec_add_sa_all: failed to add SA
 kernel:  ip_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x80

Fixes: 18cb261 ("bonding: support hardware encryption offload to slaves")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
When metadata_dst struct is allocated (using metadata_dst_alloc()), it
reserves room for options at the end of the struct.

Change the memcpy() to unsafe_memcpy() as it is guaranteed that enough
room (md_size bytes) was allocated and the field-spanning write is
intentional.

This resolves the following warning:
	------------[ cut here ]------------
	memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 104) of single field "&new_md->u.tun_info" at include/net/dst_metadata.h:166 (size 96)
	WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 391470 at include/net/dst_metadata.h:166 tun_dst_unclone+0x114/0x138 [geneve]
	Modules linked in: act_tunnel_key geneve ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel act_vlan act_mirred act_skbedit cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress sbsa_gwdt ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel6 tunnel4 xfrm_user xfrm_algo nvme_fabrics overlay optee openvswitch nsh nf_conncount ib_srp scsi_transport_srp rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser rdma_cm ib_umad iw_cm libiscsi ib_ipoib scsi_transport_iscsi ib_cm uio_pdrv_genirq uio mlxbf_pmc pwr_mlxbf mlxbf_bootctl bluefield_edac nft_chain_nat binfmt_misc xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xt_tcpmss xt_NFLOG nfnetlink_log xt_recent xt_hashlimit xt_state xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_mark xt_comment ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nf_tables nfnetlink sch_fq_codel dm_multipath fuse efi_pstore ip_tables btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor xor_neon raid6_pq raid1 raid0 nvme nvme_core mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core ipv6 crc_ccitt mlx5_core crct10dif_ce mlxfw
	 psample i2c_mlxbf gpio_mlxbf2 mlxbf_gige mlxbf_tmfifo
	CPU: 2 PID: 391470 Comm: handler6 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1 #1
	Hardware name: https://www.mellanox.com BlueField SoC/BlueField SoC, BIOS 4.5.0.12993 Dec  6 2023
	pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
	pc : tun_dst_unclone+0x114/0x138 [geneve]
	lr : tun_dst_unclone+0x114/0x138 [geneve]
	sp : ffffffc0804533f0
	x29: ffffffc0804533f0 x28: 000000000000024e x27: 0000000000000000
	x26: ffffffdcfc0e8e40 x25: ffffff8086fa6600 x24: ffffff8096a0c000
	x23: 0000000000000068 x22: 0000000000000008 x21: ffffff8092ad7000
	x20: ffffff8081e17900 x19: ffffff8092ad7900 x18: 00000000fffffffd
	x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffffdcfa018488 x15: 695f6e75742e753e
	x14: 2d646d5f77656e26 x13: 6d5f77656e262220 x12: 646c65696620656c
	x11: ffffffdcfbe33ae8 x10: ffffffdcfbe1baa8 x9 : ffffffdcfa0a4c10
	x8 : 0000000000017fe8 x7 : c0000000ffffefff x6 : 0000000000000001
	x5 : ffffff83fdeeb010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
	x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff80913f6780
	Call trace:
	 tun_dst_unclone+0x114/0x138 [geneve]
	 geneve_xmit+0x214/0x10e0 [geneve]
	 dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc0/0x220
	 __dev_queue_xmit+0xa14/0xd38
	 dev_queue_xmit+0x14/0x28 [openvswitch]
	 ovs_vport_send+0x98/0x1c8 [openvswitch]
	 do_output+0x80/0x1a0 [openvswitch]
	 do_execute_actions+0x172c/0x1958 [openvswitch]
	 ovs_execute_actions+0x64/0x1a8 [openvswitch]
	 ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x258/0x2d8 [openvswitch]
	 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xc8/0x138
	 genl_rcv_msg+0x1ec/0x280
	 netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x150
	 genl_rcv+0x40/0x60
	 netlink_unicast+0x2e4/0x348
	 netlink_sendmsg+0x1b0/0x400
	 __sock_sendmsg+0x64/0xc0
	 ____sys_sendmsg+0x284/0x308
	 ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xf0
	 __sys_sendmsg+0x70/0xd8
	 __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x2c/0x40
	 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128
	 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
	 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
	 el0_svc+0x38/0x100
	 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
	 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
	---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Reviewed-by: Cosmin Ratiu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
Kolbjørn and Jonáš reported that their 32-bit PowerMacs were crashing
in pata-macio since commit 09fe2bf ("ata: pata_macio: Fix
max_segment_size with PAGE_SIZE == 64K").

