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Non-critical crash in efi_create_mapping with linux-asahi-5.17.rc6.20220301-4 #17

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kit-ty-kate opened this issue Mar 5, 2022 · 1 comment

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@kit-ty-kate
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[...]
[    0.000646] rcu: Hierarchical SRCU implementation.
[    0.000827] Remapping and enabling EFI services.
[    0.000839] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.000840] UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?
[    0.000843] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c:28 efi_create_mapping+0x7c/0x16c
[    0.000850] Modules linked in:
[    0.000852] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-asahi-next-20220301-4-asahi-ARCH #4
[    0.000854] Hardware name: Apple MacBook Air (M1, 2020) (DT)
[    0.000856] pstate: 60000009 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[    0.000859] pc : efi_create_mapping+0x7c/0x16c
[    0.000861] lr : efi_create_mapping+0x7c/0x16c
[    0.000864] sp : ffff8000093bbd40
[    0.000864] x29: ffff8000093bbd40 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[    0.000868] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[    0.000870] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff8000092cc000
[    0.000873] x20: ffff800009270a20 x19: ffff0003731bd388 x18: 0000000000000050
[    0.000875] x17: 00000000aa9d7b42 x16: 000000003fc4a5b8 x15: fffffffffffc1488
[    0.000878] x14: 000000009f4d7c9d x13: ffff80000914e240 x12: 00000000000000de
[    0.000880] x11: 000000000000004a x10: ffff8000091fe930 x9 : ffff80000914e240
[    0.000883] x8 : 00000000ffffdfff x7 : ffff8000091fe240 x6 : 00000000000006f0
[    0.000886] x5 : 0000000000017ff4 x4 : 00000000ffffe04a x3 : 0000000000000000
[    0.000888] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000001e34040
[    0.000891] Call trace:
[    0.000891]  efi_create_mapping+0x7c/0x16c
[    0.000894]  arm_enable_runtime_services+0x12c/0x1e0
[    0.000897]  do_one_initcall+0x50/0x1c0
[    0.000899]  kernel_init_freeable+0x118/0x28c
[    0.000901]  kernel_init+0x28/0x140
[    0.000905]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[    0.000907] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    0.001013] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...
[    0.001091] Detected VIPT I-cache on CPU1
[... continues as normal]

This seems to happen everytime I boot the machine (t8103).
It’s not critical and works well otherwise but just in case it’s something to track I’m creating this issue here.

Feel free to close it if it’s not the right place for this. I can also link the entire dmesg output if needed.

@marcan
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marcan commented Mar 15, 2022

This was a u-boot bug and should be fixed now.

@marcan marcan closed this as completed Mar 15, 2022
marcan pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 22, 2022
Hulk Robot reported a issue:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500
Write of size 4105 at addr ffff8881675ef5f4 by task syz-executor.0/7092

CPU: 1 PID: 7092 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90-dirty #17
Call Trace:
[...]
 memcpy+0x34/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1747
 ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set+0x86/0x2a0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2205
 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x940/0x1300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2386
 ext4_xattr_set+0x1da/0x300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498
 __vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x170 fs/xattr.c:149
 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11b/0x2a0 fs/xattr.c:180
 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x17b/0x250 fs/xattr.c:238
 vfs_setxattr+0xed/0x270 fs/xattr.c:255
 setxattr+0x235/0x330 fs/xattr.c:520
 path_setxattr+0x176/0x190 fs/xattr.c:539
 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:561 [inline]
 __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:557 [inline]
 __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xc2/0x160 fs/xattr.c:557
 do_syscall_64+0xdf/0x530 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x459fe9
RSP: 002b:00007fa5e54b4c08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bd
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000051bf60 RCX: 0000000000459fe9
RDX: 00000000200003c0 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 000000000051bf60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000001009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc73c93fc0 R14: 000000000051bf60 R15: 00007fa5e54b4d80
[...]
==================================================================

Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
ext4_xattr_set
  ext4_xattr_set_handle
    ext4_xattr_ibody_find
      >> s->end < s->base
      >> no EXT4_STATE_XATTR
      >> xattr_check_inode is not executed
    ext4_xattr_ibody_set
      ext4_xattr_set_entry
       >> size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base
       >> UAF in memcpy

we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands:
    mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda
    mount -o debug_want_extra_isize=128 /dev/sda /mnt
    touch /mnt/file
    setfattr -n user.cat -v `seq -s z 4096|tr -d '[:digit:]'` /mnt/file

In ext4_xattr_ibody_find, we have the following assignment logic:
  header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode)
         = raw_inode + EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + i_extra_isize
  is->s.base = IFIRST(header)
             = header + sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header)
  is->s.end = raw_inode + s_inode_size

In ext4_xattr_set_entry
  min_offs = s->end - s->base
           = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize -
	     sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header)
  last = s->first
  free = min_offs - ((void *)last - s->base) - sizeof(__u32)
       = s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize -
         sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) - sizeof(__u32)

In the calculation formula, all values except s_inode_size and
i_extra_size are fixed values. When i_extra_size is the maximum value
s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE, min_offs is -4 and free is -8.
The value overflows. As a result, the preceding issue is triggered when
memcpy is executed.

Therefore, when finding xattr or setting xattr, check whether
there is space for storing xattr in the inode to resolve this issue.

Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
marcan pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 28, 2023
When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following
hang may be observed.

 Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver:
 PID: 1        TASK: ffff965400e5a340  CPU: 24   COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow"
  #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb
  #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d
  #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc
  #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930
  #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf]
  #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513
  #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa
  #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc
  #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e
  #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429
 #10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4
 #11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice]
 #12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice]
 #13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice]
 #14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1
 #15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386
 #16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870
 #17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6
 #18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159
 #19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc
 #20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d
 #21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169
 #22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b
     RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7  RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98  RFLAGS: 00000202
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 0000000000000000  RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7
     RDX: 0000000001234567  RSI: 0000000028121969  RDI: 00000000fee1dead
     RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 00007fffbcc54e90
     R10: 00007fffbcc55050  R11: 0000000000000202  R12: 0000000000000005
     R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 00007fffbcc55af0  R15: 0000000000000000
     ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked.
In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE.
In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point
calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one
of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If
that's not the case it sleeps forever.
So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will
hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE.

Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE,
as we already went through iavf_shutdown().

Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove")
Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove")
Reported-by: Marius Cornea <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
marcan pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 14, 2023
Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is
created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath
accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel
Oops.

Here is an example:

  PID: 59693    TASK: ffff0005f4f51500  CPU: 0    COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd"
   #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4
   #1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc
   #2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60
   #3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58
   #4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388
   #5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c
   #6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68
   #7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch]
   ...

  PID: 58682    TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00  CPU: 0    COMMAND: "kworker/0:3"
   #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758
   #1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994
   #2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8
   #3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c
   #4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8
   #5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4
   #6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4
   #7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710
   #8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74
   #9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac
  #10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24
  #11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc
  #12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch]
  #13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch]
  #14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch]
  #15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch]
  #16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch]
  #17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90

We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport
alloc and free functions to solve this.

Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure")
Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets")
Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Aaron Conole <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
marcan pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 19, 2024
When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a
cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when
removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be
dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request().

  PID: 3669   TASK: ffff88aef892c000  CPU: 28  COMMAND: "kworker/28:0"
   #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34
   #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2
   #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f
   #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582
   #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4
      [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291]
      RIP: ffffffff8127e72b  RSP: ffff88aa841ef778  RFLAGS: 00000046
      RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff88b01f849700  RCX: ffffffff8127e47e
      RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000004  RDI: ffffffff83857ec0
      RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8   R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa   R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa
      R10: 0000000000000001  R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9  R12: 0000000000740000
      R13: ffff88b01f849708  R14: 0000000000000003  R15: ffffed1603f092e1
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0000
  -- <NMI exception stack> --
   #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b
   #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4
   #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363
   #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma]
   #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma]
   #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma]
   #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma]
   #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb
   #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6
   #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278
   #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23
   #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice]
   #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice]
   #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a
   #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff
   #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0
   #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f

Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
svenpeter42 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 17, 2024
commit 8678b10 upstream.

