tracing: Fix potential out-of-bounds in trace_get_user()

commit 057db84 upstream.

Andrey reported the following report:

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3
ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3)
Accessed by thread T13003:
  #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440)
  wandboard-org#1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40)
  wandboard-org#2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20)
  wandboard-org#3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260)
  wandboard-org#4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360)
  wandboard-org#5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30)
  wandboard-org#6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140)
  wandboard-org#7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0)
  torvalds#8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130)
  torvalds#9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30)
  torvalds#10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)

Allocated by thread T5167:
  #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0)
  wandboard-org#1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500)
  wandboard-org#2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90)
  wandboard-org#3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0)
  wandboard-org#4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40)
  wandboard-org#5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430)
  wandboard-org#6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0)
  wandboard-org#7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710)
  torvalds#8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50)
  torvalds#9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0)
  torvalds#10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0)
  torvalds#11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50)
  torvalds#12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)

Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb
  ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap redzone:          fa
  Heap kmalloc redzone:  fb
  Freed heap region:     fd
  Shadow gap:            fe

The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;'

Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug
occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to
parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered
is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop
that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because
there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine
what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size.

Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character
with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul
character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory.

Luckily, only root user has write access to this file.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

kernel/trace/trace.c

@@ -826,9 +826,12 @@ int trace_get_user(struct trace_parser *parser, const char __user *ubuf,
 	if (isspace(ch)) {
 		parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;
 		parser->cont = false;
-	} else {
+	} else if (parser->idx < parser->size - 1) {
 		parser->cont = true;
 		parser->buffer[parser->idx++] = ch;
+	} else {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	*ppos += read;