For example:

  kernel BUG at drivers/ata/pata_macio.c:544!
  Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
  BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2 DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PowerMac
  ...
  NIP pata_macio_qc_prep+0xf4/0x190
  LR  pata_macio_qc_prep+0xfc/0x190
  Call Trace:
    0xc1421660 (unreliable)
    ata_qc_issue+0x14c/0x2d4
    __ata_scsi_queuecmd+0x200/0x53c
    ata_scsi_queuecmd+0x50/0xe0
    scsi_queue_rq+0x788/0xb1c
    __blk_mq_issue_directly+0x58/0xf4
    blk_mq_plug_issue_direct+0x8c/0x1b4
    blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.0+0x584/0x5e0
    __blk_flush_plug+0xf8/0x194
    __submit_bio+0x1b8/0x2e0
    submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x230/0x304
    btrfs_work_helper+0x200/0x338
    process_one_work+0x1a8/0x338
    worker_thread+0x364/0x4c0
    kthread+0x100/0x104
    start_kernel_thread+0x10/0x14

That commit increased max_segment_size to 64KB, with the justification
that the SCSI core was already using that size when PAGE_SIZE == 64KB,
and that there was existing logic to split over-sized requests.

However with a sufficiently large request, the splitting logic causes
each sg to be split into two commands in the DMA table, leading to
overflow of the DMA table, triggering the BUG_ON().

With default settings the bug doesn't trigger, because the request size
is limited by max_sectors_kb == 1280, however max_sectors_kb can be
increased, and apparently some distros do that by default using udev
rules.

Fix the bug for 4KB kernels by reverting to the old max_segment_size.

For 64KB kernels the sg_tablesize needs to be halved, to allow for the
possibility that each sg will be split into two.

Fixes: 09fe2bf ("ata: pata_macio: Fix max_segment_size with PAGE_SIZE == 64K")
Cc: [email protected] # v6.10+
Reported-by: Kolbjørn Barmen <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Reported-by: Jonáš Vidra <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Tested-by: Kolbjørn Barmen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

Patch #1 disable BH when collecting stats via hardware offload to ensure
         concurrent updates from packet path do not result in losing stats.
         From Sebastian Andrzej Siewior.

Patch #2 uses write seqcount to reset counters serialize against reader.
         Also from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior.

Patch #3 ensures vlan header is in place before accessing its fields,
         according to KMSAN splat triggered by syzbot.

* tag 'nf-24-08-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  netfilter: flowtable: validate vlan header
  netfilter: nft_counter: Synchronize nft_counter_reset() against reader.
  netfilter: nft_counter: Disable BH in nft_counter_offload_stats().
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
Unmask upper DSCP bits - part 1

tl;dr - This patchset starts to unmask the upper DSCP bits in the IPv4
flow key in preparation for allowing IPv4 FIB rules to match on DSCP.
No functional changes are expected.

The TOS field in the IPv4 flow key ('flowi4_tos') is used during FIB
lookup to match against the TOS selector in FIB rules and routes.

It is currently impossible for user space to configure FIB rules that
match on the DSCP value as the upper DSCP bits are either masked in the
various call sites that initialize the IPv4 flow key or along the path
to the FIB core.

In preparation for adding a DSCP selector to IPv4 and IPv6 FIB rules, we
need to make sure the entire DSCP value is present in the IPv4 flow key.
This patchset starts to unmask the upper DSCP bits in the various places
that invoke the core FIB lookup functions directly (patches #1-#7) and
in the input route path (patches #8-alobakin#12). Future patchsets will do the
same in the output route path.

