deps: upgrade openssl sources to 1.0.1t

This just replaces all sources of openssl-1.0.1t.tar.gz
into deps/openssl/openssl.

Fixes: #6458
PR-URL: #6553
Reviewed-By: Ben Noordhuis <[email protected]>

deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,103 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1s and 1.0.1t [3 May 2016]
+
+  *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
+
+     A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+     when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+     AES-NI.
+
+     This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+     attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
+     constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+     compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+     checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+     bytes.
+
+     This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+     (CVE-2016-2107)
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+
+     An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+     Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+     amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+     corruption.
+
+     Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by
+     the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+     OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+     from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+     vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+     with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+
+     This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-2105)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+
+     An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+     is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+     EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+     resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+     internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+     forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+     the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+     specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+     EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+     therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+     one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+     internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+     EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+     Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+     of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+     instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+
+     This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-2106)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
+
+     When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+     a short invalid encoding can casuse allocation of large amounts of memory
+     potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
+
+     Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+     affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+     Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+     applications are not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+     (CVE-2016-2109)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) EBCDIC overread
+
+     ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+     using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+     in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
+
+     This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-2176)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+     callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+     [Todd Short]
+
+  *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list.  This removes singles DES from the
+     default.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+     methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
  Changes between 1.0.1r and 1.0.1s [1 Mar 2016]
 
   * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.

deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.1r
+VERSION=1.0.1t
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.1
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ SHLIB_MAJOR=1
 SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
 SHLIB_EXT=
 PLATFORM=dist
-OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
+OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl2 no-store no-unit-test no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
 CONFIGURE_ARGS=dist
 SHLIB_TARGET=
 
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
 
 CC= cc
 CFLAG= -O
-DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
 PEX_LIBS= 
 EX_LIBS= 
 EXE_EXT= 

deps/openssl/openssl/Makefile.bak

@@ -4,18 +4,18 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.1r-dev
+VERSION=1.0.1t
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.1
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
 SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=
 SHLIB_MAJOR=1
 SHLIB_MINOR=0.0
-SHLIB_EXT=
-PLATFORM=gcc
-OPTIONS= no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-store no-unit-test no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
-CONFIGURE_ARGS=gcc
-SHLIB_TARGET=
+SHLIB_EXT=.so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
+PLATFORM=linux-x86_64
+OPTIONS=-Wa,--noexecstack no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-md2 no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-sctp no-shared no-ssl2 no-store no-unit-test no-weak-ssl-ciphers no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic static-engine
+CONFIGURE_ARGS=linux-x86_64 -Wa,--noexecstack
+SHLIB_TARGET=linux-shared
 
 # HERE indicates where this Makefile lives.  This can be used to indicate
 # where sub-Makefiles are expected to be.  Currently has very limited usage,
@@ -60,10 +60,10 @@ OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
 # PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests.
 
 CC= gcc
-CFLAG= -O3
-DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
+CFLAG= -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -Wa,--noexecstack -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DAES_ASM -DVPAES_ASM -DBSAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM
+DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2 -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
 PEX_LIBS= 
-EX_LIBS= 
+EX_LIBS= -ldl
 EXE_EXT= 
 ARFLAGS= 
 AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r
@@ -88,22 +88,22 @@ ASFLAG=$(CFLAG)
 PROCESSOR= 
 
 # CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets
-CPUID_OBJ= mem_clr.o
-BN_ASM= bn_asm.o
+CPUID_OBJ= x86_64cpuid.o
+BN_ASM= x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
 DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o
-AES_ENC= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o
+AES_ENC= aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o
 BF_ENC= bf_enc.o
 CAST_ENC= c_enc.o
-RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o
+RC4_ENC= rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o
 RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o
-MD5_ASM_OBJ= 
-SHA1_ASM_OBJ= 
+MD5_ASM_OBJ= md5-x86_64.o
+SHA1_ASM_OBJ= sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o
 RMD160_ASM_OBJ= 
-WP_ASM_OBJ= wp_block.o
-CMLL_ENC= camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o
-MODES_ASM_OBJ= 
+WP_ASM_OBJ= wp-x86_64.o
+CMLL_ENC= cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o
+MODES_ASM_OBJ= ghash-x86_64.o
 ENGINES_ASM_OBJ= 
-PERLASM_SCHEME= 
+PERLASM_SCHEME= elf
 