An errant disk backup on my desktop got into debugfs and triggered the
following deadlock scenario in the amdgpu debugfs files. The machine
also hard-resets immediately after those lines are printed (although I
wasn't able to reproduce that part when reading by hand):

[ 1318.016074][ T1082] ======================================================
[ 1318.016607][ T1082] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 1318.017107][ T1082] 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 Not tainted
[ 1318.017598][ T1082] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 1318.018096][ T1082] tar/1082 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1318.018585][ T1082] ffff98c44175d6a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x40/0x80
[ 1318.019084][ T1082]
[ 1318.019084][ T1082] but task is already holding lock:
[ 1318.020052][ T1082] ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu]
[ 1318.020607][ T1082]
[ 1318.020607][ T1082] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 1318.020607][ T1082]
[ 1318.022081][ T1082]
[ 1318.022081][ T1082] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 1318.023083][ T1082]
[ 1318.023083][ T1082] -> #2 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 1318.024114][ T1082]        __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xe0/0x12f0
[ 1318.024639][ T1082]        ww_mutex_lock+0x32/0x90
[ 1318.025161][ T1082]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x18a/0x330
[ 1318.025683][ T1082]        do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350
[ 1318.026210][ T1082]        kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310
[ 1318.026728][ T1082]        kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0
[ 1318.027242][ T1082]        ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
[ 1318.027759][ T1082]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[ 1318.028281][ T1082]
[ 1318.028281][ T1082] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 1318.029297][ T1082]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x16c/0x330
[ 1318.029790][ T1082]        do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350
[ 1318.030263][ T1082]        kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310
[ 1318.030722][ T1082]        kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0
[ 1318.031168][ T1082]        ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
[ 1318.031598][ T1082]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[ 1318.032011][ T1082]
[ 1318.032011][ T1082] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 1318.032778][ T1082]        __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680
[ 1318.033141][ T1082]        lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0
[ 1318.033487][ T1082]        __might_fault+0x58/0x80
[ 1318.033814][ T1082]        amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu]
[ 1318.034181][ T1082]        full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80
[ 1318.034487][ T1082]        vfs_read+0xa7/0x360
[ 1318.034788][ T1082]        ksys_read+0x70/0xf0
[ 1318.035085][ T1082]        do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180
[ 1318.035375][ T1082]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[ 1318.035664][ T1082]
[ 1318.035664][ T1082] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1318.035664][ T1082]
[ 1318.036487][ T1082] Chain exists of:
[ 1318.036487][ T1082]   &mm->mmap_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex
[ 1318.036487][ T1082]
[ 1318.037310][ T1082]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1318.037310][ T1082]
[ 1318.037838][ T1082]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 1318.038101][ T1082]        ----                    ----
[ 1318.038350][ T1082]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[ 1318.038590][ T1082]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire);
[ 1318.038839][ T1082]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[ 1318.039083][ T1082]   rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
[ 1318.039328][ T1082]
[ 1318.039328][ T1082]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1318.039328][ T1082]
[ 1318.040029][ T1082] 1 lock held by tar/1082:
[ 1318.040259][ T1082]  #0: ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu]
[ 1318.040560][ T1082]
[ 1318.040560][ T1082] stack backtrace:
[ 1318.041053][ T1082] CPU: 22 PID: 1082 Comm: tar Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 3316c85d50e282c5643b075d1f01a4f6365e39c2
[ 1318.041329][ T1082] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B650 AORUS PRO AX/B650 AORUS PRO AX, BIOS F20 12/14/2023
[ 1318.041614][ T1082] Call Trace:
[ 1318.041895][ T1082]  <TASK>
[ 1318.042175][ T1082]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
[ 1318.042460][ T1082]  check_noncircular+0x145/0x160
[ 1318.042743][ T1082]  __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680
[ 1318.043022][ T1082]  lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0
[ 1318.043301][ T1082]  ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80
[ 1318.043580][ T1082]  ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80
[ 1318.043856][ T1082]  __might_fault+0x58/0x80
[ 1318.044131][ T1082]  ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80
[ 1318.044408][ T1082]  amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu 8fe2afaa910cbd7654c8cab23563a94d6caebaab]
[ 1318.044749][ T1082]  full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80
[ 1318.045042][ T1082]  vfs_read+0xa7/0x360
[ 1318.045333][ T1082]  ksys_read+0x70/0xf0
[ 1318.045623][ T1082]  do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180
[ 1318.045913][ T1082]  ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.046201][ T1082]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 1318.046487][ T1082]  ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.046773][ T1082]  ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.047057][ T1082]  ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.047337][ T1082]  ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.047611][ T1082]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[ 1318.047887][ T1082] RIP: 0033:0x7f480b70a39d
[ 1318.048162][ T1082] Code: 91 ba 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb b2 e8 18 a3 01 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d a9 3c 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5b c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 48 83
[ 1318.048769][ T1082] RSP: 002b:00007ffde77f5c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 1318.049083][ T1082] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000800 RCX: 00007f480b70a39d
[ 1318.049392][ T1082] RDX: 0000000000000800 RSI: 000055c9f2120c00 RDI: 0000000000000008
[ 1318.049703][ T1082] RBP: 0000000000000800 R08: 000055c9f2120a94 R09: 0000000000000007
[ 1318.050011][ T1082] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c9f2120c00
[ 1318.050324][ T1082] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000000000000800
[ 1318.050638][ T1082]  </TASK>

amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read() holds a reservation when it calls
put_user(), which may fault and acquire the mmap_sem. This violates
the established locking order.

Bounce the mqd data through a kernel buffer to get put_user() out of
the illegal section.

Fixes: 445d85e ("drm/amdgpu: add debugfs interface for reading MQDs")
Cc: [email protected] # v6.5+
Reviewed-by: Shashank Sharma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 29, 2024
[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ]

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 29, 2024
Test runners on debug kernels occasionally fail with:

 # #  RUN           tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async ...
 # # tls.c:1883:poll_partial_rec_async:Expected poll(&pfd, 1, 5) (0) == 1 (1)
 # # tls.c:1870:poll_partial_rec_async:Expected status (256) == 0 (0)
 # # poll_partial_rec_async: Test failed at step #17
 # #          FAIL  tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async
 # not ok 699 tls_err.13_aes_gcm.poll_partial_rec_async
 # # FAILED: 698 / 699 tests passed.

This points to the second poll() in the test which is expected
to wait for the sender to send the rest of the data.
Apparently under some conditions that doesn't happen within 5ms,
bump the timeout to 20ms.

Fixes: 23fcb62 ("selftests: tls: add tests for poll behavior")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 15, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Gainey <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Clark <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Dong <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Oliver Upton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paran Lee <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <[email protected]>
Cc: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Yanteng Si <[email protected]>
Cc: Yicong Yang <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 6, 2024
commit be346c1 upstream.

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 29, 2024
The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
Cc: Gang He <[email protected]>
Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 9, 2024
[ Upstream commit a699781 ]

A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 16, 2024
A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
WhatAmISupposedToPutHere pushed a commit to WhatAmISupposedToPutHere/linux that referenced this issue Oct 30, 2024
[ Upstream commit dc09f00 ]

During noirq suspend phase the Raspberry Pi power driver suffer of
firmware property timeouts. The reason is that the IRQ of the underlying
BCM2835 mailbox is disabled and rpi_firmware_property_list() will always
run into a timeout [1].

Since the VideoCore side isn't consider as a wakeup source, set the
IRQF_NO_SUSPEND flag for the mailbox IRQ in order to keep it enabled
during suspend-resume cycle.