No functional changes are expected as commit 1fa3314 ("ipv4:
Centralize TOS matching") moved the masking of the upper DSCP bits to
the core where 'flowi4_tos' is matched against the TOS selector.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
This fixes the random kernel crash seen while removing the driver, when
running the load/unload test over multiple iterations.

1) modprobe btnxpuart
2) hciconfig hci0 reset
3) hciconfig (check hci0 interface up with valid BD address)
4) modprobe -r btnxpuart
Repeat steps 1 to 4

The ps_wakeup() call in btnxpuart_close() schedules the psdata->work(),
which gets scheduled after module is removed, causing a kernel crash.

This hidden issue got highlighted after enabling Power Save by default
in 4183a7b (Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Enable Power Save feature on
startup)

The new ps_cleanup() deasserts UART break immediately while closing
serdev device, cancels any scheduled ps_work and destroys the ps_lock
mutex.

[   85.884604] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffd4a61638f258
[   85.884624] Mem abort info:
[   85.884625]   ESR = 0x0000000086000007
[   85.884628]   EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   85.884633]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   85.884636]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   85.884638]   FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[   85.884642] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000041dd0000
[   85.884646] [ffffd4a61638f258] pgd=1000000095fff003, p4d=1000000095fff003, pud=100000004823d003, pmd=100000004823e003, pte=0000000000000000
[   85.884662] Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   85.890932] Modules linked in: algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce polyval_generic snd_soc_imx_spdif snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_ak5558 snd_soc_ak4458 caam secvio error snd_soc_fsl_spdif snd_soc_fsl_micfil snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_utils gpio_ir_recv rc_core fuse [last unloaded: btnxpuart(O)]
[   85.927297] CPU: 1 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/1:3 Tainted: G           O       6.1.36+g937b1be4345a #1
[   85.936176] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MM EVK board (DT)
[   85.936182] Workqueue: events 0xffffd4a61638f380
[   85.936198] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   85.952817] pc : 0xffffd4a61638f258
[   85.952823] lr : 0xffffd4a61638f258
[   85.952827] sp : ffff8000084fbd70
[   85.952829] x29: ffff8000084fbd70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[   85.963112] x26: ffffd4a69133f000 x25: ffff4bf1c8540990 x24: ffff4bf215b87305
[   85.963119] x23: ffff4bf215b87300 x22: ffff4bf1c85409d0 x21: ffff4bf1c8540970
[   85.977382] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff4bf1c8540880 x18: 0000000000000000
[   85.977391] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000133 x15: 0000ffffe2217090
[   85.977399] x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000133 x12: 0000000000000139
[   85.977407] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : ffff8000084fbc50
[   85.977417] x8 : ffff4bf215b7d000 x7 : ffff4bf215b83b40 x6 : 00000000000003e8
[   85.977424] x5 : 00000000410fd030 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[   85.977432] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff4bf1c4265880 x0 : 0000000000000000
[   85.977443] Call trace:
[   85.977446]  0xffffd4a61638f258
[   85.977451]  0xffffd4a61638f3e8
[   85.977455]  process_one_work+0x1d4/0x330
[   85.977464]  worker_thread+0x6c/0x430
[   85.977471]  kthread+0x108/0x10c
[   85.977476]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[   85.977488] Code: bad PC value
[   85.977491] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Preset since v6.9.11
Fixes: 86d55f1 ("Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Deasset UART break before closing serdev device")
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
…rnel/git/netfilter/nf-next

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter updates for net-next

The following batch contains Netfilter updates for net-next:

Patch #1 fix checksum calculation in nfnetlink_queue with SCTP,
	 segment GSO packet since skb_zerocopy() does not support
	 GSO_BY_FRAGS, from Antonio Ojea.

Patch #2 extend nfnetlink_queue coverage to handle SCTP packets,
	 from Antonio Ojea.