 # KRB5 stuff
 KRB5_INCLUDES=
@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ LIBS=   libcrypto.a libssl.a
 SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
 SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
 SHARED_LIBS=
-SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=
-SHARED_LDFLAGS=
+SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS=.so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR) .so
+SHARED_LDFLAGS=-m64
 
 GENERAL=        Makefile
 BASENAME=       openssl

deps/openssl/openssl/NEWS

@@ -5,6 +5,19 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1s and OpenSSL 1.0.1t [3 May 2016]
+
+      o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107)
+      o Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105)
+      o Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2106)
+      o Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109)
+      o EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176)
+      o Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+        callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+      o Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list.  This removes singles DES from
+        the default.
+      o Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option.
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1r and OpenSSL 1.0.1s [1 Mar 2016]
 
       o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.

deps/openssl/openssl/README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1s 1 Mar 2016
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1t 3 May 2016
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

deps/openssl/openssl/apps/pkcs7.c

@@ -235,12 +235,16 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
         i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
         switch (i) {
         case NID_pkcs7_signed:
-            certs = p7->d.sign->cert;
-            crls = p7->d.sign->crl;
+            if (p7->d.sign != NULL) {
+                certs = p7->d.sign->cert;
+                crls = p7->d.sign->crl;
+            }
             break;
         case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
-            certs = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
-            crls = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl;
+            if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped != NULL) {
+                certs = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
+                crls = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl;
+            }
             break;
         default:
             break;

deps/openssl/openssl/apps/s_client.c

@@ -180,13 +180,6 @@ typedef unsigned int u_int;
 # include <fcntl.h>
 #endif
 
-/* Use Windows API with STD_INPUT_HANDLE when checking for input?
-   Don't look at OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS for this, since it is always defined if
-   OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS is defined */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) && defined(STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
-#define OPENSSL_USE_STD_INPUT_HANDLE
-#endif
-
 #undef PROG
 #define PROG    s_client_main
 
@@ -1591,16 +1584,17 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
                     tv.tv_usec = 0;
                     i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
                                NULL, &tv);
-#if defined(OPENSSL_USE_STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+                    if (!i && (!_kbhit() || !read_tty))
+                        continue;
+# else
                     if (!i && (!((_kbhit())
                                  || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 ==
                                      WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle
                                                          (STD_INPUT_HANDLE),
                                                          0)))
                                || !read_tty))
                         continue;
-#else
-                    if(!i && (!_kbhit() || !read_tty) ) continue;
 # endif
                 } else
                     i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds,
@@ -1799,12 +1793,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
             }
         }
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
-#if defined(OPENSSL_USE_STD_INPUT_HANDLE)
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)
+        else if (_kbhit())
+# else
         else if ((_kbhit())
                  || (WAIT_OBJECT_0 ==
                      WaitForSingleObject(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), 0)))
-#else
-        else if (_kbhit())
 # endif
 #elif defined (OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
         else if (_kbhit())

deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_bytes.c

@@ -200,13 +200,13 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
     } else {
         if (len != 0) {
             if ((ret->length < len) || (ret->data == NULL)) {
-                if (ret->data != NULL)
-                    OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
                 s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1);
                 if (s == NULL) {
                     i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
                     goto err;
                 }
+                if (ret->data != NULL)
+                    OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
             } else
                 s = ret->data;
             memcpy(s, p, (int)len);

deps/openssl/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c

@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x)
 #endif
 
 #define HEADER_SIZE   8
+#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
 static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 {
     BUF_MEM *b;
@@ -217,29 +218,44 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
             /* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
             want = c.slen;
             if (want > (len - off)) {
+                size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
+
                 want -= (len - off);
                 if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */  ||
                     len + want < len) {
                     ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
                     goto err;
                 }
-                if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
-                    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                    goto err;
-                }
                 while (want > 0) {
-                    i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
-                    if (i <= 0) {
-                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
-                                ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+                    /*
+                     * Read content in chunks of increasing size
+                     * so we can return an error for EOF without
+                     * having to allocate the entire content length
+                     * in one go.
+                     */
+                    size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
+
+                    if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) {
+                        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                         goto err;
                     }
+                    want -= chunk;
+                    while (chunk > 0) {
+                        i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
+                        if (i <= 0) {
+                            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+                            goto err;
+                        }
                     /*
                      * This can't overflow because |len+want| didn't
                      * overflow.
                      */
-                    len += i;
-                    want -= i;
+                        len += i;
+                        chunk -= i;
+                    }
+                    if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
+                        chunk_max *= 2;
                 }
             }
             if (off + c.slen < off) {