[1]
PM: late suspend of devices complete after 1.754 msecs
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 438 at drivers/firmware/raspberrypi.c:128
 rpi_firmware_property_list+0x204/0x22c
Firmware transaction 0x00028001 timeout
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 438 Comm: bash Tainted: G         C         6.9.3-dirty AsahiLinux#17
Hardware name: BCM2835
Call trace:
unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0x88/0xec
__warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x7c/0xb0
warn_slowpath_fmt from rpi_firmware_property_list+0x204/0x22c
rpi_firmware_property_list from rpi_firmware_property+0x68/0x8c
rpi_firmware_property from rpi_firmware_set_power+0x54/0xc0
rpi_firmware_set_power from _genpd_power_off+0xe4/0x148
_genpd_power_off from genpd_sync_power_off+0x7c/0x11c
genpd_sync_power_off from genpd_finish_suspend+0xcc/0xe0
genpd_finish_suspend from dpm_run_callback+0x78/0xd0
dpm_run_callback from device_suspend_noirq+0xc0/0x238
device_suspend_noirq from dpm_suspend_noirq+0xb0/0x168
dpm_suspend_noirq from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x1b8/0x5ac
suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x254/0x2e4
pm_suspend from state_store+0xa8/0xd4
state_store from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x1a0
kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x12c/0x184
vfs_write from ksys_write+0x78/0xc0
ksys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54
Exception stack(0xcc93dfa8 to 0xcc93dff0)
[...]
PM: noirq suspend of devices complete after 3095.584 msecs

Link: raspberrypi/firmware#1894
Fixes: 0bae6af ("mailbox: Enable BCM2835 mailbox support")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jassi Brar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
WhatAmISupposedToPutHere pushed a commit to WhatAmISupposedToPutHere/linux that referenced this issue Oct 30, 2024
commit 9af2efe upstream.

The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only
have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used.

So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in
the hist entry can be garbage.  So it shouldn't access it
unconditionally.

I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles.

  $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true

  $ sudo perf report -s cgroup

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  48		return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  #1  0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344
  #2  0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385
  #3  0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true)
      at util/hist.c:644
  AsahiLinux#4  0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761
  AsahiLinux#5  0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779
  AsahiLinux#6  0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015
  AsahiLinux#7  0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0)
      at util/hist.c:1260
  AsahiLinux#8  0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0,
      machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334
  AsahiLinux#9  0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232
  AsahiLinux#10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271
  AsahiLinux#11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0,
      file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354
  AsahiLinux#12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132
  AsahiLinux#13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
  AsahiLinux#14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
  AsahiLinux#15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342
  AsahiLinux#16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60)
      at util/session.c:780
  AsahiLinux#17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688,
      file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406

As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a
value.  This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume
whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same.  I only checked the
'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same).

Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Fleming <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 7, 2024
[ Upstream commit 826cc42 ]

My colleague Wupeng found the following problems during fault injection:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff809d073
PGD 6e648067 P4D 123ec8067 PUD 123ec4067 PMD 100e38067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 755 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #17
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__asan_load8+0x4c/0xa0
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 blkdev_put_whole+0x41/0x70
 bdev_release+0x1a3/0x250
 blkdev_release+0x11/0x20
 __fput+0x1d7/0x4a0
 task_work_run+0xfc/0x180
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1de/0x1f0
 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x170
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

loop_init() is calling loop_add() after __register_blkdev() succeeds and
is ignoring disk_add() failure from loop_add(), for loop_add() failure
is not fatal and successfully created disks are already visible to
bdev_open().

brd_init() is currently calling brd_alloc() before __register_blkdev()
succeeds and is releasing successfully created disks when brd_init()
returns an error. This can cause UAF for the latter two case:

case 1:
    T1:
modprobe brd
  brd_init
    brd_alloc(0) // success
      add_disk
        disk_scan_partitions
          bdev_file_open_by_dev // alloc file
          fput // won't free until back to userspace
    brd_alloc(1) // failed since mem alloc error inject
  // error path for modprobe will release code segment
  // back to userspace
  __fput
    blkdev_release
      bdev_release
        blkdev_put_whole
          bdev->bd_disk->fops->release // fops is freed now, UAF!

case 2:
    T1:                            T2:
modprobe brd
  brd_init
    brd_alloc(0) // success
                                   open(/dev/ram0)
    brd_alloc(1) // fail
  // error path for modprobe

                                   close(/dev/ram0)
                                   ...
                                   /* UAF! */
                                   bdev->bd_disk->fops->release

Fix this problem by following what loop_init() does. Besides,
reintroduce brd_devices_mutex to help serialize modifications to
brd_list.