Patch #3 uses consume_skb() instead of kfree_skb() in nfnetlink,
         from Donald Hunter.

Patch #4 adds a dedicate commit list for sets to speed up
	 intra-transaction lookups, from Florian Westphal.

Patch #5 skips removal of element from abort path for the pipapo
         backend, ditching the shadow copy of this datastructure
	 is sufficient.

Patch #6 moves nf_ct_netns_get() out of nf_conncount_init() to
	 let users of conncoiunt decide when to enable conntrack,
	 this is needed by openvswitch, from Xin Long.

Patch #7 pass context to all nft_parse_register_load() in
	 preparation for the next patch.

Patches #8 and alobakin#9 reject loads from uninitialized registers from
	 control plane to remove register initialization from
	 datapath. From Florian Westphal.

* tag 'nf-next-24-08-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf-next:
  netfilter: nf_tables: don't initialize registers in nft_do_chain()
  netfilter: nf_tables: allow loads only when register is initialized
  netfilter: nf_tables: pass context structure to nft_parse_register_load
  netfilter: move nf_ct_netns_get out of nf_conncount_init
  netfilter: nf_tables: do not remove elements if set backend implements .abort
  netfilter: nf_tables: store new sets in dedicated list
  netfilter: nfnetlink: convert kfree_skb to consume_skb
  selftests: netfilter: nft_queue.sh: sctp coverage
  netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: unbreak SCTP traffic
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
In the cited commit, bond->ipsec_lock is added to protect ipsec_list,
hence xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete are called inside
this lock. As ipsec_lock is a spin lock and such xfrmdev ops may sleep,
"scheduling while atomic" will be triggered when changing bond's
active slave.

[  101.055189] BUG: scheduling while atomic: bash/902/0x00000200
[  101.055726] Modules linked in:
[  101.058211] CPU: 3 PID: 902 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1
[  101.058760] Hardware name:
[  101.059434] Call Trace:
[  101.059436]  <TASK>
[  101.060873]  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
[  101.061275]  __schedule_bug+0x4e/0x60
[  101.061682]  __schedule+0x612/0x7c0
[  101.062078]  ? __mod_timer+0x25c/0x370
[  101.062486]  schedule+0x25/0xd0
[  101.062845]  schedule_timeout+0x77/0xf0
[  101.063265]  ? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[  101.063724]  ? __bpf_trace_itimer_state+0x10/0x10
[  101.064215]  __wait_for_common+0x87/0x190
[  101.064648]  ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90
[  101.065091]  cmd_exec+0x437/0xb20 [mlx5_core]
[  101.065569]  mlx5_cmd_do+0x1e/0x40 [mlx5_core]
[  101.066051]  mlx5_cmd_exec+0x18/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[  101.066552]  mlx5_crypto_create_dek_key+0xea/0x120 [mlx5_core]
[  101.067163]  ? bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[  101.067738]  ? kmalloc_trace+0x4d/0x350
[  101.068156]  mlx5_ipsec_create_sa_ctx+0x33/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[  101.068747]  mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x47b/0xaa0 [mlx5_core]
[  101.069312]  bond_change_active_slave+0x392/0x900 [bonding]
[  101.069868]  bond_option_active_slave_set+0x1c2/0x240 [bonding]
[  101.070454]  __bond_opt_set+0xa6/0x430 [bonding]
[  101.070935]  __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2f/0x90 [bonding]
[  101.071453]  bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x72/0xb0 [bonding]
[  101.071965]  bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding]
[  101.072567]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0
[  101.073033]  vfs_write+0x2d8/0x400
[  101.073416]  ? alloc_fd+0x48/0x180
[  101.073798]  ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
[  101.074175]  do_syscall_64+0x52/0x110
[  101.074576]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

As bond_ipsec_add_sa_all and bond_ipsec_del_sa_all are only called
from bond_change_active_slave, which requires holding the RTNL lock.
And bond_ipsec_add_sa and bond_ipsec_del_sa are xfrm state
xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete APIs, which are in user
context. So ipsec_lock doesn't have to be spin lock, change it to
mutex, and thus the above issue can be resolved.

Fixes: 9a56055 ("bonding: Add struct bond_ipesc to manage SA")
Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

Patch #1 sets on NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO for UDP packets less than 4 bytes
payload from netdev/egress by subtracting skb_network_offset() when
validating IPv4 packet length, otherwise 'meta l4proto udp' never
matches.

Patch #2 subtracts skb_network_offset() when validating IPv6 packet
length for netdev/egress.

netfilter pull request 24-08-28

* tag 'nf-24-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  netfilter: nf_tables_ipv6: consider network offset in netdev/egress validation
  netfilter: nf_tables: restore IP sanity checks for netdev/egress
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 6, 2024
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
Unmask upper DSCP bits - part 2

tl;dr - This patchset continues to unmask the upper DSCP bits in the
IPv4 flow key in preparation for allowing IPv4 FIB rules to match on
DSCP. No functional changes are expected. Part 1 was merged in commit
("Merge branch 'unmask-upper-dscp-bits-part-1'").

The TOS field in the IPv4 flow key ('flowi4_tos') is used during FIB
lookup to match against the TOS selector in FIB rules and routes.

It is currently impossible for user space to configure FIB rules that
match on the DSCP value as the upper DSCP bits are either masked in the
various call sites that initialize the IPv4 flow key or along the path
to the FIB core.

In preparation for adding a DSCP selector to IPv4 and IPv6 FIB rules, we
need to make sure the entire DSCP value is present in the IPv4 flow key.
This patchset continues to unmask the upper DSCP bits, but this time in
the output route path.

Patches #1-#3 unmask the upper DSCP bits in the various places that
invoke the core output route lookup functions directly.

Patches #4-#6 do the same in three helpers that are widely used in the
output path to initialize the TOS field in the IPv4 flow key.

The rest of the patches continue to unmask these bits in call sites that
invoke the following wrappers around the core lookup functions:

Patch #7 - __ip_route_output_key()
Patches #8-alobakin#12 - ip_route_output_flow()

The next patchset will handle the callers of ip_route_output_ports() and
ip_route_output_key().

No functional changes are expected as commit 1fa3314 ("ipv4:
Centralize TOS matching") moved the masking of the upper DSCP bits to
the core where 'flowi4_tos' is matched against the TOS selector.

Changes since v1 [1]:

* Remove IPTOS_RT_MASK in patch #7 instead of in patch #6

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
The commit 19af457 ("workqueue: Remove cpus_read_lock() from
apply_wqattrs_lock()") removes the unneed cpus_read_lock() after the pwq
creations and installations have been reworked based on wq_online_cpumask
rather than cpu_online_mask making cpus_read_lock() is unneeded during
wqattrs changes.

But it desn't remove the lockdep_assert_cpus_held() checks during wqattrs
changes, which leads to complaints from lockdep reported by kernel test
robot:

[   15.726567][  T131] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 15.728117][ T131] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 131 at kernel/cpu.c:525 lockdep_assert_cpus_held (kernel/cpu.c:525)
[   15.731191][  T131] Modules linked in: floppy(+) parport_pc(+) parport qemu_fw_cfg rtc_cmos
[   15.733423][  T131] CPU: 1 PID: 131 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G                T  6.10.0-rc2-00254-g19af45757383 #1 df6f039f42e8818bf9a534449362ebad1aad32e2
[   15.737011][  T131] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
[ 15.739760][ T131] EIP: lockdep_assert_cpus_held (kernel/cpu.c:525)
[ 15.741326][ T131] Code: 97 c2 03 72 20 83 3d f4 73 97 c2 00 74 17 55 89 e5 b8 fc bd 4d c2 ba ff ff ff ff e8 e4 57 d1 00 85 c0 74 06 5d 31 c0 31 d2 c3 <0f> 0b eb f6 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 89 e5 b8

Fix it by removing the unneeded lockdep_assert_cpus_held().
Also remove the unneed cpus_read_lock() from wq_affn_dfl_set().

tj: Dropped the removal of cpus_read_lock/unlock() in wq_affn_dfl_set() to
    keep this patch fix only.