Fixes: 7f9b348 ("brd: convert to blk_alloc_disk/blk_cleanup_disk")
Reported-by: Wupeng Ma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 11, 2024
commit 17af2b3 upstream.

The workqueue should be destroyed in mtk_jpeg_core.c since commit
09aea13 ("media: mtk-jpeg: refactor some variables"), otherwise
the below calltrace can be easily triggered.

[  677.862514] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000023
[  677.863633] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]
...
[  677.879654] CPU: 6 PID: 1071 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G           O       6.8.12-mtk+gfa1a78e5d24b+ #17
...
[  677.882838] pc : destroy_workqueue+0x3c/0x770
[  677.883413] lr : mtk_jpegdec_destroy_workqueue+0x70/0x88 [mtk_jpeg_dec_hw]
[  677.884314] sp : ffff80008ad974f0
[  677.884744] x29: ffff80008ad974f0 x28: ffff0000d7115580 x27: ffff0000dd691070
[  677.885669] x26: ffff0000dd691408 x25: ffff8000844af3e0 x24: ffff80008ad97690
[  677.886592] x23: ffff0000e051d400 x22: ffff0000dd691010 x21: dfff800000000000
[  677.887515] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffff800085397ac0
[  677.888438] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff8000801b87c8 x15: 1ffff000115b2e10
[  677.889361] x14: 00000000f1f1f1f1 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffff7000115b2e4d
[  677.890285] x11: 1ffff000115b2e4c x10: ffff7000115b2e4c x9 : ffff80000aa43e90
[  677.891208] x8 : 00008fffeea4d1b4 x7 : ffff80008ad97267 x6 : 0000000000000001
[  677.892131] x5 : ffff80008ad97260 x4 : ffff7000115b2e4d x3 : 0000000000000000
[  677.893054] x2 : 0000000000000023 x1 : dfff800000000000 x0 : 0000000000000118
[  677.893977] Call trace:
[  677.894297]  destroy_workqueue+0x3c/0x770
[  677.894826]  mtk_jpegdec_destroy_workqueue+0x70/0x88 [mtk_jpeg_dec_hw]
[  677.895677]  devm_action_release+0x50/0x90
[  677.896211]  release_nodes+0xe8/0x170
[  677.896688]  devres_release_all+0xf8/0x178
[  677.897219]  device_unbind_cleanup+0x24/0x170
[  677.897785]  device_release_driver_internal+0x35c/0x480
[  677.898461]  device_release_driver+0x20/0x38
...
[  677.912665] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 09aea13 ("media: mtk-jpeg: refactor some variables")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jannau pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 11, 2024
commit dc8aea4 upstream.

In binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc->nodes with the
proc->inner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped in
order to acquire the node->lock first (lock nesting order). This can
race with binder_node_release() and trigger a use-after-free:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff53c04c29dd04 by task freeze/640

  CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 640 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #17
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c
   binder_add_freeze_work+0x148/0x478
   binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190

  Allocated by task 637:
   __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x12c/0x27c
   binder_new_node+0x50/0x700
   binder_transaction+0x35ac/0x6f74
   binder_thread_write+0xfb8/0x42a0
   binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x25ac
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190

  Freed by task 637:
   kfree+0xf0/0x330
   binder_thread_read+0x1e88/0x3a68
   binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x25ac
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190
  ==================================================================

Fix the race by taking a temporary reference on the node before
releasing the proc->inner lock. This ensures the node remains alive
while in use.

Fixes: d579b04 ("binder: frozen notification")
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Todd Kjos <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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