Cc: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 19af457("workqueue: Remove cpus_read_lock() from apply_wqattrs_lock()")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
Commit 8efcd48 ("ASoC: Intel: sof_rt5682: use common module for
sof_card_private initialization") migrated the pin assignment in the
context struct up to soc-acpi-intel-ssp-common.c. This uses a lookup
table to see if a device has a amp/codec before assigning the pin. The
issue here arises when combination parts that serve both (with 2 ports)
are used.

sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1f.3/adl_rt5682_def/SSP0-Codec'
CPU: 1 PID: 2079 Comm: udevd Tainted: G     U             6.6.36-03391-g744739e00023 #1 3be1a2880a0970f65545a957db7d08ef4b3e2c0d
Hardware name: Google Anraggar/Anraggar, BIOS Google_Anraggar.15217.552.0 05/07/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0
 sysfs_warn_dup+0x5b/0x70
 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xb0/0x100
 kobject_add_internal+0x133/0x3c0
 kobject_add+0x66/0xb0
 ? device_add+0x65/0x780
 device_add+0x164/0x780
 snd_soc_add_pcm_runtimes+0x2fa/0x800
 snd_soc_bind_card+0x35e/0xc20
 devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x48/0x90
 platform_probe+0x7b/0xb0
 really_probe+0xf7/0x2a0
 ...
kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for SSP0-Codec with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory.

The issue is that the ALC5650 was only defined in the codec table and
not the amp table which left the pin unassigned but the dai link was
still created by the machine driver.

Also patch the suffix filename code for the topology to prevent double
suffix names as a result of this change.

Fixes: 8efcd48 ("ASoC: Intel: sof_rt5682: use common module for sof_card_private initialization")
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Curtis Malainey <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
When tries to demote 1G hugetlb folios, a lockdep warning is observed:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.10.0-rc6-00452-ga4d0275fa660-dirty torvalds#79 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bash/710 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8f0a7850 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0x244/0x460

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f0a6f48 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0xae/0x460

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&h->resize_lock);
  lock(&h->resize_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

4 locks held by bash/710:
 #0: ffff8f118439c3f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 #1: ffff8f11893b9e88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0
 #2: ffff8f1183dc4428 (kn->active#98){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0
 #3: ffffffff8f0a6f48 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0xae/0x460

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 710 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc6-00452-ga4d0275fa660-dirty torvalds#79
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
 __lock_acquire+0x10f2/0x1ca0
 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x2d0
 __mutex_lock+0x6d/0x400
 demote_store+0x244/0x460
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
 vfs_write+0x380/0x540
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa61db14887
RSP: 002b:00007ffc56c48358 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007fa61db14887
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000055a030050220 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055a030050220 R08: 00007fa61dbd1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 00007fa61dc1b780 R14: 00007fa61dc17600 R15: 00007fa61dc16a00
 </TASK>

Lockdep considers this an AA deadlock because the different resize_lock
mutexes reside in the same lockdep class, but this is a false positive.
Place them in distinct classes to avoid these warnings.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 8531fc6 ("hugetlb: add hugetlb demote page support")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
…b folio

A kernel crash was observed when migrating hugetlb folio:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 3435 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc6-00450-g8578ca01f21f torvalds#66
RIP: 0010:__folio_undo_large_rmappable+0x70/0xb0
RSP: 0018:ffffb165c98a7b38 EFLAGS: 00000097
RAX: fffffbbc44528090 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffa30e000a2800 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffffa3153ffffcc0
RBP: fffffbbc44528000 R08: 0000000000002371 R09: ffffffffbe4e5868
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffa3153ffffcc0
R13: fffffbbc44468000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f5b3a716740(0000) GS:ffffa3151fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010959a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __folio_migrate_mapping+0x59e/0x950
 __migrate_folio.constprop.0+0x5f/0x120
 move_to_new_folio+0xfd/0x250
 migrate_pages+0x383/0xd70
 soft_offline_page+0x2ab/0x7f0
 soft_offline_page_store+0x52/0x90
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
 vfs_write+0x380/0x540
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5b3a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffe138fce68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007f5b3a514887
RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 0000556ab809ee10 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000556ab809ee10 R08: 00007f5b3a5d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c
R13: 00007f5b3a61b780 R14: 00007f5b3a617600 R15: 00007f5b3a616a00

It's because hugetlb folio is passed to __folio_undo_large_rmappable()
unexpectedly.  large_rmappable flag is imperceptibly set to hugetlb folio
since commit f6a8dd9 ("hugetlb: convert alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio to
use a folio").  Then commit be9581e ("mm: fix crashes from deferred
split racing folio migration") makes folio_migrate_mapping() call
folio_undo_large_rmappable() triggering the bug.  Fix this issue by
clearing large_rmappable flag for hugetlb folios.  They don't need that
flag set anyway.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: f6a8dd9 ("hugetlb: convert alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio to use a folio")
Fixes: be9581e ("mm: fix crashes from deferred split racing folio migration")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
When using cachefiles, lockdep may emit something similar to the circular
locking dependency notice below.  The problem appears to stem from the
following:

 (1) Cachefiles manipulates xattrs on the files in its cache when called
     from ->writepages().

 (2) The setxattr() and removexattr() system call handlers get the name
     (and value) from userspace after taking the sb_writers lock, putting
     accesses of the vma->vm_lock and mm->mmap_lock inside of that.

 (3) The afs filesystem uses a per-inode lock to prevent multiple
     revalidation RPCs and in writeback vs truncate to prevent parallel
     operations from deadlocking against the server on one side and local
     page locks on the other.

Fix this by moving the getting of the name and value in {get,remove}xattr()
outside of the sb_writers lock.  This also has the minor benefits that we
don't need to reget these in the event of a retry and we never try to take
the sb_writers lock in the event we can't pull the name and value into the
kernel.

Alternative approaches that might fix this include moving the dispatch of a
write to the cache off to a workqueue or trying to do without the
validation lock in afs.  Note that this might also affect other filesystems
that use netfslib and/or cachefiles.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.10.0-build2+ torvalds#956 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 fsstress/6050 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888138fd82f0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){++++}-{3:3}, at: filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888113f26d18 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0x165/0x250

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #4 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_write+0x3b/0x50
        vma_start_write+0x6b/0xa0
        vma_link+0xcc/0x140
        insert_vm_struct+0xb7/0xf0
        alloc_bprm+0x2c1/0x390
        kernel_execve+0x65/0x1a0
        call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x14d/0x190
        ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        __might_fault+0x7c/0xb0
        strncpy_from_user+0x25/0x160
        removexattr+0x7f/0x100
        __do_sys_fremovexattr+0x7e/0xb0
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #2 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        percpu_down_read+0x3c/0x90
        vfs_iocb_iter_write+0xe9/0x1d0
        __cachefiles_write+0x367/0x430
        cachefiles_issue_write+0x299/0x2f0
        netfs_advance_write+0x117/0x140
        netfs_write_folio.isra.0+0x5ca/0x6e0
        netfs_writepages+0x230/0x2f0
        afs_writepages+0x4d/0x70
        do_writepages+0x1e8/0x3e0
        filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x84/0xa0
        __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xa8/0xf0
        file_write_and_wait_range+0x59/0x90
        afs_release+0x10f/0x270
        __fput+0x25f/0x3d0
        __do_sys_close+0x43/0x70
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #1 (&vnode->validate_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_read+0x95/0x200
        afs_writepages+0x37/0x70
        do_writepages+0x1e8/0x3e0
        filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x84/0xa0
        filemap_invalidate_inode+0x167/0x1e0
        netfs_unbuffered_write_iter+0x1bd/0x2d0
        vfs_write+0x22e/0x320
        ksys_write+0xbc/0x130
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){++++}-{3:3}:
        check_noncircular+0x119/0x160
        check_prev_add+0x195/0x430
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_read+0x95/0x200
        filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
        __do_fault+0x57/0xd0
        do_pte_missing+0x23b/0x320
        __handle_mm_fault+0x2d4/0x320
        handle_mm_fault+0x14f/0x260
        do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x500
        exc_page_fault+0x71/0x90
        asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   mapping.invalidate_lock#3 --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &vma->vm_lock->lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   rlock(&vma->vm_lock->lock);
                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                                lock(&vma->vm_lock->lock);
   rlock(mapping.invalidate_lock#3);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 1 lock held by fsstress/6050:
  #0: ffff888113f26d18 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0x165/0x250

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 PID: 6050 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.10.0-build2+ torvalds#956
 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x80
  check_noncircular+0x119/0x160
  ? queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4be/0x510
  ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_lock+0x47/0x160
  ? init_chain_block+0x9c/0xc0
  ? add_chain_block+0x84/0xf0
  check_prev_add+0x195/0x430
  __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x13b/0x230
  lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
  ? filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_lock_acquire.part.0+0x10/0x10
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? lock_acquire+0xd7/0x120
  down_read+0x95/0x200
  ? filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10
  ? __filemap_get_folio+0x25/0x1a0
  filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_filemap_fault+0x10/0x10
  ? find_held_lock+0x7c/0x90
  ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10
  ? __pte_offset_map+0x99/0x110
  __do_fault+0x57/0xd0
  do_pte_missing+0x23b/0x320
  __handle_mm_fault+0x2d4/0x320
  ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10
  handle_mm_fault+0x14f/0x260
  do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x500
  exc_page_fault+0x71/0x90
  asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30

Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
cc: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
cc: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
cc: [email protected]
[brauner: fix minor issues]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains a Netfilter fix for net:

Patch #1 if FPU is busy, then pipapo set backend falls back to standard
         set element lookup. Moreover, disable bh while at this.
	 From Florian Westphal.

netfilter pull request 24-07-24

* tag 'nf-24-07-24' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  netfilter: nft_set_pipapo_avx2: disable softinterrupts
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
michalQb pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
This just standardizes the use of MIN() and MAX() macros, with the very
traditional semantics.  The goal is to use these for C constant
expressions and for top-level / static initializers, and so be able to
simplify the min()/max() macros.

These macro names were used by various kernel code - they are very
traditional, after all - and all such users have been fixed up, with a
few different approaches:

 - trivial duplicated macro definitions have been removed

   Note that 'trivial' here means that it's obviously kernel code that
   already included all the major kernel headers, and thus gets the new
   generic MIN/MAX macros automatically.

 - non-trivial duplicated macro definitions are guarded with #ifndef

   This is the "yes, they define their own versions, but no, the include
   situation is not entirely obvious, and maybe they don't get the
   generic version automatically" case.

 - strange use case #1

   A couple of drivers decided that the way they want to describe their
   versioning is with

	#define MAJ 1
	#define MIN 2
	#define DRV_VERSION __stringify(MAJ) "." __stringify(MIN)

   which adds zero value and I just did my Alexander the Great
   impersonation, and rewrote that pointless Gordian knot as

	#define DRV_VERSION "1.2"

   instead.

 - strange use case #2

   A couple of drivers thought that it's a good idea to have a random
   'MIN' or 'MAX' define for a value or index into a table, rather than
   the traditional macro that takes arguments.

   These values were re-written as C enum's instead. The new
   function-line macros only expand when followed by an open
   parenthesis, and thus don't clash with enum use.

Happily, there weren't really all that many of these cases, and a lot of
users already had the pattern of using '#ifndef' guarding (or in one
case just using '#undef MIN') before defining their own private version
that does the same thing. I left such cases alone.

Cc: David Laight <[email protected]>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
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3 participants